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ABSTRACT 
This thesis, entitled Vulnerable Sovereignty: A 
cybernetic essay in political science_, attempts to 
investigate an area usually related to the sphere of military 
or national defence-Nevertheless sovereignty as conceived in 
this study enables the analysis to be set in a broader context 
using the cybernetic concept of information as a key 
explanatory element. 
It is clear that there are a variety of criteria 
and even ideological viewpoints used in the politic-? _ sciences 
and there may be some readers who do not agree wit'_ some 
judgments employed in this work. 
The thesis is organized into five chapters: in the 
first, the concept of information is analysec, beginning with 
its etymological origin and its relationship to cybernetics, 
system theory, computation, and, finally, its importance as 
a new factor of power. 
The second chapter attempts to establish the 
relationship between international entities which control 
information and the occurrence of economic problems such as 
'the energy crisis'. The introduction of the theme "Energy 
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crisis: threshold for a war" is used to investigate this 
relationship, to explain the main sources of this crisis 
and to assess the role of transnational corporations as 
manipulators of information in this situation. 
Chapter III, "Underdevelopment: the real crisis", 
analyses, within the framework of the underdevelopment and 
dependency theory, the historical and economic aspects of 
Latin-American dependence. Here the relationship between 
the process of underdevelopment and technology is discussed 
in detail. This analysis is fundamental in order to understand 
not only the technological dependence of the Latin American 
states but to assess the implications of this condition for 
their sovereignty. 
In chapter IV the problem of the vulnerability of 
the sovereignty of technologically dependent countries is 
discussed. A general concept of sovereignty, in the context 
of the international political system, is introduced in this 
chapter in order to analyse the links between transnational 
corporations and the trilogy: sovereignty, information and 
technology. This analysis is conducted from two points of 
view: first, within the context of the international political 
system; this will be referred to as TNCs within the 
international political system. Second, within the specific 
context of technologically dependent states. The economic 
and political vulnerability of some underdeveloped countries, 
established as a function of the deterioration of their 
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sovereignty, is shown in this chapter to be closely linked 
to the leakage of political and economic information. This 
leakage of information is explained as a consequence of the 
participation of foreign technology which is outside the 
control of the local interests in dependent economies. 
Finally, in chapter V some cybernetic alternatives 
are presented, the theme of war briefly mentioned in chapter 
II, is reconsidered in order to explain two decision levels 
which are treated as alternative approaches to the problems 
discussed throughout the work. These two decision levels 
are described here under the headings of "The peacetime 
alternative" and "The wartime alternative". 
The decisions at the first level(The peacetime 
alternative) require the analysis of the following questions. 
1. - Can a valid measure of the access of the 
information(data)implicit in the productive 
processof a country be formulated? 
In this section a method of measuring the information 
produced by the 64 industrial activities which, according 
to the United Nations International Classification Standard 
(ISICC) can be identified within the economy of any country, 
is suggested. 
The country studied is Venezuela: a full list of 
the 580 transnational corporations operating in its 64 
industrial categories has been elaborated and is included 
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in annex N°27. 
2. - Which changes should be considered 
in a 
strategic plan of access and control of 
information? 
In this section it is argued that no strategy of 
development for those underdeveloped countries which have 
resources would be successful if a strategy of control of 
information is not planned and executed first. However, the 
execution of such a strategy requires changes, and these do 
not occur either continuously or spontaneously, rather they 
are discrete and induced and could be measured and controlled. 
3. - How could a control of a goods and services 
information system help a nation to deal 
with destabilizing activities? 
In this section the possibility of developing a 
cybernetic mechanism capable-of producing suitable information 
with respect to the production system is reviewed. This mechanism 
would provide the user with vital information whenever the 
relative stability of the output of goods and services from 
a firm or industry was disturbed and threatened to become 
intentionally unstable. 
The decisions invoked at the second level, (The 
wartime alternative) require the analysis of two questions: 
1. - Could the idea of war be considered in the 
formulation of a strategy of development? 
survive" 
This section, "The cybernetic preparedness to 
discusses the implications of technological 
dependence in the light of the strategic relations between 
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the world super-powers. International war between the 
super-powerswould surely collapse the economy of any 
technologically dependent country because it would 
effectively cut off access to vital technology. But by 
severing the links of technological dependence the 
underdeveloped country would be forced to initiate 
independent development in order to subsist. Hence this 
section examines- whether or not those underdeveloped 
countries which have resources can initiate such independent 
development during peace time instead of waiting for war as 
a historical alternative. 
2. - Could the scheme of an 'economic closed system' 
stand as alternative for transformation and 
development in some Latin-American countries? 
This last section starts from the theoretical 
assumption that when a politically independent country 
(analysed as a system) does not possess sufficient resources 
it has to become an open system in order to survive; if it 
fails to obtain resources from the external world, it is 
then inevitably obliged to exchange sovereignty for the 
resources which it does not possess. However, if the assumption 
is changed, that is, the underdeveloped country possesses 
resources then it is possible to develop closed transformations. 
By guaranteeing an increment in sovereignty to levels 
compatible with the development options, this could allow 
the selected model, whatever might be its ideological basis, 
to be actually converted into a realisable alternative. 
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CHAPTERI 
1. -. Information: A new factor of power? 
When I control the actions of another person, 
I communicate a message to him, and although 
this message is in the imperative mood, the 
technique of communication does not differ 
from that of a message of fact. Furthermore, 
if my control is to be effective I must take 
cognizance of any messages from him which may 
indicate that the order is understood and has 
been obeyed. 
Norbert Wiener 1950(1) 
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1.1. - What does information mean? 
Because of the importance of the term "information", 
in the context of this study, I will try to explain it and 
define it in a broad context, which, starting from its 
etymological origin, should permit us finally to locate it 
clearly in the specific area of our interest. 
The word information comes from the Latin 
"informationem", which as the accusative of "informatio" 
signifies a representation, a sketch, a conception, an idea 
of something(2). 
Information, considered in ancient French and 
medieval English as "enformacion", in fact is a word formed 
by two vocables: "inform" and "ation". (3) 
Inform, which in the transitive and intransitive 
forms of the verb means "notify", "teach" comes from the 
Latin "informare" which means "give form to something", "model". 
"Action" a suffix which denotes action, process, 
state or condition, derives from the Latin "ationem". 
Nevertheless, the more general definition conceives 
of information as "the action and effect of informing". The 
majority of dictionaries consulted agree in this definition 
as the first meaning. 
For the Oxford English Dictionary(4), information is 
the action of Informing, forming or moulding the mind or the 
character, it is training, instruction, teaching, and the 
communication of knowledge. 
Depending on'the area of study, the meaning of the 
word varies. In the sphere of religious philosophy(5) it 
constitutes the action of informing, of giving a form. "L'homme 
est l'information supreme et comme la vivante synthýse des 
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forces creatrices du globe", writes D. Stern in "Essai sur 
la Liberte" Page 9. 
From the point of view of Jurisprudence and according 
to Oxford(4), Emil Litre(s), the Royal Academy of Spanish 
Language(6), and Le Robert(7), information is related to the 
juridical verification of a case. "the assembly of the facts 
which tend to establish the proof of an offence and to 
describe the offenders", "the action of informing, accusing 
or making charges against a person in a court or a magistrate"(4). 
"Instructions on which one proceeds to the search or the 
definition of a crime or misdemeanour". It is the instruction 
or complaint which proceeds to the investigation or 
registration of a crime or a default(s). 
Another traditional meaning of the word , in the 
field of social communication, press, radio, TV etc., cites 
information as the action of informing or communicating 
knowledge or news on some fact or occurrence, the action of 
telling what happened. In this sense there can be political, 
economic, sporting, financial and scientific information etc. (4). 
State information, or opinions transmitted by the 
means of communications and coming from institutions such as 
firms, political parties, ministries, organisations etc., also 
are included within this classification(7). 
In Biochemistry, on the other hand, information has 
a very special significance. The British scientific weekly 
"Nature" includes in its edition N°4357_(8) a work by J. D. 
Watson and F. H. Crick on the genetic implications of 
deoxyribonucleic acid in the structure of cells, pointing out 
that in one molecule there are many possible permutations, 
and the precise sequence of its bases obeys a code which 
carries the genetical information. 
In 1958, another article in the "Spectator"(9), 
indicated that complex molecules carry genetic information 
from one generation to the next. And in 1971 E. M. Dowben(10) 
pointed out that the genetic information transmitted is 
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determined by the composition of the amino acids of all the 
proteins synthesised by each cell. 
In the field of mathematics, information is defined 
as the quantity which represents the degree of choice 
exercised in selecting or individual formation of a symbol, 
sequence, message, etc., within a number of possibilities, and 
this is expressed logarithmically in terms of the statistical 
probabilities of ocurrence of the symbol or elements of the 
message(10). 
As we can see, the term "information" possesses a 
wide range of meaning which make difficult any classification 
of concepts denoted by the various uses of such a term. 
However, an interesting distinction is pointed out 
by C. M. Elstob(12), he coined two new words: Physical-information 
(p-information) and Semantic-information(s-information). 
"Physical-information", he said, "is what is dealt 
with in technical information theory as developed 
by Shannon and others. Studies of physical-information 
concern(at an agreed level of resolution) questions 
about the amount of form(pattern, or potential 
distinction). contained within a specified domain. 
It also concerns the preservation of form as it 
undergoes transformation and transmission. 
p-information flow exists(i. e. there is a channel 
for p-information)wherever correlation exists". 
According to Dr. Elstob, we cannot consider 
Semantic-information without any concern for p-information 
because always meaning and significance are conveyed by 
p-information carriers. So although we could say that 
theoretically all information should be actually p-information, 
the interesting thing from Elstob's view is that p-information, 
in the way he defines it, does not make any sense for its 
users if there is no transmission of meaning. 
"Information, as used in the everyday sense, he said, 
is much closer to s-information in its meaning than 
p-information. We are, of course, s-information users 
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and it is the transmission of meaning that 
concerns us in our interactions with one 
another and the world about us". 
From this point of view, the concept of information that 
the reader will find in this work should be considered as 
semantic-information. Only in points 1.2(Information and 
computation: informatics) and 5.1.3(Goods and services 
information system) can it be treated mainly as physical- 
information. 
Apart from the two areas of meaning associated 
with the word information (s. and p. ). already mentioned, 
other writers have distinguished a third area called 
"Pragmatic information". 
This third meaning concerns how information 
relates to the behaviour of information users -their actions, 
beliefs, aptitudes, plans etc. This will be particularly 
important when analysing the behaviour of the people involved 
in decision making processes. 
It is well know that human beings have a quite 
limited capacity to process data in order to extract informa- 
tion relevant to their interests and actions. Individuals in 
management and decision making positions have to face the 
problem of how to obtain pragmatically usefull information 
which is both reliable and comprehensible. This implies the 
need for a robust and flexible information filtering system, 
to work in conjunction with a sophisticated data gathering 
system, so that decision makers at all levels have access to 
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data that informs their actions and control responsibilities 
without overloading them with me-aningless data irrelevant to 
their particular functions. 
The design and implementation of such a pragmatic 
information system or cybernetic information system presents 
many problems which are as yet not completely solved. S. Beer 
has frequently drawn attention to the need for such informa- 
tion systems. Beer's work in Chile(1.23) involved an attempt 
to provide a pragmatically effective information system for 
the monitoring and control of economic behaviour and it 
introduced many useful ideas. 
It is recognized that an effective "Goods and 
services supply information system" has to be designed in 
accordance with the above principles. The'particular design 
problems that will have to be overcome are not discussed 
further in this work, but it should be stressed that a- 
pragmatically effective information system is essential if 
a nation is to gain control in terms of sovereignty. 
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1.2. - Cybernetics and information 
if 
The term Cybernetics, coming from the Greek word 
KV Qf pv-QW" (1 3) which meansto govern, conduct, which in Latin 
is guberno, gubernavi, gubernatum, and S,, Yu which 
means pilot, government and which in Latin is guber(14). 
This word, which still is in use by the Greeks to 
denominate the man who steered a boat, would have in that 
language a sound which in English script could be "Kybernet". 
The suffix "ics" is used to form names of arts and 
sciences. Formally this suffix is nothing but the plural of 
suffix "ic". It was formed in imitation of Greek "-ºKck " which 
comes from " 3K OS " used to form names of arts and sciences 
in Greek(15). 
This suffix was taken by Norbert Wiener, 1894- 
1964(16)together with the vocable "Kybernet" to denote the 
theory which he formulated and which later wouled be called 
"Cybernetics". 
The word cybernetics, in the Greek sense of the 
expression, was employed by Plato 400 years before the Christian 
era, and in modern times appeared for the first time in 
published form in 1884, in an essay on the Philosophy of 
Science written by Ampe're(17). 
Nevetheless it was not until after 1948, with the 
appearance of the book "Cybernetics: or Control and 
Communication in the Animal and the Machine" by Norbert Wiener 
(16)., that cybernetics began to acquire its value and 
significance as a contemporary science. 
"When I wrote the first edition of Cybernetics 
some thirteen years ego, I did it under some 
serious handicaps which had the effect of piling 
up unfortunate typographical errors, together 
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with a few errors of content. Now I believe the 
time has come to reconsider cybernetics, not 
merely as a program to be carry out at some 
period in the future, but as an existing science". 
So said Norbert Wiener in the Preface to the second 
edition of his book in 1961. (16). 
During the last 34 years, this new science has been 
transformed into an important instrument of analysis for the 
investigation of many phenomena, and has developed its own 
language and concepts, properties which allow it to treat many 
other disciplines in order to explain, in functional terms, 
the behaviour of the object of its study. 
Norbert Wiener defined cybernetics as "The science 
of control and communication in the animal and in the machine" 
Other definitions have been produced since this one. Neville 
Moray(18) for example, after pointing out that cybernetics is 
the study of the functioning of all classes of systems, 
defines it as "The Science of Applied Logic". 
The Russian scientist I. B. Novik(19) elaborates what 
he calls an operational definition for this new science-He 
said that cybernetics is 
"The science which analyses, in a functional way, 
the processes of direction and optimisation of 
complex dynamic systems in which information plays 
an essential part". 
I have chosen these three definitions, considering 
that they represent the essential content of the points of 
view which I will try to outline in this work. That is to 
say, I believe that cybernetics is the science of applied 
logic, as set out by Neville Moray in his definition, and 
intend to apply this logic to the cybernetic analysis of 
the role of information in the phenomenom of the vulnerability 
of technologically dependent economies. 
Also important for our analysis will be the 
definitions given by Wiener and Novik, above all if we consider 
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the significance which both of them assign to information. 
Wiener pointed out that "The role of information 
and the technique of measuring and transmitting information 
constitute a whole discipline for the engineer, for the 
physiologist, for the psychologist, and for the sociologist"(16) 
We already know from Wiener that information is 
something which can be measured in relation to its role. 
When we observe a phenomenom, we can determine its occurrence 
in terms of a numerical quantity, or numerical sequence; the 
gradual increase in the temperature registered by a thermometer 
in a given period, or the meteorological weather data, taken 
daily during a fixed lapse of time, can be represented as a 
continuous numerical series. 
When we observe something, we can work out a plan, 
map or model which reflects its behaviour in terms of time 
and sequence. What happens, discrete or continuous, to this 
thing or phenomenom, according to Wiener, constitutes 
information which can be measured. 
a Wiener established the formula" 
SZ to5Z Fi(xýfiýx)Jx 
in order to measure the amount of information. This formula, 
which later was used in the so-called Theory of Communication 
(20), enablesone to establish the minimum effort and cost 
required to transmit a message independently of the value, 
importance and consequences of the information'transmitted. 
According to Elstob's distinction between physical- 
information and semantic-information(12), which we quoted in 
point 1.1 of this chapter, we could include the appreciation 
of information given by Wiener within the physical-information, 
and it is in this that. we can note the difference in relation 
to the appreciation of information given by Novik. 
For Novik, "The successful development of methods of 
measuring information has relegated to a lower plane the 
qualitative analysis of the content of the information"(19) 
Novik pointed out that there is a difference between 
the formal communication of information, which is measurable, 
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quantifiable, etc., (p-information) and the meaningful 
communication of information. The latter not only should be 
quantifiable (p-information), but also represent in itself 
a meaning and significance(s-information), which corresponds 
to the reality which produces it. 
In other words, I. B. Novik, making use of the 
hypothesis of "reflex property" established by V. I. Lenin 
in his book "Materialism and Empiriocriticism"(21), concluded 
that information is the reflection of the material. 
Given that the interest of this work does not 
reside in demonstration of ideal or formal characteristics, 
but rather in practical uses of the study of information, the 
mathematical and philosophical aspects of its measurability 
and essence will not be treated in detail. 
From now on, what interests us is: 
1. - That information can be quantifiable = Wiener 
2. - That information inherently possesses significance 
and meaning which corresponds to the reality which 
produces it = Novik 
3. - That information plays an essential role in 
explaining the behaviour of any system. 
These aspects will be considered again in the 
analysis of chapters IV and V. 
Cybernetics has, until now, had 'a greater welcome 
among the so-called exact sciences than among the social 
sciences. Biology, medicine, physics, engineering have made 
up some of the fundamental fields of orientation of this 
science. 
The works of W. Ross Ashby(22), Stafford Beer(23), 
Neville Moray(18), Frank H. George(24), Gordon Pask(25), I. B. 
Novik(19), Jacques Guillaumaud(26) and Norbert Wiener himself 
in this areas demonstrate such an orientation. 
In the study of the regulation of economic processes 
one may distinguish the works of the Polish economists Oscar 
Lange(27) and Henryk Greniewski(28), the Rumanian Manea 
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Manescu as well as the already quoted Stafford Beer. 
In our case, we intend to locate and analyse the 
three aspects previously indicated within the ambit of the 
politico-technological relationships which are established 
between developed and underdeveloped economic systems. 
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1.3. - System Theory and information 
We could not talk about General System Theory 
without any reference to Ludwig von Bertalanffy(30). He 
himself claims to be the first to introduce the idea of a 
General System Theory. 
System theory is frequently identified with 
cybernetics and control theory. This is incorrect, said 
Bertalanffy: 
"Cybernetics is a theory of control systems based on 
communication(transfer of information) between system 
and environment and within the system and control(feedback) 
of the system's function in regard to environment. 
The model is of wide application but should not be 
identified with. system theory in general". 
To deal with the methodological problems of systems 
theory, Bertalanffy points out that there are many approaches. 
Among the more important are: Classical system theory, 
Computerization and simulation, Compartment theory, Set theory, 
Graph theory, Net theory, Information theory, Theory of 
automata, Game theory, Decision theory, Queuing theory and 
Cybernetics theory. 
But the so-called Hierarchic order theory, seems 
to be one of the mainstays of general system theory. According 
to this hierarchic order theory, we can see the universe as 
a tremendous hierarchy, from elementary particles to atomic 
nuclei, to atoms, molecules, to cells, organisms etc. to 
supra-individual organizations. 
So we could say that the universe is composed of 
parts, elements or organizations. Hence if we ask what does 
a system mean, the answer should be, in the broadest sense 
of the expression; any of such parts, elements, organizations 
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or even the universe itself. 
This consideration leads to the idea that if any 
entity can be considered as a system, then it seems legitimate 
to ask for a theory which can be useful, not for systems of 
a special kind, but for systems in general. And that is the aim 
of general system theory as Bertalanffy postulates: 
"General system theory is a general science of 
wholeness... Its subject matter is formulation 
of principles that are valid for system in 
general, whatever the nature of their component 
elements and the relations or 'forces' between 
them". 
There are correspondences in the principles that 
govern the behaviour of entities that are, intrinsically, 
widely different. These correspondences are possible because 
of structural similarities or isomorphisms showed by such 
entities. There are, for example, isomorphisms between 
biological systems like animal communities and human societies. 
However, Bertalanffy himself emphasizes the danger 
that general system theory may end up as meaningless analogies. 
"This danger indeed exists , he said, for example, it 
is a widespread idea to look at the state or the 
nation as an organism on a superordinate level. 
Such a theory, however, would constitute the 
foundation for a totalitarian state, within which 
the human individual appears like an insignificant 
cell in an organism or an unimportant worker in 
a beehive" 
We are ; got going to argue in depth about this matter. 
However, we must say that we disagree with Bertalanffy's 
statement. First of all because the reader should understand 
that when we analyse the nation as a system, we have to use 
analogies. And secondly because in the same way as we believe 
in freedom, we believe in control as the only way to guarantee 
freedom, control not upon man but upon his information. 
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With this brief introduction in mind, we will 
consider some further aspects of system theory and cybernetics 
relevant to our current interests. 
Depending on the relationship or interaction which 
any system maintains with its environment we may speak of open 
or closed systems and that is important from the point of 
view of the survival of the system. 
Living organisms are essentially open systems(i. e. 
they necessarily: exchange matter, energy and information with 
their environment), and it was precisely from the study of 
this type of systems, in the field of biology, which permitted 
the formulation of a principle called "Homeostasis". 
In biology, homeostasis is the phenomenon closely 
connected with the maintenance of balance in the living 
organism, and specifically with the process of thermoregulation 
in warm blooded animals. This process may be taken as a 
convenient example of homeostasis: 
Cooling or warming of the blood stimulates certain 
centres in the brain which "turn on" heat-producing(or cooling) 
mechanisms of the body. This action leads to bring blood 
temperature to a standard of normal temperature and the body 
temperature is monitored and adjusted in this way. Similar 
homeostatic mechanisms exist in the body for maintaining the 
constancy of a great number of physiochemical variables. 
Ross Ashby in chapter X of his book "An Introduction 
to Cybernetics"(22) gives a wide analysis on regulation in 
biological systems, "Regulation and control" he said, "is the 
central theme of cybernetics". Ashby points out how the concepts 
of regulation, information and survival are intimately tied 
together. ".. . all the organism's exteriorly-directed activities 
its higher activities are all similarly regulatory, i. e. 
homeostatic" he said. 
Apart from the biological point of view, the 
principle of homeostasis, or regulation, is very wide in its 
applications, covering as it does most of the activities in 
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physiology, sociology, economics and many of the activities 
in almost every branch of science and life. 
The principle of homeostasis is fundamental to the 
survival of many systems. According to Ashby(22, p197): 
"... the concepts of survival and stability can 
be brought into an exact relationship: and facts 
-and theorems about either can be used with the 
other, provided the exactness is sustained". 
The better the homeostasis, the better the system's 
chance of survival. So, we could say that the perfect 
homeostasis would be one that, in spite of disturbances, 
maintained the system's stability. 
One of Ashby's greatest achievements was to develop 
ways of measuring the amount or degree of homeostasis. His 
law of requisite variety allowed a precise statement of the 
theoretical maximum level of regulation that a given system 
could achieve. 
"In general'; said Ashby, 'an essential feature 
of the good regulator(homeostat) is that it 
blocks the flow of variety from disturbances 
to essential variables". 
By essential variables he meant those variables 
whose condition characterises what defines survival for an 
organism or social system. Ashby distinguishes two ways of 
blocking the flow of variety. The first way is to interpose 
something that acts as a simple passive block to the disturbances. 
The second form is what he called "the defence by skilled 
counter-action" that is, he explains: 
"... the defence that gets information about the 
disturbances to come, prepares for its arrival, 
and then meets the disturbance, which may be 
complex and mobile, with a defence that is 
equally complex and mobile". 
According to Ashby, where the law of requisite 
variety, in its quantitative form, develops its power is when 
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we come to consider a very large system. For example, Ashby 
ask himself, "by how much can a dictator control a country? 
It is commonly said that Hitler's control over Germany was 
total. So far as his power of regulation was concerned, the 
law says that his control amounted to just 1 man-power, and 
no more". 
Regulation and control are, on the other hand, 
intimately related. "The achievement of control may depend 
necessarily on the achievement of regulation", said Ashby. 
Ashby's views will be analysed further in chapter 
V of this work; homeostasis and control should be one of' 
the main aims of'the cyberrietic-alternatives pointed out in 
that chapter. 
The other cybernetician who gives a very interesting 
definition of homeostasis is Stafford Beer. He said in 
"Platform for Change"(p. 426): 
"Homeostasis is the tendency of a complex system to 
run towards an equilibrial state. This happens 
because the many parts of the complex system 
absorb each other's 
Now, the ultimately 
system may run(that 
capacity to disrupt the whole. 
stable state to which a viable 
state where its entropy is 
unity) is finally rigid and we call that death". 
However, if we want the survival of the system, then, 
according to Beer, there will be the absolute necessity of an 
extra concept of equilibrium. An equilibrium that is not 
fixed, but on the move. 
In order, to explain this concept, Beer makes use 
of Ashby's notion of "physiological limit"(22)(11/11 p. 209). 
Beer said: 
"It is necessary for a viable system to keep 
moving its stable point, but it cannot afford 
to move it so far or so fast that the system 
itself is blown apart. It must keep its degree 
and its rate of change within a tolerance fixed 
by its own physiology". 
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Finally R°er suggests: 
"Revolutions, violent or not, do blow 
societies apart because they deliberately 
take the inherited system outside its 
physiological limits". 
Another principle intimatelly linked with system 
theory and cybernetics is that of "Entropy". Conventional 
physics gave the first basis for the study of closed systems, 
i. e., systems which are considered to be isolated from their 
environment, and it was in the field of physical chemistry, 
and particularly in thermodynamics, where the concept of 
"entropy" was first employed. 
The second principle of thermodynamics states that 
in a closed system, a certain quantity, called entropy, must 
increase to a maximum, and eventually the process comes to 
a stop at a state of equilibrium. 
This principle of thermodynamics can be formulated 
in different ways. It can be said, for example, that entropy 
in a closed system could be considered as a measure of 
probability and that the state of equilibrium then, is the 
state in which the parts which interact in the system reach 
their most probable distribution. 
The most probable distribution of the velocities 
of molecules in a mixture of gases is a state of complete 
disorder. If we imagine a closed space in which we maintain 
two gases separate, the first with fast molecules, that is, 
a high temperature on the right side, and the second with 
slow molecules and low temperature at the left, when these 
gases are mixed the final distribution of their molecules 
is highly uncertain, therefore, we can say that their mQst 
probable distribution is that of maximum disorder or 
maximum entropy. 
For Beer(23, p. 28), entropy began life as a subtle 
measurement of energy flow. 
"In fact", he said, "the second principle was 
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popularised in the nineteen-thirties as 
demonstrating that the universe is 'running 
down'. If heat always flows from hotter 
to cooler bodies, and never the other 
way round, then(since everything is ultimately 
in contact with everything else) all heat 
will eventually even out". 
As energy inexorably flows in one direction and 
order is continually destroyed, entropy, as a measurement of 
energy flow, is always positive, but Beer suggests that its 
opposite or negative entropy which he calls "negentropy" is 
precisely information. 
"... although entropy inexorably tends to increase", said 
Beer, "that tendency is barred by. injections. of 
information. Every complex system is held in being 
at the balance of its entropy and negentropy". 
The breakdown of that balance into what we call "The 
Continental American System"(chapter IV) by virtue of a intcr- 
national war- and its-- impact on- a-Un Anw_rJan reality is what we 
will analyse in point 5.2.1(The cybernetic preparedness to 
survive)(chapter V). 
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1.4. - Information and computation: informatics 
First we shall consider the origin of the term 
"Informatics". According to an article published by the French 
daily Le Monde(31) the author of the word "informatics" was 
the Frenchman Philippe Dreyfus who, in 1962, suppressed the 
suffix -ion of information and replaced it by the suffix 
-ique which in French denote something relative to, and 
which, like -ics (remember the etymological definition which 
we gave for the word cybernetics) in English also is used 
to denote "something relative to" and in this way to create 
names for the arts and sciences. 
So that in this way "informatique" in French, 
"informatics" in English, and "informatica" in Spanish, 
constitutes, according to Dreyfus' version, a useful noun 
for the designation of the treatment of information. 
In 1967, the Academic Francaise(32) accepted the 
term informatics and defined it as the science of the rational 
treatment by automatic machines of information, considered.. 
as a support for knowledge and of the communications within 
the domains of technology, economics and sociology(Science 
du traitement rationnel, notamment par machines automatiques, 
de 11information consideree comme le support des connaissances 
et des communications dans les domaines technique, economique 
et social). 
In 1975 the Intergovernmental Bureau for Informatics 
(IBI)1an organisation created under ECOSOC UNESCO(33), defined 
it"as "Informatics is the systematic rational application of 
information to economic, social and political problems(34). 
The concept of informatics has been evolving and 
acquiring a much broader significance than that originally 
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established, but always tending to relate information with 
the technology directed to its processing. A definition of 
this type, also provided by the IBI is: 
"Informatics is the discipline which studies 
the phenomenon of information, information 
systems, and the elaboration, transmission 
and utilisation of information, principally, 
although not necessarily, with the aid of 
computers and telecommunications systems as 
instruments, for the benefit of humanity-1 
I 
This last definition demonstrates the inseparable 
relationship which presently exists between information and 
the technology directed to its processing. This technology, 
for which the Third World countries are totally and absolutely 
dependent(35) constitutes the industry with greatest thrust 
and development in the industrialised capitalist world. 
The so-called Third Industrial Revolution or the 
Silicon Revolution, is an evident fact, and the strategic 
power acquired by whoever controls the development and 
commercial exploitation of this industry is unquestionable. 
The biggest transnational corporations who operate 
in the computer industry are all mainly from United States, 
among then, IBM with a sales volume of 23 thousand million 
dollars in 1979, more than 325,000 workers, and with a 
research budget of US$ 1,000 millions, maintains an indisputable 
leadership in the industry, controlling 65% of the world 
market in computers(see annex 1). 
The important and also strategic industry of 
integrated circuit production is also mainly controlled by 
the United States. Firms such as Texas Instruments, Motorola, 
Mostek, Intel, AMD, National Semiconductors, Rockwell, AMI, 
and Fairchild are all U. S. parent companies dedicated to 
the manufacture of these devices. Nevertheless, Japanese 
corporations such as Hitachi, Nippon Electric, Toshiba, Oki, 
Fujitsu, and Mitsubishi are vigourously breaking into the 
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market for "silicon chips"(see annex 2). 
The silicon chip constitutes the basic component 
for the manufacture of microprocessors and these, in their 
turn, are converted into the devices which are keys to the 
functioning not only of computers, but also of any other 
information and control machinery, in the broadest sense of 
the word. 
From electronic watches, sewing machines, washing 
machines, TV games, typewriters, automobile ignition systems, 
microwave ovens, etc., to the most complex analogue-digital 
computing systems used in the control of industrial processes, 
including robot, space travel and communications systems, 
microprocessors with this type of semiconductor are used. 
Theoretically, the use of the silicon chip is 
virtually limitless, as we could deduce from what Jack Kilby 
(inventor of the integrated circuit) said: 
"In fact, digital circuits are even replacing 
mechanical parts like gears and pinions -as in 
the modern digital electronic watches(36). 
Whilst some natural resources such as oil, iron, 
copper etc are finite and their prices go on rising, silicon 
chips whose principal ingredient is, essentially, sand, (an 
almost infinite resource if we consider the quantity of this 
material used in each chip) show prices which are, at present 
definitely falling. 
In the field of computation, the price, for example, 
of the components required to produce an assembly for the 
central memory, with a capacity of 1 megabyte(which is 
equivalent to a million characters) was US$ 32,000 in 1974; 
three years later it fell to US$ 7,000 ; now in 1981, its 
price is US$ 2,000 and, by 1984, it is estimated that it 
will be reduced to around US$ 500. 
But the fantastic development of the assembles 
designed for storage of information do not end with the 
drastic reduction in prices of the silicon chip, but in the 
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increase in the capacity of each chip to store characters 
(at present, this capacity reaches, for RAM type semiconductors, 
64K per chip, each K represents 1024 bits or two-state 
positions of memory). If we look forward to 1990, the 
situation could present even more spectacular changes. 
Apart from the increase in chip capacity to 128K 
and 256K which has already been announced by some Japanese 
and US companies, Texas Instruments and Intel, both 
United States firms, have developed what promises to be a 
major new data and storage technology of the future: the 
"bubble memory". This type of memory can hold up to four 
megabytes of data(four million bits of information) . 
According to Intel Magnetics General Manager, Dick 
Clover, the company is putting into development and production 
a four megabyte bubble memory device that will be introduced 
some time during the second half of 1982(see reference 1.01). 
This new device would be able to replace those 
already advanced and powerful means of bulk storage information, 
such as the small disc, the tape and the magnetic drum. 
In any case, to give us an idea of what the 
posibilities of information storage with the new data storage 
devices already in existence means, it should be enough to 
suppose that all the personal information of the population 
of any Latin American country, that is the data on each 
individual, concerning his educational background as well as his 
political and financial activity, could be stored using a 
system which would require a space no larger than that used 
to build any village church. 
This circumstance, without doubt, creates risks 
from the point of view of vulnerability of information-But what 
constitutes the main danger in this concentration of information 
is not the existence of devices which permit it to be stored 
in smaller spaces, but rather, if you like, the existence of 
other devices which permit it to be accessed and transmitted 
in smaller lengths of time. 
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In 1964, my professor of Economic Theory Manuel 
Rodriguez Mena, pointed out in the course of a lecture: 
"... whoever controls the means of communications controls 
the power", I was then 22 years old, and even though I did 
not understand in depth the significance of the statement, 
the expression remained ringing in my ears. 
In 1982 the control of-the means of communications 
means the control of information, and as we point . out 
in this 
work, information constituted the essential element of 
contemporary power. 
But what gives this significance to information is its 
possibility of its being used in making decisions and this 
is precisely what is possible as a result of the "marriage" 
between computing and communications(38). 
This technological marriage, which in the United 
States is called "Compunications" and which the French have 
christened with the name "Telematique", has been converted 
into the most serious menace to individual privacy of the 
inhabitants of the developed world. The reason is very 
simple -the so-called "data banks" with registers of 
information for each citizen, are not a futuristic supposition 
nor a work of science fiction, they are a reality in the 
offices and home affairs ministries of these countries. 
The privacy of personal information is based 
essentially on the notion of dignity and integrity of the 
individual and his relationship with the information about 
him(39). 
This notion of privacy derives from the assumption 
that all information with respect to one person constitutes 
a property which belongs to the individual to which it refers, 
or who originates it, and who has the right to communicate 
it to third parties or retain it for himself. 
Some countries such as Sweden, the United States, 
France, Austria and Norway, have legislated in this respect 
and formulated laws which permit or guarantee the right of 
Page. 33 
any citizen to see his own file of information and to change 
it when he considers it to be wrong. 
One of these laws, the "Data Act" of Sweden, 
established in 1973, expresses in Section N°10: "0n the 
request of an individual on the register, the official 
responsible for maintaining the register should, as quickly 
as possible, inform him about the information concerning him 
which has been registered" 
This law, which is considered of the greatest 
interest in this chapter, has been included in this work 
under annex N°3. 
In other countries such as West Germany, and England, 
there already exist organised movements which are bringing 
pressure so that similar laws are promulgated. 
In England, the National Council for Civil Liberties, 
has for many years been fighting against what it calls "the 
real English disease"(40) a soubriquet which it uses to indicate 
the classic tendency of the British Government to give more 
importance to its privilege to hide than the right of the 
citizen to know. 
Nevertheless, the most serious threat which, to our 
eyes, informatics is generating is not in relation to the 
invasion of individual privacy, but rather in relation to 
what in this way of thinking, would be termed "national 
privacy". 
The deterioration in this privacy and its impact 
on national sovereignty, is extensively discussed in chapter 
IV of this work; at this point we only refer to the 
preoccupation which, on this aspect, also exist even in the 
developed countries. 
"La Telematique" or the relation between computation 
and communications has reached such a state of development 
that the government of some countries have begun to preoccupy 
themselves with what could be the necessity of restraining 
the flow of information by teleprocessing means. 
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The methods which some countries have adopted on 
what is beginning to be called "Transborder data flow"(41) 
or what would be the transnational or transfrontier flow of 
data, is directed specifically at the control of transnational 
companies which own computer systems with communications 
systems capable of transmitting or receiving information to 
or from their head offices. 
But the absence of uniformity in the criteria with 
respect to the laws governing the control of the so called 
"data havens" has created a confusion about what type of 
information ought to be restricted. 
Up to the present, three different international 
organisations, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD), and the European 
Economic Community(EEC) are working together trying to 
harmonise the different laws. 
. For some countries, control means more than individual 
privacy, it means the safeguarding of political and economic 
information which could weaken the integrity or sovereignty 
of the nation. 
In June 1978, the Swedish government published a 
study carried out by a commitee of the Ministry of Defence 
to which had been entrusted the task of investigating the 
vulnerability of the computerised society(42). The title of 
this work, in Swedish, is "Adboch samhallets sarbarhet" and 
the name of the commitee is "Sarbarhetskommitten"(SARK). 
One of its most important conclusions was that: 
"... the vulnerability is due to various-factors 
the principal of which, in the opinion of SARK 
are the dependency upon foreign technological 
resources, the geographic concentration of the 
computer systems, the dependence on the people 
who develop and operate the systems, and the 
risk associated with the content of certain 
types of files" and finally they point out 
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"various forms of external attack are 
possible or feasible, thanks to these 
vulnerability factors". 
Neverthelesý;, the preoccupation shown by some 
governments, and the means that have been adopted in this 
respect seem to be insufficient . 
"I use a network of computers with access 
points in 26 countries, including a public 
telephone box in Peru. How can any authority 
for protection of data hope to tackle what 
I am doing with my data and where I am doing 
it? " said the data processing manager of a TNC during 
an exhibition of equipment to Members of Parliament in 
London(43). 
Since 1876, when A. G. Bell invented the telephone, 
telecommunications has achieved a vertiginous rate of 
development. With more than 400 million telephones installed 
in the world, the international telephone network constitu: 2s 
not only the biggest automatic system in existence, but the 
best available means for the transmission of information. 
Apart from voice, which was originally considered by 
Bell as the only transmission element, the telephone network, 
in combination with other means, permits the transmission 
of alphanumeric, graphical information, moving pictures, and 
even television programs(see annex N° 4) 
New services, always within the basic combination of 
telephone-computation, are found in operation, Telecopying, 
teletex, electronic mail system, viewdata, mobile radio, 
digital transmission, video telephone and video-conferencing 
are systems already in operation. 
Telecopying, for example, could enable a TNC to 
transmit via satellite, from any part of the world, to New 
York or Washington, the complete text of the information 
contained in a page or drawing in only 15 seconds(44). 
The electronic mail system, also known in the 
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United States as the electronic message system, also utilises 
the telephone network to provide this type of service. Each 
suscriber possesses a video terminal connected to this network 
and with access to a central computer. In the computer each 
user has the use of an area of memory, which becomes a kind 
of post box, in which are stored the messages which he sends, 
or are sent to him. 
Another revolutionary system for the transmission 
of information goes under the generic term "viewdata". This 
system, originating in England, was put into operation in 
March 1980, under the name of Prestel and under the official 
control of the British Post Office(Ministry of Communications) 
later in 1982 under the new state institution: British Telecom(45) 
Viewdata involves the use of the telephone network 
I the subscribers' private television sets, and a central 
computer. The system permits each user to make use of his 
own television(in reality a normal television but with a special 
device incorporated) to access a'computer id which is encoded 
a data bank with more than 250 thousand pages of information. 
The 250 thousand pages are continually updated, 
so that almost any information which is normally obtained 
from the printed press can be visualised alphanumerically, 
or by graphics on the screen of the television set. 
This system, which promises to convert itself into 
one of the biggest mechanisms for bulk storage of data ever 
conceived, and which, without doubt, represents the 
realisation of the dreams of any writer of science 
fiction, induces also the same questions with respect to 
the control of information and power which we formulated 
in the opening discussion of this work. 
It is enough to suppose that, during the next 5 or 
10 years, it will be possible to obtain, not only the devices 
for operating with viewdata, but also the accessories and 
the memory which would be needed to turn a television set 
into a intelligent terminal, or into a microcomputer to which 
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also can be coxpled some peripherals such as a printer, discs, 
tapes etc. 
By making use of this the viewer, rather than being 
a passive spectator, becomes an active participant, capable 
of interacting with what could be the data base of the central 
computer; he could seek information, but also could respond 
to certain types of questionnaires or decide on purchases 
or reservations. 
Faced with these circumstances, the government which 
controls a data base of this type will have at its disposal 
the most rapid, complete. and precise mechanism for feed-back 
ever found in the political history of mankind; it could 
measure the impact of its decisions, the rejection of 
policies or the trend in the demand for goods and services. 
From all that has been said, it is clear that the 
integration of the processing and transmission of 
information in a closed system of communications is a 
reality. Unfortunately for those who do not control the 
technology implicit in such a process, this reality is 
converted into a terrifying perspective on which we must 
reflect and analyse as one more element in the context of 
the study of technological dependence. 
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1.5. - Control of information: the real power 
In the modern world, the relevant role of 
information for decision-making has created a new system of 
evaluating and structuring the factors which generate power; 
today it is not the ownership of natural resources, or of 
capital which confers power on their possessors, but in this 
new order the great organisations, and among them, the 
governments of the most developed nations have witnessed the 
collapse of these factors when they are not associated with 
the new resource: information. 
These nations and organisations have understood 
not only the present-day value of information, but above all, 
its influence in the destinity of peoples. They know that 
the success of decisions adopted by their rulers does not depend 
upon capacity or experience in the management of resources, 
not the quantity or quality of the same, but fundamentally, 
the truth and coverage of the information of the reality in 
which they take their decisions. 
If power, as a fundamental element of development, 
was determined by the holding of capital, the member countries 
of OPEC would for some time not only have been developed 
nations but world powers, if we take into consideration 
only the quantity of their natural resources. In the Latin 
American region, one of this countries, Venezuela, has 
received during the past 10 years injections of capital 
which, taken together, exceed the sum of that invested by 
the United States in the celebrated Marshall Plan for the 
reconstruction of Europe(46). 
The essential nature of power can be defined as 
the interaction between two beings one of which is capable 
of affecting the behaviour of the other. 
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This interaction creates a certain type of 
negotiation in which the particular potentialities of 
both 
parties are displayed, with respect to the capacity of each 
one to modify the behaviour of the other. 
on the other hand, for any interaction of this type, 
we may say that it assumes the status of a system with a 
specific objective. The type of relationship established 
will depend on the particular characteristics of the system 
and its objetives but in any case, and in accordance with 
the theory of cybernetics it will often be possible to 
identify one part as controller and the other as that which 
is controlled. 
Let us suppose a system in which government "A" 
seeks from government "B" the dismantling of nuclear missile 
base, but during the negotiation, indirect relationship 
(diplomacy) fail, and "B" refuses to accept the demands of "A". 
"A" has recourse to direct action and establishes 
a military blockade on "B". "B" then dismantles the bases, 
accepting "A's" conditions. 
For this system in particular, we could say that 
"A" controlled "B", and finally the objective was achieved. 
But as we can see, the power of "A", in this case over "B", 
was only demonstrated after the interaction between-, them 
Thus, if power is not something abstract, and is 
only demonstrable by means of confrontation, that is to say 
power of something with respect to something, we could ask 
ourselves What induced "A" to confront "B" in the way 
they did(military blockade) and demand the dismantling of 
the bases? 
We believe that fundamentally the information which 
"A" possessed about "B", and in effect the power of 
"A" with respect to "B", began to develop much earlier than 
the production of the interactive(confrontation) system we 
have indicated. 
In other words, we may assume that "A" had been 
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"accumulating power" relative to "B" when it was accumulating 
information about "B". 
This leads us to think that power, in the form 
which we have conceived it, certainly can be accumulated, 
when what is actually accumulated is information. 
So that when in general terms we think of power of 
a man over other men and over natural things, we suppose 
that this power may be a function of the knowledge which he 
possesses of each thing and each man, but only in the moment 
in which they confront each other. 
Nevertheless in the matter of international politics 
and decisions which affect the security or sovereignty of a 
State, the information which is possessed about the supposed 
opponent has always signified advantages(power) 
for its 
possessor. What has changed now is not the conception of 
information as an instrument of power, but the modern 
possibility(and particularly since 1950) of its manipulation 
as a function of decision-making, and it is in this situation, 
within the context of technology oriented towards information 
processing, which enables us to point to information as a new 
factor of power. 
Hence informatics, analysed as the discipline of 
information processes, and supported by the growing 
technological expansion of the electronic industry, acquires 
therefore a political and strategic content in this process. 
The industrialised countries, and particularly 
the United States, have developed the informatics until it 
has been converted into what could be a menacing instrument, 
insofar as the capture and concentration of information 
relating to the political, economic and military reality of 
developing nations is concerned. 
The technological capacity of the United States in 
the capture and processing of this information by employing 
sophisticated systems of computing, which include extensive 
international teleprocessing networks with communications 
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via satellite, places its leaders and planners in a situation 
of alarming advantage over the governments of the developing 
countries. They not only do not dispose of complete and 
truthful information but also find themselves confronted by 
the threat which signifies the limitation of the expansion, 
in their own territories, of non-national interests of an 
opponent whose strategy of action is unknown. 
This circumstance, without doubt, creates a circle 
of decision in which the best possibilities of success will 
always be in favour of the director or strategist who has 
access and control over this technology and who, in consequence, 
obtains a better information base. 
For the Latin American case, the quantity and 
quality of political, military and economic information 
produced in those countries during the last 30 years, which 
is being processed and stored in the great data banks of the 
United States, constitutes the fundamental basis on which 
the organs of decision and political strategy of that country 
operate, to confront the politico-economic dynamics of Latin 
American reality and in this way maintain the stability of 
the system. 
In this order of ideas, the analysis of the 
politico-economic system of the Western World which can be 
made in the light of cybernetic theory, would imply the study 
of a system whose integral parts would be all the countries 
which interact within the capitalist production mode. These 
form an interstate system with particular characteristics 
of political, military and economic relationships established 
between the decision centres of the dominant economies and 
between the economies which are dependent. 
As a result of the changes originated in the 
dependent economies, the control centres of the dominant 
economies have to be capable of reacting by means of the 
decision-making process. These decisions ought to be adopted 
at a speed which is compatible with that at which such changes 
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take place, because if this is not the case, there exists 
the danger of an increase in the instability of the system, 
giving rise to the possibility of its deterioration or 
destruction. 
The speed of decision-taking depends on the form 
of the feed-back processes which can transmit information 
about current circumstances. 
In what we may term the "Continental American 
System(see chapter IV)-United States and Latin America-, the 
quantity of information which this process allots to the 
United States is now so vast that only by making use of the 
modern techniques of storage and processing of information 
such as data bases, already mentioned, which permits the 
simultaneous interrelation of archives of information, and 
its access in real time(47), can the centres of political 
decision-making of that country make adequate use of it and 
extract from it the data needed for their decisions. 
In accordance with the indications in the book by 
Thomas Frank(48)in the State Department of the U. S. govern- 
ment there exist around 150 million archived documents of 
which 35 millions had already been classified by 1974. 
The United States invests great sums of money in 
systems for classification and concentration of information. 
According to the publication cited, a study commissioned 
by the General Accounting Office (GAO) estimated that the 
Department of State and Defence, the Atomic Energy Commission, 
and the National Aeronautical and Space Administration(NASA) 
invested alltogether around 200 million dollars each year 
solely in concentration of information. 
The Foreign Operations and Government Information 
Subcommittee, a subcommittee of the Committee for Operations 
of the House of Representatives of the United States, points 
out, in referring to the political and legal controversy 
which has broken out in relation to the classification of 
information: "They affect the most excruciatingly difficult 
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decisions on which our defence and foreign policy strategies 
are based"(49). 
Having summarised the outline of the relationship 
of multidirectional interaction between system and subsystem, 
or linkage between the directing system and the directed, we 
will attempt to amplify it and describe it with the aid of 
the model which we present in chapter IV; for the moment 
let us leave open the question of the concrete process of 
communication of information which is established between 
the parts of a geopolitical system, such as we have indicated, 
and of how a war situation could perturb the mechanisms of 
collection, processing, and use of this information on the 
part of the dominant economy. 
Within the scheme of operations of what we shall 
call the Continental American System, the United States 
establishes its own mechanisms for auto-regulation or feed- 
back from the basis of that system(dependent economies). 
This feedback or auto-regulation is made through 
political, economic or warlike actions, capable of generating 
sufficient negative entropy to guarantee the maintenance of 
the equilibrium of the system. These actions consist of 
decisions taken in centres(Department of State, Pentagon, 
Department of Defence etc. ) where they converge and 
concentrate the data from information communicated by other 
parts of the system. All this is adjusted by a process 
of creating a hierarchy and individualisation of each 
information element of the diverse political communities 
which comprise the system, guaranteeing in this way a 
substantial reduction in the probabilistic or random character 
of the results of their decisions. 
Between the centre which controls and the periphery 
of the system there exist various channels of communication 
through which circulate the economic and political feedback 
from the countries of Latin America to this centre. 
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One of these channels consists of the TNCs, which act as 
intermediate subsystems capable of producing information on 
certain sectors. 
Together with the electronic computers, in 
accordance with cybernetic theory, an extremely important 
part in the improvement of this process will depend on 
the evaluation of the information processed. This permit the 
determination of a strategy adequate to meet the objectives 
of the leadership. This will also include the elaboration 
of a programme of politico-economic action which safeguards, 
in the last resort, the interests of the TNCs in the face 
of the decisions of the local governments of the dependent 
economies. 
It becomes evident that the information received 
by the great centres of the world economy, with respect to 
the global analysis of social, political and economic reality 
of the developing countries, is better in both quantitative 
and qualitative terms than that which can be received by the. 
governments of these countries themselves, since they only 
receive partial information of the reality. This allows the 
decisions adopted by these governments in defence of their 
national interests to be easily neutralised by those who 
possess a better information base. 
Finally, in the system of relations which has been 
indicated, the control obeys the directions of the great 
centres of capitalist power and more specifically the so- 
called "Trilateral World"(United States, Western Europe and 
Japan) in whose working commissions the president of EXXON 
sits alongside the presidents of IBM, of FIAT, of Federal 
Union of German Industry, of the Compagnie Financiere Holding, 
together with Royal Dutch Shell, the German Banking Federation, 
the Chairman of Barclays Bank International, the president 
of Mitsubishi, of Nippon Steel, of the Bank of Tokyo, and 
the president of the Toyota Motor Company. 
Between this Trilateral World and the periphery, 
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a technological umbilical cord joins the parts 
into a whole and it is by this means that power finally is 
demostrated and by which governments are given oxygen or 
asphyxsiated, economies collapse or become destabilised, 
and anti-development is fed. 
Page. 46 
REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY CHAPTER I 
1. - Information: a new factor of power? 
1.01. - Wiener, Norbert "The Human Use of Human 
Beings" 
Eyre and Spottis Woode. 
London 1954. p. 16 
1.02. - Lewis, C. T. & "A Latin Dictionary" 
Short, C. Oxford University Press. 
London, 1969. p. 948. 
1.03. - Klein, Ernes. "A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary 
of the English Language". 
Elsevier Publishing, Company. 
London, 1969. p"793 
1.04. - Oxford U. Press 
1.05. - Littre, Emile 
"Oxford English Dictionary" 
Oxford University Press. 
London, 1961. p. 274. 
"Dictionnaire de la Langüe Francaise" 
Gallimard Hachette. 
Paris, 1969. p. 975. 
1.06. - Spanish Academy "Diccionario de la Real Academia 
of Lenguage de la Lengua Espanola. 
Madrid, 1971. 
1.07. - Robert, Paul "Le Robert Dictionnaire Alphabetique 
et Analogique de la Langue Francaise". 
Societe du Nouveau Littre. 
Paris, 1969. p. 736. 
Page-47 
1.08. - Watson, J, & "General Implications of 
the Structure 
Crick, F. of of Deoxyribonucleic Acid" 
Article published in "Nature"Vol. 171 
London, 30th May 1953. p. 964. 
1.09. -Spectator Spectator" 
London, 4th July 1958. p. 22 
1.10. - Dowben, R. M. "Cel Biol" 
Vol-97. London, 1971. 
1.11. - Oxford U. Press "A Supplement to the Oxford English 
Dictionary". 
Oxford University Press. 
London, 1976. p. 300. 
1.12. - Elstob, C. Mike "Information Meaning & Knowledge" 
Brunel University 
Cybernetics Department. 
Londo, 1981. 
1.13. - Lidell, H. & "A Greek-English Lexicon" 
Scott, R. Oxford University Press. 
London, 1968. p. 1004. 
1.14. - Lewis, C. & "A Latin Dictionary" 
Short, C. Oxford University Press. 
London, 1.969. p. 831. 
1.15. - Klein, Ernes. "A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary 
of the English Language". 
Elsevier Publishing Company. 
London, 1966. p. 793. 
1.16. - Wiener, Norbert. "Cybernetics: or Control and Communi- 
cation in the Animal and the Machine" 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Massachusetts, USA. 1948. 
page . 48 
1.17. - Young, John. 
1.18. - Moray, Neville. 
"La Cibernetica". Original title: 
"Cybernetics". Translation: Nestor Miguez. 
Monte Avila Editores. 
Caracas, 1969. 
"Cybernetica". Original title: 
"Cybernetics". Translation: Mendizabal, T. 
Editorial Herder S. A. 
Barcelona, Espana, 1967. p. 12 and 17. 
1.19. - Novik, I. & "Cibernetica Ciencia y Practical' 
Kasakovsev, V. Translated from Russian to Spanish 
by D. Reuter Krull. Editorial Lotauro 
Buenos Aires, 1967. p. 15 
1.20. - Jackson, W. "Communication Theory" 
(editor) Butterworth Scientific Publications. 
London, 1953. 
1.21. - Lenin, V. I. 
1.22. - Ashby, W. Ross. 
1.23. - Beer, Stafford. 
1.24. -George, Frank H. 
"Materialismo y Empiriocriticismo". 
Berlin, 1952. Included in the works 
of Novik & Kasakovsev. Quoted book. 
"An Introduction to Cybernetics". 
Methuen & Co. Ltd. 
London, 1979" 
"Platform for Change". 
John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
London, 1975" 
"The Brain as a Computer" 
Pergamon Press Ltd. 
London, 1973" 
1.25. - Pask, Gordon. "An Approach to Cybernetics" 
Hutchinson. London, 1961. 
Page. 49 
1.26. - Guillaumaud, J. 
1.27. - Lange, Oskar. 
"Cibernetica y Logica Dialectical' 
Original title: Cybernetique et mate- 
rialisme dialectique. Translation: Sua- 
rez, Marcial. Editorial Castilla. 
Madrid, 1971. 
"Introduccion a la Economia Cyberne- 
tica". Original title: "Wstep do Cyber- 
netyki Ekonomicznej". Translation from 
Polish to Spanish: de Kurticz, Mercedes. 
Siglo Veintiuno Editores. Madrid, 1969. 
1.28. - Greniewski, H. "Modeles Economiques". Translated from 
Polish by Recherches Internationales, 
N°29. Editions de la Novelle Critique. 
Paris, 1962. 
1.29. - Manescu, Manea. 
1.30"- Bertalanffy, L. 
"Economic Cybernetics" 
Abacus Press. 
London, 1980. 
"General System Theory" 
Allen Lane Penguin Press. 
London, 1971. 
1.31. -Dreyfus, Philippe. "Le Monde". French newspaper. Article 
published on 8th January 1970. p. 13 
Paris, 1970. 
1.32. -Editions de Dupre Encyclopedie du bon Francais 
Trevise. dans L'usage Contemporain. 
Editions de Trevise. Paris, 1973. 
1.33. -IBI "La Informatica y los Dirigentes 
Politicos". Serie Marron DGI-03. 
Roma, Agosto 1975"p"5 
Page . 50 
1.34 .. - IBI "Introduccion a la Informatica" 
Serie Marron DG1-01. p. 2 
Roma, 1975. 
1.35"- Marina, Manuel. La Dependencia Tecnologica en los 
Sistemas de Computacion"UCV. Facul- 
tad de Economia. Trabajo de ascenso 
en el. escalafon docente. Caracas, 1973. 
1.36. - Texas Instruments. "Understanding Digital Electronics" 
Book with. a foreword by Jack Kilby. 
and published by Texas Instruments 
Learning Centre. Dallas, Texas, 1978. 
1.37. - Kehone, Louise "Why bubble memories fell from grace" 
-California- Financial Times. London, 16.06.81 
(see reference 1.01 chapter I) 
1.38. - Nora, Simon & "L'informatisation de la societe" 
Minc, Alain. La Documentation francaise. 
Paris, 1978. p. 17. 
1.39. - Canadian "Privacy & Computers" Report written 
Government by members of the Federal Department 
of Communications and of Justice. 
Ottawa, 1972. 
1.40. - Michael, James "The Politics of Secrecy": The case 
for a freedom of information law. 
Published by the National Council 
for Civil Libierties. London, 1979. 
1.41. - Computer Weekly Term frequently used by the Computer 
Weekly magazine. 
Page. Si 
1.42"- Swedish Government "The Vulnerability of the Computerized 
Society. "Translation onto English by 
John Hogg-Original title: "ADB Och 
samhällets sabarhet". Report published 
by the Swedish Government in Jun 1978. 
1.43. -Johnston, Rory "Do computers really threaten our 
privacy? " 
The Times. p. 23. London, 26.3.80 
1.44"-Arndt, G. Lang, M. & "Modern Communication Services" 
Unterberger, H. Physics in Technology. Vol. 10 N°4 
London, July 1979. 
1.45"- British Telecom "Prestel". Viewdata. 
Financial Times Survey. 
London, 24.3.80 
1.46. - Vernon, Raymond. "Sovereignty at Bay, The multinational 
spread of U. S. enterprises". 
Longman Group Ltd. 
London, 1971. p. 87. 
1.47. - Date, C. J. "An Introduction to Database Systems" 
Addison-wesley Publishing Co. 
London, 1977. 
1.48. - Franck, Thomas & "Secrecy and Foreign Policy". 
Weisband, E. Oxford University Press. 
London, 1974. 
1.49"- Moorhead, William "Operation and Reform of the 
Classification System in the United 
States". Included in Secrecy and 
Foreign Policy. Quoted book. p. 89. 
itefereiice 1.01 
Page. 52 
Financial Tii es. Londoll lt3-u6-81 
Why bubble ýlLýniories, 
fell from grace BY LOUISE KEHOE IN CALIFORNIA _1 
Bubble memories are faster than: ticular location corresponds to a `The second problem. " said,, 
discs and inherently more binary " I, " and the absence of Lomond, "has been the lack of 
reliable than the mechanical a bubble corresponds to a binary standardisation. In bubble 
systems used to operate disc ; . 40" - memories, Rockwell, Intel, ; 
drives.. They are extremely By contrast, the comparable National and Texas have all 11 
rugged and can withstand harsh functions are preformed in semi- been building parts with, 
environments where there are. conductor memories by switch- different designs. " 
temperature extremes; - changes' ing transistors on and off. This has meant that userst, 
in air pressure and humidity. The functional elements of a cannot find a second source 
for 
poor air quality, vibration and.; semiconductor memory are a bubble memory part. 
Lomond 
shock or a high risk of power larger than bubbles, and in the says that National has taken aA 
loss. 1 'ease of RAMs, when the power- step towards solving this pro-' Other storage devices can fails is turned off the elements can blem by signing a secondi 
easily or require high m. ainten- change state thus losing the source agreement with Motorola. 1 
ance in these environments. Like cjata stored in them. " He feels that this will help the 
disc stores, they are non- Given all the advantages of market to develop. 
volatile which means that they bubble memories, why have they "For National, bubble' 
do not lose their memory con- not been an instant success? memories have been a multi 
tents when the power is turned Several factors have held them million dollar investment, " said 
off. This gives them an advant- back, according to industry ex- Lamond. 
age over the widely used "They are not profitable- yet ", 
dynamic 4 RAMS. '. -"- perts. First, they have proved,, he concedes, but he expects! 
They also have a much higher more difficult to make than had them to be so within a year. 
data capacity then semiconduc been expected: This has meant Intel is even more bullish 
tor memories, with the, current that products have been slow to about the future of bubble' 
generation of magnetic bubbles , 
reach the market. memories. Although ' Intell 
holding up to one megabit of The most widely held view is, entered the market later than its' 
data as compared to the 
'64K 
that falling prices of competitive competitors, the companyl 
bits 
. 
held in a RAM. 'r . technologies such as mini-floppy jumped straight into the deeps' 
Semiconductor makers - have 
discs, have made. -bubbles an end by% announcing a one l 
s. b' ci me the major; producers_., 9f expensive alternative.. 
At today's 'megabit bubble. memory-fours 
bubbler memories because the prices, 
bubble memories are times larger.. than any other' 
about, five times more costly available at the time. 
,. fabrication of these 
devices It., thaat: floppy-disc memories fora I, t . has taken a -unique; in. many ways similar to,, that of the same amount of storage approach to bubble memories' semiconductor chips, The capacity. "' 
principles-, of operation " of the Low coot* has made floppy 
by packaging them "into a 
magnetic " bubble memory -'discs very popular in. personal pluggey-system 
which can be, 
(MBM) aTe, however, quite: computer , applications where The co' paay latest 
into a compduct, a 
different. bubbly memories had been pro.. 
The 
introduced. 
. 
in in 
co 
April. 
. 
Is 4 called The " bubbles" of MBMs are jected as having a large volume "plug-a-bubble" and is designedJ 
small. islands of reversed mag use. , -r. , 40 `" to fit into the same space as a 
netisation in a sea of uniform At National Slemitonductor, mini floppy disc. 
magnetisation of the opposite one of the' semiconductot firths By 1984, the bubble memoryspolatfly, 
. 
They. are formed with- that has. Put a" major. develop- 'market will have expanded by in a thin, single-cystal film of.. ment ! effort , into ` bubble a factor of ten from its present 
s 
synthetic. garnet, in the pre-, i-memonies,. Pierre Lamond, 'tech- value of around. $30m, to more 
sence of, a magnetic field, nical director, has a different than $300rn. Intel believes. 
The, bubbles are only i few - theory as to why 
bubble' 'According to Intel Magnetics; 
;. microns in diameter and cart; ' memories have not become as General Manager, Dick. Clover,, 
be, 
' 
by the creation of a°' Popular as expected... ,", the Company is putting an addi- 
magnetic gradient across the "Until recently nobody had a tional $3m into expanding its 
garnet field. Viewed- under a. good, set, of support circuits- manufacturing capacity for one 
I 
microsconc' with polarised lieht. ' drivers,, readers and controllers megabit bubble memories and 
the bobbles' . 
look like fluid. that make it easy to build a into. development and, produc-1 
circplar areas--hence the name, bubble memory into a system, " lion of a four megabit bubble 
A pair of, coils. surrounding,, ' 
he said. memory device that will be, 
the bubble chip produces a; "That restrained the market. " introduced some time during 
rotating magnetic field which Recently, however; National has the second half of next year. 
can be used to control the move introduced a five chip set that Intel is also guaranteeing 
mentof the bubbles along tracks supports its 256K 'bubble customers -a falling price curve 
that are formed using standard memory and its soon to be for bubble memories for the. 
nhatoiithographic. methods: The'' announced one , 
megabit bubble next 18 months with: 1982 prices' 
hubbles can be controlled to per _ `memor 
failing to close to aO per cent of 
fnrn1 
, ilttittAry 
; fUtýctions. ý::. 'The' today'spncea 
1~. pte ACg, Of tä buklil&at , . pair. 
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CHAPTERII 
2. - Energy crisis: threshold for a war? 
"Nuclear weapons must be employed... to convey 
a decisive escalation of sufficient shock to 
convincingly persuade the enemy that he should 
make the political decision to cease the attack 
and withdraw. To evidence our solidarity, I 
am considering use in all regions employing 
both UK and US weapons using primarily aircraft 
and land-based missile systems. The initial 
use would be restricted to GDR, Czecholovakia, 
Poland, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria". 
Telex Message from General Alexander 
Haig, then Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe to the NATO Command, during 
the WINTEX 77. exercises. (1) 
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2.1. - How did the 1980's begin a 
The western industrialized countries are at the 
present seized by economic crisis and labor unrest. The rate 
of economic growth in the main developed economies has fallen 
drastically' from an average of 6% per annum to 2%, 1% or even 
0.5%. In some nations the present crisis reflected in 
their Gross National Product's index is obvious. (see annex 5). 
1979 was a deficit year for the Current Account 
balances for the United States, Japan, West Germany, England 
etc. (see"annex No 6). 
The era of easy wealth and cheap energy has come to 
an end but the major oil transnational corporations are still 
doing big business. Inflation and the deep social differences 
produced by the system itself have generated a panorama of 
uncertainty(see annex N°7). 
"America Plunges into recession" pointed out a head- 
line of the magazine "Newsweek" on'May 5th 1980(2). Yet in 
October 1981 David Buchan's report from Washington to the 
Financial Times : "Index of economic indicators takes steep 
plunge(3) and a month later he writes again to the Financial 
Times and says: "U. S. admits deepening recession"(4),. 
The spectacular fall in profits, in 1980, announced 
by such giants as General Motors, Ford, Bank of America, Du 
Pont, and a dozen more multimilliondollar corporations(see 
annex N°8) constitutes symptoms of what appears to be an 
economic contraction of serious consequences, both political 
and social, for the leading nation of the capitalist economy. 
The guarantee of continuous supply of petroleum 
from the Arab World to the nations of the West is, from some 
specialists' viewpoints, in a precarious state. 
The Iranian revolution early in 1979 and later the 
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war between Iraq and Iran in 1981 and their impact on world 
oil production has shaken the economies of some industrialized 
countries, especially Japan and West Germany. "West German 
industry investment will stagnate next year" writes Jonathan 
Carr in Bonn in the Financial Times on 10.11.81(5). 
"Libya threat to halt U. S. and U. K. oil" signalled 
another headline in F. Times on 10th May 1980(6). Exports of 
Libyan crude oil to the United States(600 thousand barrels a 
day), represent 8% of her petroleum imports. 
The predictions of improvement in the British economy 
as a result of the impact of the North Sea oil industry have 
not yet been fulfilled, and the economic recession, unemployment 
and social unrest obscure the future of the country which was 
the center of the former British Empire (6). 
At the very beginning of the decade, in Afghanistan, 
a country bordering with Iran, Russian troops came to the aid 
of the recently installed revolutionary government of Premier 
Babrak Karmal. 
The United States angrily protested and demanded the 
immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghan soil. 
"Brezhnev rejects U. S. call for Afghan withdrawal" 
headlined the F. Times and the crisis absorbed the majority 
of the world's newspapers during the month of February 1980(8). 
At the same time, a BBC 1 news broadcast(9)announced 
that the U. S. government(headed at that time by President 
Carter) had ordered the despatch of 100,000 men to the region 
of the Persian Gulf with the object of protecting United 
States' interests in the Midle East. 
On 6th October 1981 another news story shook the 
world: the assassination of the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat 
Washington moved to support Hosni Mubarak, the new leader in 
Cairo. Weapons and military equipment were promptly delivered 
to Egypt. Seemingly, the Pentagon was anxious that the new 
President Mubarak should not change his mind about U. S. plans 
to use Egypt as a platform for the training and manoeuvres of 
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the American Rapid Deployment Force in the Middle East. 
A month after, Anthony McDermott from Cairo reported 
for the F. Times: "U. S. airborne troops fly to Cairo for 
manoeuvres"(10). 
The manoeuvres, which involved Egyptian forces along 
with troops from Sudan and Oman, included two U. S. Awacs 
reconnaissance aircraft which came into operation along the 
border with Libya just nine days after President Sadat was murdered. 
Apparently the fear is based on the assumption that 
the highly tense situation between Libya, Sudan and Egypt 
could lead to an inter-Arab war involving the United States 
and the Soviet Union on rival Arab sides. 
Meanwhile, the historical confrontation between Jews 
and Arabs reached one of its points of political tension when 
the Government of the United States decided to sell eight 
Awacs(Advance Warning and Control System) radar aircraft to 
Saudi Arabia as an aftermath of the Sadat assassination. 
"The U. S. Senate decision to sell Awacs surveillance 
aircraft to Saudi Arabia poses a 'new and serious danger' to 
Israel" Mr Menahem Begin, the Prime Minister, said on 29th 
October 1981. He warned: "We will do what we have to do in 
order to overcome this threat"(11). 
In 1980 Anwar Sadat signed a Peace Plan with Israel 
and the United States as mediator. This Plan was called the 
Camp David Agreements. For many Arabs such a peace treaty was 
a betrayal to the Arab peoples and Sadat was an unpardonable 
traitor, but for others the deal was the only way to reach 
peace between Egipt and Israel and for them, Sadat was'the 
Peace Architect. 
According to a study by the Hungarian professor 
Istvan Kende(12) one hundred and thirty wars have broken out 
since the Second World War, all of them in more than seventy 
underdeveloped countries, with ten million victims. 
All these crises in the Arab World perhaps could 
be recorded by modern history as conflicts finally resolved 
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and, similar to those of Suez Canal in 1957, the Cuban 
missiles in 1962 or Israel in 1967, simply passing into the 
archives of contemporary history. 
Even when that happens and this situation 
remembered as one of 
the most crucial since the second World 
War, there exists an undeniable fact which is that 
the events which originated it cannot be resolved in the short 
term, and that the crisis in the Arab World is not an isolated 
phenomenon. 
What "The Economist"(13) calls "The Shrinking of 
America" to designate the political retreat of the United 
States before the Arab World, possesses other ramifications 
which, starting from the present, could possibly increase in 
the near future and in the context of a major crisis. 
The Iranian affair for instance, is not simply the 
mystic response of people impassioned by the Koranic fervour 
of an unhinged Ayatollah, as some western commentators try to 
show. 
"Whatever you say, Iman -I guess you know what you 
are doing... " sarcastically said the caption of a cartoon 
which appeared in "Newsweek"(14), in which Ayatollah Khomeini 
was represented as immolating himself together with another 
figure representing the Republic of Iran. 
When the people of Iran asked for Carter's head in 
1980, it was not the response to a messianic call, nor was it 
the response to a supposed communist subversion, it was simply 
the reaction of a country demanding from the world the 
symbolical head of a system which for them has signified the 
greatest obstacle for their development. 
Iranian oil output reached 72 million barrels a day, 
which, at US$ 20 a barrel(1979 prices), amounted to a fortune 
of US$ 54 thousand million a year in the times of the Shah. 
These riches did not reach the people, nor did they transform 
the nation in terms of development -they were simply taken 
back by the "transnational route", and therefore against the 
Page. 58 
misery imposed from abroad now there is a country which is 
now confronting the industrialized capitalist world, the 
world which they believe is responsible for their misery- 
the world they accuse as responsible for their crisis. 
Nevertheless, what is happening in Iran today is 
more than the fringe of a major crisis. It is also a 
manifestation of the Third World, which in a non-marxist way, 
indicates the existence of a more complex and conflicting 
process, which is the confrontation of the under-developed 
world and developed capitalism. 
Apart from all the biblical prophecies, predicting 
a world military conflict in the present decade, there is one 
evident fact, and that is that, in the middle of the breakdown 
of all development theories, growth and international cooperation 
toward the less developed nations, the population of the Third 
World continues to rise, and hunger increases(see annex N19). 
An investigation carried out by John Durand(15) on 
population increase indicates that world population for the 
year 2000 will be 6,130 million inhabitants(double today's 
population) and of this number, 4,774 millions(78%) will be 
in the Third World. 
Latin America, for example with a population increase 
rate of 2.8% per annum(one of the highest in the world) will 
have 638 million inhabitants by the end of this century(in just 
eighteen years). 
The path sought for its industrialisation(as we will 
analyse later) was that of direct foreign investment. As a 
result, the creation of a single job opportunity now costs 
US$ 20,000(16). Who, then, will employ the gigantic working 
populations of Latin America at the end of the next decade? 
Some of these countries, especially those which 
possess a high degree of technological dependence, show 
economic indicators which, paradoxically, place them among 
the most advanced nations of the Third World. 
If we examine the figures for Gross National 
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Product from a list of 213 countries, published by "The 
Economist(17)";, for the Latin American group Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico and Venezuela appear in the group of 30 nations with 
the highest world production in 1974. 
If, in the same publication we examine the ranking 
relative to standard of living, measured in terms of per 
capita income, we find for instance Venezuela in 1974 trans- 
formed into a paradise with a per capita income of US$ 2,048, 
above those of the Soviet Union, Poland and other developed 
countries. 
And for those countries with low labour and transport 
costs and with doors open to foreign investment(Export-platform 
countries) (18), and whose investments are undertaken mainly 
by firms in the so called "footloose" industries, such as 
semiconductors, transistor radios, cameras, textiles and 
leather goods, the indicators demonstrate "miracles", as in the 
case of Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Mexico. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the economic growth 
experienced by some of these countries, there exists an 
irrefutable fact: living conditions for the vast majority of 
their people continue at subsistence level. 
For some nations, on the other hand, the possession 
of mineral resources and, in particular, hydrocarbons, has 
enabled them specially since 1973 to enrol in a sort of "Third 
World club of the under-developed rich". 
However, the increase in riches of these nations, 
measured in terms of income from crude oil exports, has been 
coincidentally linked with an extraordinary increase in the 
profits of the enterprises which control the world petroleum 
business, which in recent years not only has-achieved the 
highest dividends in its history,, but also has made it 
profitable to exploit some crude oil sources from deep waters 
off the continental shelves which, before 1973 would have had 
no place in the international markets. 
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For 1973 the price of a barrel of oil was, on average, 
US$ 3.50. The production cost alone for a barrel of North Sea 
oil in Britain or any offshore oil is US$ 12.50 so that the 
profits of Shell, Esso, British Petroleum and other deep 
water producers and the whole significance of oil from the 
North Sea for Britain, paradoxically, is attributable to their 
"enemies'; namely OPEC. 
But the most significant aspect of the sudden riches 
of the OPEC countries is the speed of return of the so-called 
"petrodollars" to their place of origin. 
According to the estimates of Jacques de Laroriere, 
the Director-General of the International Monetary Fund(19), 
the positive balance of payments surplus on current 
account of the OPEC nations, which for 1980 was estimated at 
115 thousand million dollars, will fall in 1981 to US$ 87 
thousand million. At the same time he predicts that the deficit 
in the balance of payments of the industrial countries will 
fall from US$ 48 thousand million to US$ 17 thousand million 
and for the less developed countries without oil resources, 
the deficit in their balance of payments will increase from 
US$ 68 thousand million to US$ 78 thousand million during the 
same period(see annex N°10). 
The most widely used method for the return of these 
riches is through arms purchases(see annex N°11). The highest 
return was precisely performed on 29th October 1981 when the 
U. S. Senate approved a package deal to sell weapons(specially 
Awacs radar aircraft)to Saudi Arabia. The amount of this 
"century sell" was eight thousand five hundred million dollars 
(us$ 8,500,000,000). 
Another "transnational way" for the return of petro- 
dollars is through purchases of "technological packages" 
(analysed later) and in general manufactured goods. 
The business of investment of petrodollars, as 
practised by the Arabs, in the markets of the developed 
countries themselves, is becoming a thing of the past. 
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In Saudi Arabia itself(see annex N012), the difference 
between imports and exports for 1976 was a positive balance of 
US$ 5,400 millions(at the exchange rate of US$ 1=3.70 Saudi 
riyals), for 1977 it was US$ 2,130 millions, in 1978 it fell 
to only US$. 810 million and already for 1979 it has been 
converted into a deficit of US$ 3,783 millions. 
The same phenomenon has happened in other OPEC 
countries(see in annex N°14 imports and exports for Venezuela 
1973-1978). 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development -OECD- predicts that there will be no world 
economic recovery until the second half of 1982(20). So that 
in one year if the international monetary system returns to 
a more suitable equilibrium and the world slump has ended, 
within the capitalist borders there will be more sufferers 
than before the first oil price shock of 1973; however, all 
of them will be in the Third World, because the western 
industrialised nations, having recovered, will be the great 
creditors of the enormous unrepayable debts which, over the 
last eight years have been accumulated by the non-oil less- 
developed countries. 
The less-developed oil producers, even with all 
their inequalities in income distribution, would have wasted 
the historic opportunity of converting their wealth into 
development. By virtue of their economic dependence, 
paradoxically, they would see the exhaustion of their resources, 
accompanied by a deepening of their technological submission 
and therefore reducing the possibility of such development 
and increasing the prospects of an even more uncertain future. 
But while all this is going on, and the energy and 
raw material which feed the economies of the North ironically 
co-exist with the hunger and misery in the countries of the 
South, a million dollars a minute are wasted in armaments. 
This sum represents almost twice the combined Gross 
National Product-of all the Third World's countries(21). That 
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is to say, a figure roughly equivalent to that which the 
2,742 million inhabitants of the South barely produce to 
survive is what the neighbours of the North and even some 
underdeveloped oil producers spend on weapons industry and 
military activities. 
A planet militarised with 100 thousand nuclear 
devices in the arsenals of the nuclear weapon powers without 
any doubt increases what Alva Myrdal(22) calls "a feeling of 
near despair". 
Nevertheless, some politicians and strategists of 
a possible nuclear holocaust do not think along the same lines. 
In 1957, Henry A. Kissinger(23), basing himself on the so- 
called theory of the balance of power, which in nuclear terms 
could be nothing but a balance of terror, suggests that the 
use of nuclear arms can be limited, in other words "a limited 
nuclear war is possible". 
Kissinger suggests a clear difference between 
tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, indicating that it 
would be viable to have a treaty between the United States 
and the Soviet Union to limit the theatre of operations in 
the eventuality of war. 
According to Michael Madelbaum in his book "The 
Nuclear Question"(24), tactical nuclear weapons are small 
scale; nuclear. devices which can be launched from a conventional 
aircraft such as the B-52. They were designed, apparently, not 
to pulverise cities but to win battles and also, in terms of 
conventional forces, as a support for the artillery battalions. 
However, the Kennedy government's own Secretary of 
Defence Robert MacNamara indicated that tactical nuclear arms 
would not necessarily guarantee a war within traditional 
limits, and in an to Congress, MacNamara stated: 
"Nuclear weapons, even in the lower kiloton 
range, are extremely destructive devices and 
hardly the preferred weapons to defend such 
heavily populated areas as Europe. Furthermore, 
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while it does not necessarily follow that 
the use of tactical nuclear weapons must 
inevitably escalate into global war, it 
does present a very definite threshold, 
beyond which we enter a vast unknown"(25). 
Later, during Nixon administration, Kissinger himself 
took care not to utilise tactical nuclear weapons during 
the Vietnam war. 
Another strategist of terror, the former National 
Security Advisor in Carter's administration, considers it 
ridiculous to think of the disappearance of humankind as a 
consequence of a thermonuclear exchange., and in an interview 
with the New Yorker Magazine(26) Zbigniew Brzezinski said: 
"It's inaccurate thinking to say that the 
use of nuclear weapons would be the end of 
the human race. That's an egocentric thought... 
in strictly statistical terms if the United 
States used up all of its arsenal in the 
Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union used all 
of its against the United States it would 
not be the end of humanity". 
Brzezinski, President J. Carter's notorious counsellor, 
was one of the leading strategists of the "Fiasco in Iran"(27) 
on 5th May, 1980. He became famous for his apocalyptic 
thoughts, and some North American critics have nick-named him 
the "mad Rasputin". 
In 1977, during the NATO exercises WINTEX 77, General 
Alexander Haig, then Supreme Allied Commander Europe to the 
NATO Command, broadcast the following message: 
"Nuclear weapons must be employed... to convey 
a decisive escalation of sufficient shock, 
to convincingly persuade the enemy that he 
should make the political decision to cease 
the attack and withdraw. To evidence our 
solidarity, I am considering use in all regions 
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employing both UK and US weapons using 
primarily aircraft and land-based missile 
systems. The initial use would be restricted 
to GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania 
Hungary and Bulgaria". (l) 
Early in 1981 Haig became US Secretary of State. 
The same year, in October, the US President Ronald Reagan 
suggested: 
"Nuclear war could be limited to Europe 
without involving the two superpower in 
direct confrontation"(28). 
Such suggestions caused a furore in Europe and 
reinforced suspicions that American strategy is to rely on 
Europe as the battlefield in a limited nuclear war. 
In November 1981 Haig was pressed by the US-Senate 
foreign relations commitee to explain a remark by Reagan that 
implied that a nuclear war could be limited to Europe. He 
quoted established NATO doctrine relating to the warning shot 
contingency plan and, as an illustration, dredged up the 
possible option of dropping a nuclear bomb on Soviet 
territory for "demonstration purposes"(29). 
Limited nuclear war needs tactical weapons, so the 
New York Times reported: 
"President Reagan has decided to go ahead 
with the full production of the controversial 
neutron bomb"(30). 
This new instrument of warlike terror, according 
to the statement of one of its creators Samuel T Cohen, in an 
interview with the-German magazine Stern(31) is capable of 
eliminating instäntaneously any living being within a radius 
of 800 metres of the explosion. 
It produces an explosion which is "clean" or 
"humanitarian" and does not destroy material objects. Its fatal 
effect is produced by the emission of radiations created in 
microseconds, and which once emitted disperse in fractions of 
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seconds permitting the target area to be occupied without 
danger of contamination at the speed of an advancing army. 
Cohen also advises: 
"It is doubtful if the weapon can be considered 
humanitarian, because if a person does not die 
immediately, because he is in an area within 
1,200 metres of the epicente of the explosion, 
he could suffer from pain and convulsions for 
weeks before he dies, and those who manage to 
survive, would suffer from leukemia and other 
congenital diseases". 
Rockwell International, the Aerospace Corporation 
of Los Angeles, Monsanto Chemical of St Louis Missouri, and 
the Bendix Aerospace Corporation of New York, are for the time 
being the fortunate direct beneficiaries of the production 
of this type of armament. 
President Reagan says that the new bombs and 
artillery shells will be deployed only in the United States 
and that any decision to base them in Europe would be taken 
only after full consultation with NATO allies. 
However, in 1978 when in spite of the opposition 
to the development of the neutron bomb by such members of the 
US Congress as Mark Hatfield, Richard Clark, and Edward 
Kennedy, the warmongers and those who affirm that the precision 
of this new bomb reduces the dangers of nuclear war, such as 
Senator Henry Jackson and the then governor of California, 
Ronald Reagan, won approval for their proposals, and the 
neutron bomb now exists. 
After that decision the Pentagon invested U. S. $23m 
in it, and at this moment and in accordance with the 
plans of the Pentagon and NATO, the armies of the principal 
nations of western Europe already possess guided missiles 
fitted with neutron bomb warheads(-`) as part of their tactical 
combat equipment. 
(*)The warhead is the section of a missile containing 
the explosive, chemical, or incendiary charge. 
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The military-technological race has grown rapidly 
since the Second World War, and the participants would be limited 
to the half dozen or so industrialized countries able to 
support sufficient military R& D(Research and Development) 
activities to develop new weapons.. Fundamentally such a 
race developed" between United States and the Soviet Union. 
Nuclear weapons are subdivided into several categories: 
besides the "Tactical" already mentioned there exists the 
"Theatre"(long, middle or short range), which may be bombs or 
missiles, carried on an aircraft or permanently sited, or moved 
around at sea or on land on mobile launch platforms, and 
finally there are the most destructive ones, the range 
of so-called "Strategic" weapons. 
In this last category are encountered the inter- 
continental missiles of immense range and inconceivable 
destructive power, which could be launched from submarines or 
sited in silos and or land-based platforms. In this group fall 
the Pershing, the F111, the Vulcan, the Pershing II, the Cruise 
Missile, the Polaris and the Trident of the United States, and 
the SS4, the SS5, the SS20 and the Backfire bombers of the 
Soviet Union. 
All these "strategic" nuclear weapons as well as 
"Theatre" and "Tactical" are described in terms of strategy 
of nuclear warfare using a special, arcane vocabulary which 
includes along list of acronyms such as MIRV(multiple 
independently-targeted reentry vehicle), ICBM(inter-continental 
ballistic missile), ECCM(electronic counter-counter measures), 
MEASL(marconi-elliott avionics systems), and as the plum of 
them all, MAD, which one would have to be mad to use, but in 
this case stands for"mutual assured destruction". 
In certain extreme circumstances some of these 
weapons, specifically those carried on the US nuclear submarine 
fleet(carrying 4,000 nuclear warheads) could be launched by 
the commanders of such submarines acting on their own. 
This means that each of America's 39 nuclear 
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submarine commanders. is empowered to arm and fire his weapons 
without receiving special codes from the White House. 
Confirmation of the submarines' independent 
capability comes from Admiral Powell Carter, communications 
director of strategic and theatre nuclear warfare, when in a 
CBS television series on America's nuclear arsenal said: 
"There is nothing on a submarine system that 
prevents -a launch- mechanically through 
some sort of interlock system... "(32) 
So, if since 1957, when Henry Kissinger first laid 
out the Nato strategy about the possibility of a limited 
nuclear war(33), the probability of such war has been steadily 
increasing. Who, apart from the Americans could push the 
button to detonate the first device and initiate the "satanic 
feast ? ". 
When China's defence chief, Deng Xiaoping was asked 
in April 1980 by Italian pressmen in Peking if it were true 
that the Chinese leaders thought war was inevitable, he 
replied: 
"Yes, we still believe war will break out 
sooner or later"(34). 
The leaders of China, with their expansionist 
ambitions, have long proclaimed war not only inevitable but 
even desirable for this nation of 950 million inhabitants. 
"It doesn't matter if war kills half the 
human race if only a third part survives"'. 
said Mao Tse Tung. 
He never said which would be the third part, but 
one supposes that Mao hoped that it would be China. Five years 
after Mao's death, Peking's rulers still cling to his concept 
of the inevitability of war and they are preparing for such 
war. Deng has expressed. the hope that his inevitable war 
should not happen for "at least 20 years". 
According to Yury Kornilov and his article included 
in "Soviet Weekly" on 3th May 1980: 
"... twenty years is about the time the Chinese 
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leaders think it will take them to carry out 
their four modernisations and by which they 
mean, primarily, to complete the militarisation 
of the country and then begin to carry out 
their great-power plans. Those plans are no 
secrets. Out of the 30 military conflicts in 
Asia since the Second World War, 19 have been 
provoked by China and China's territorial claims 
on neighbouring countries, including the Soviet 
Union, involve an area as large as China itself". 
Nevertheless, Deng may be thinking he can cut that 
20 years down with the help of some countries in the west. So 
the first step to deal with the idea was to make it clear 
that China's strategic policy is to develop a friendly 
relationship with the United States. 
The outcome of such policy were soon evident, and 
on 23th June 1981 the Financial Times outlined: "How the U. S. 
could rearm Peking's military machine"(35). 
David Buchan in Washington and Colina MacDougall in 
London reported: 
"The one tangible result of Mr Alexander Haig's 
visit to Peking last. week was the U. S. decision 
to allow China to buy limited quantities of 
lethal weapons. This, plus the admission that 
the U. S. had set up a missile-tracking station 
inside China to monitor what was going on in 
the Soviet Union, raised the Sino-US relationship 
to a very different level". 
So China is now spending around US$ 12,000 million 
a year on defence and the arms manufacturers from western 
countries are anxious to take adventage of such a potentially 
enormous market. 
The warmongers and those groups in Washington and 
NATO which are gambling on Peking's anti-Sovietism and are 
seing China as a possible ally in the event of a nuclear 
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war with the Soviet Union might not be aware of the Chinese 
armed forces( 4,750,000in number, the largest in the world) (36) 
and their nuclear capability could be a boomerang resulting in 
their own destruction if they decide to play the China card. 
The other country which could also push the button 
and gain by war would be West Germany, precisely the Germany 
which for some time has been promoting "Detente" between the 
East and the West, and which in this decade-presents itself as 
the standard-bearer of the arms race. 
Bonn was the first to support the Nato decision 
that the United States should station new nuclear missiles 
(the Cruise Missiles) in Western Europe and especially in 
West Germany. 
The rearmament and militarisation of the country 
is an undeniable fact as its Defence Minister Hans Apel 
remarked in 1980: "We are well armed and can compare with 
any Nato army"(37). 
According to Vladimir Katin: 
"30% of Nato's fighting air force and 50% of 
the ground force in Central Europe are West 
German and that its army consists of 500,000 
well-trained soldiers. And, incidentally, the 
Nato nuclear planning H. Q. is staffed mainly 
by West German officers. There is also another 
entirely new dimension to Bonn's militaristic 
ambitions: squadrons of West German warships 
will soon be cruising in the Atlantic and 
Mediterranean, which have not seen German 
naval vessels since the decline of the Kriegs- 
marine, Hitler's naval force"(37). 
As is known, Western Germany can neither produce 
nor have its own nuclear weapons. But this nation, which has 
brought the world to two world wars, already has more nuclear 
devices in its territory than any other West European country. 
Former Nazis, who fled to Arge. ntina and Brazil after 
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the Second World War have been playing, together with the German 
Government a special role in both Brazil and Argentina's 
nuclear programme. As a result of these nuclear links, 
West Germany now is able to manufacture nuclear weapons, if 
its government so decides, not in its own territory but in 
somewhere in Latin America, where 100,000 Germans could be 
wishing to rebuild the Third Reich 
37 years after the war there is again in West Germany 
a strong right-wing, which is pushing the country towards 
military expansionism. People and entire organisations 
exist now, just as 50 years ego, which are again demanding 
"German Greatness" and nurturing plans for the domination of 
Europe and control of the oil-producing countries. 
There are people who like Alfred Dregger, a CDU 
leader, who proposed extending Nato's supremacy, and 
consequently the Bundeswehr's sphere of action to the Persian 
Gulf. There are also very influential leaders like Franz- 
Josef Strauss, a candidate in the October 1980 elections. 
When the Bonn government took the decision to station US 
missiles in German soil he said -. "We praise it for doing so"(38) 
These people and forces are not yet in power, but 
where is the guarantee that they will might not be in the near 
future? 
Hitler's Germany in the past became Europe's first 
and strongest country, and now it is the strongest again. So 
Germany, from being a vehicle of U. S. military policies in 
Europe, now is probably ready to embark on a more independent 
course or even push the button if they can... or can't they?. 
The third nation which in a short time and for 
reasons of expansion could plan war as an alternative would 
be Japan. The post-war Japanese Constitution establishes in 
its Article Nine: 
"The Japanese people forever renounce war as 
a sovereign right of the nation and the threat 
of the use of force as a means for resolving 
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international disputes.... Land, sea and air 
forces, as well as other war potential, will 
never be maintained". 
This renunciation of war imposed by the Allies and 
accepted by the people and government of Japan since 1945, 
also has been supported by the fear of nuclear war. Japan, 
the only country in the world which has physically suffered 
the actual consequences of a nuclear attack, would have 
sufficient reasons not to participate in the "hellish nuclear 
game". 
On the 6th and 9th August 1945, Americans bombers 
dropped two nuclear bombs on Japanese soil, the first in the 
city of Hiroshima where, it is estimated, 140,000 Japanese 
died as a direct effect of the explosion, and the second on 
Nagasaki where 70,000 people were incinerated by the atomic 
radiation which followed the explosion. 
But on the ruins of this devastated Hiroshima which 
once produced warships, now exists a powerful modern city, 
where the Mazda company produces motorcars for export, and 
where only an "Atomic Museum" shows the young Japanese a 
memento of the war. 
The dynamism and working discipline of the Japanese 
people is oriented to industrial activity, and has permitted, 
as in Germany, the resurgence of a nation which today has 
been converted into an industrial power which vigorously 
competes in the traditional markets of the great Western 
powers, and which even in their own domestic markets has 
damaged such colossi as Chrysler and British Leyland, and 
intends to bring to their knees such giants as Ford and 
General Motors. 
A recent news broadcast in London on BBC1(39) 
showed a sequence filmed in the North American city of Detroit, 
cradle of the world's motorcar industry, in which a workman 
from the automobile industry appeared "taking a hammer" to a 
Toyota car. In reality, it was not one but several unemployed 
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workmen who apparently were undergoing a sort of "mental 
catharsis" working off their impotence with a "sledgehammer" 
against their innocent competitor, Toyota. 
Another interesting fact and no less entertaining 
occured during the funeral of Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira 
of Japan. Mrs Margaret Thatcher, President Carter, Chanlellor 
Helmut Schmidt and the rest of the representatives of the 
European Economic Community attended this funeral. 
Some of those who accompanied the British Prime Minister 
were officials belonging to British Leyland and the British 
Overseas Trade Ministry, they asked the japanese to be more 
considerate with their export of motor vehicles to that 
country, and said they would be very grateful if the Japanese 
could curb their exports to no more than a maximum share of 
a 100 of the British market, in order to allow the ill-treated 
British motor industry an opportunity for recovery. 
In the midst of the flowers and the tears of the 
funeral the request was accepted, but later the new Prime 
Minister Zenko Suzuki's government took care to ignore 
such a "gentlemen's agreement". 
For their part, the Germans suffering as the English 
from the same Japanese expansion in the motor car industry, 
threaten to impose protectionist measures to avoid the 
menacing competition in their market. 
"Japan urged to curb car exports" headlined the 
Financial Times on 11th July 1980. The text of the article 
began by indicating that: 
"The leaders of the West German motor 
industry have decided to unite with'the 
chorus of European manufacturers in 
demanding a restriction in exports from 
Japan"(40). 
"The Japanese", said Herr Horst Backsmann, president 
of the West German Motor Industry Federation: 
"achieve a production cost per man-hour of 
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only 15 Marks, while our man-hour cost 
has 
risen to 25 Marks. At the same time, the 
number of hours worked annually by the motor 
industry in Germany has fallen to less than 
1,600 hours per workman, compared with 
around 2,000 hours in Japan, and finally 
their annual total of days worked is 275 
compared with the barely 201 days that we 
work in the Federal Republic. All this 
explains the reason for their aggressive 
penetration in the German market with the 
advantage of a production cost between 20 
and 25 per cent under ours. 
The Japanese aggressive penetration is going on not 
only in the United States as well as in German and England but 
in the rest of the European countries also, so in October 1981 
Japan was given a clear warning that it must abandon its 
present "perilous" trade policies immediately or face tough 
EEC actions. 
Herr Wilhelm Haferkamp, the EEC External Affairs 
Commissioner warned:. 
"Selective import controls to curb cars, 
televisions, and machine tools may have 
to be i-. Dosed" . 
Facing- up to the threats Mr Toshio Komoto, a Japanese 
Cabinet Minis;, er, said on 20th November. 1981: 
"Overseas discontent is rising so high that 
we are almost on the verge of a trade war. 
Discontent in the U. S. and Western Europe 
has been causing a protectionist tendency 
which might deal a fatal blow to the world 
economy"(42). 
But this trade war will be performed by the 
competition between such contenders as Toyota Vs General 
Motors or Mitsibishi Vs IBM and so on. All of them fighting 
for the same prize: markets. 
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"In 1974 Professor David H. Blake pointed out: 
The day may not be too distant when competition 
among multinational corporations from different 
countries will provoke political and economic 
involvement by the respective parent government""(4. s-). 
According to the arguments developed in chapter IV 
of this work(Transnational corporations within the international 
political system), that day, which professor Blake had 
referred to, is on its way or maybe it has already arrived. 
But its consequences for world peace could be unpredictable 
and therefore might lead the Japanese government to a 
different kind of war. 
However, Japan seems to be out of the arms race 
and thence incapable of pursuing any war different than trade 
war. 
The economic miracle of Japan in the past 30 years 
has been produced without the resources which in other 
countries have stemmed from the sale of armaments. Japan 
appears to have destroyed the theory that capitalist developed 
nations require an export weapon industry to maintain their 
economies. 
Nevertheless, the boom in armaments business since 
1973, and the excuse of the supposed Soviet threat in South 
East Asia and the Persian Gulf are changing the outlook of 
some Japan's leaders and pacifists. 
Ikutaro Shimizu, who 10 years. ago was a leading 
pacifist thinker, now declares that Japan needs four attack 
carriers, 100 destroyers and submarines, and 1,000 fighter 
planes for effective defence(44). 
In 1980 Japan had the world's seventh largest 
defence budget and by 1981 it was increased by 9.7%. Tokyo 
cheerfully maintains the fiction that it has no army but the 
Government has managed to establish forces that are now 
268,000 strong. 
In the meantime the big industrial corporations like 
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Hitachi Ltd., Mitsubishi Corporation, Toyota Motor Co. and 
all the conglomerates which can produce the military hardware, 
feel that the time has arrived to increase their profit from 
the new business. 
"The Russians are preparing an attack 
against Japan's northern island of 
Hokkaido" said some Japaneses lobbyists 
in 1980(44).. 
. 
Nobody can imagine how Japan could carry on any 
type of formal rearmament in order to stop the supposed Soviet 
aggression, without getting involved in nuclear armament. 
After 1945, the aftermath of the crushing of Europe's 
industrial structure helped the United States in its fast post- 
war economic growth. 
The future belongs to technology and Japan is, 
beyond doubt, a "Technology-Based Nation" where high-tech 
corporations, with the full support of the country's strong' 
and stable government, are entering a period of unprecedented 
growth. So who can stop stop the Japanese? _ 
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2.2. - Energy crisis or manipulation of information 
Apparently, the foundation of the present crisis is 
based on the accepted wisdom of an inevitable scarcity of oil 
in the near future, and its unstable supply from the convulsed 
Arab World. 
The Soviet Union advances towards the Persian Gulf, 
thirsting for Middle East oil, which is the offered assumption of 
the Pentagon's strategists as an explanation of the USSR's 
presence in Afghanistan. 
A study by CIA, published in 1977, indicates that 
the production of petroleum from Soviet Western Siberia will 
not reach more than 5 million barrels a day by 1978. 
For their part, by the time J. Carter was in charge 
of the White House, his energy advisers insisted on the truth 
of a profound shortage of energy resources in the United States. 
Both statements have been strongly discredited by 
the evidence that not only has the production of oil in the 
Soviet Siberia not been exhausted, but as-vouched for by Dr. 
David Wilson(45), Professor of Soviet Geography of Leeds 
University, it is found to be in expanding production, reaching 
production 6.3 million barrels a day by the end of 1980. 
"There is no evidence", said Professor Wilson, 
that Soviet oil production is going to fall 
in 1981, rather the reverse, it will continue 
increasing at a low rate, to reach 14 million 
barrels a day in 1985 and 15 million in 1990" 
Another study published by E. I. U. Special Reports(46) 
demolishes the idea that the USSR will be a net importer of 
oil by 1985, this study shows that the Soviet Union will be 
exporting more of both oil and gas in 1985, and still exporting 
some 2.3mn b/d of oil and 13bn cu ft/day of gas in 1990. 
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Yet, by the end of 1980, and according to the 
Economist Intelligence Unit's "World Outlook 1981"(47), the 
Soviet Union was producing 12 million barrels a day and 42.8 
billion cubic feet a day of gas. 
In relation to the supposed energy crisis in the 
United States, the recent book of Anthony C. Sutton(48) is 
sufficiently explicit. 
Sutton warns that the Carter administration itself, - 
responding to or manipulated by the interests of the 
transnationals of the oil industry, has created the energy 
problem. 
"Our mythical energy shortage"Sutton indicates, 
"can be dismissed with a few statistics. The US 
consumes about 71 Quads(-`) of energy per year. 
There is available now in the United States, 
excluding solar sources and without oil and 
gas imports, about 150,000 quads. Consequently, 
we have sufficient energy resources to keep us 
functioning at our present rate of consumption 
for about 2,000 to 3,000 years without discovering 
new reserves"(see annex N°14). 
Apparently, the lack of any absolute shortage of 
energy resources was well known in Washington, but according 
to Sutton, many efforts were made by the Carter administration 
to censor release of this evidence. 
However, a revealing picture of U. S. energy abundance 
was published by ERDA(Energy Research and Development Agency) 
this picture is reproduced in annex N°15, " in it we can see 
U. S. domestic energy consumption in 1977(71 quads) is 
represented by the small square in the bottom right. corner of 
the chart. Available energy supplies, with or without new 
technology, are represented by the larger squares on the left. 
In Sutton's opinion: 
"... the only way to generate an energy crisis 
is by converting the big potential squares 
(-) A "quad" is one quadrillion BTUs(i. e. 1015 British 
Thermal Units) Is a standard measure of energy 
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into the little consumption square, and 
this, could only be done by gross and 
deliberate mismanagement"(48). 
Such a mismanagement is what Sutton affirms was the 
situation in Washington in 1978. 
William Brown, Director of Technological Studies, 
Hudson Institute said in 1979: 
"The President(Carter)said there is no chance 
of us becoming independent in our oil supplies. 
That is just wrong. We have at least 100 years 
of petroleum resources in this country"(48). 
So, there is no shortage of energy either in the 
Soviet Union nor in the United States, and if we add to the 
U. S. and USSR oil reserves, the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of 
Mexico, the Venezuelan Orinoco reserves and the unmeasured 
reservoirs of the offshore sedimentary basins, then, it is 
very difficult to say that the world is running out of crude 
oil. 
Rather than scarcity of oil, a new era in oil 
production, extracting the world's most valued natural resource 
from deep waters off the continental shelves has begun. 
According to a Financial Times survey on Offshore 
Technology(49), during the next 20 years offshore discoveries 
could account for between a third and a half of all the world's 
new oil reserves. Much of this oil will be found in regions 
outside those covered by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries(OPEC). 
An oil company man, John Strickland of Conoco made 
his calculations: 
"The world's total expected oil reserves, 
were two thousand billion barrels, assuming 
that about 32 per cent of the oil in the 
reservoirs can be extracted. Some 60 per 
cent of this total has already been found, 
leaving 850 billion barrels yet to be 
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confirmed by exploration teams. And nearly 
40 per cent of this unconfirmed oil, 332 
billion barrels, lies offshore with something 
like 90 billion barrels in U. K., Norwegian 
and Greenland waters"(50). 
Finally, if we want a wider picture of the world's 
oil reserves, one of the most reliable overall petroleum 
estimates comes from former director of the U. S. Geological 
Survey, V. E. McKelvey: 
"... at this point about half the world's 
endowment of presently recoverable crude 
oil has been discovered(and)about one-sixth 
of it has been used up"(48). 
Accepting the estimate that only one-sixth of the 
world's oil potential has been used, then clearly there is no 
fundamental oil crisis for many years. 
So, what happened before and during 1973 that oil 
prices were pushed up so fast? 
Should we blame OPEC for having raised oil prices 
to a point where the world economy was plunged into crisis?. 
Or on the contrary, is there somebody else behind 
OPEC's back, which could be the guilty party?. 
A Philadelphia investigative study carried out in 
1973 by the reporters Donald Bartlett and James Steele(51) 
demonstrates how the government of the United States, and in 
particular the Nixon Administration, in connivance with the 
oil companies, surprised the world with a mythical energy 
crisis, which has seized the world economy, to the direct 
profit of the huge petroleum corporations. 
The conclusions of this study were as follows: 
1. - American multinational oil firms made deliberate long 
term decisions to expand operations in foreign countries 
to meet demands for oil products in Europe and Asia. 
2. - The Nixon Administration failed to lift oil import 
restrictions in 1969 and said that there were no oil 
supply problems. 
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3. - Simultaneously American oil companies were telling 
U. S. 
customers to cut back on consumption, while urging their 
customers in Europe and Asia to buy more oil products. 
4. - The American taxpayer is subsidizing the sale of petroleum 
abroad, through tax allowances and benefits granted to 
American oil companies. 
5. - The gasoline shortage of 1973 was created through 
default 
and bungling by oil companies and the Federal Government. 
6. - In 1973 the oil industry launched an advertising campaign 
to make the American consumer feel responsible for the 
nation's gasoline shortage. Yet for every barrel(42 gallons) 
of oil products sold in the United States the five largest 
companies(Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, Gulf and Standard Oil of 
California) sold nearly two barrels abroad. 
Another refutation of the supposed crisis comes from 
one. of the most orthodox and conservative sectors of American 
opinion, the Wall Street Journal(52). The Journal, taking into 
account the behaviour of the market under economic and business 
conditions, apparently blames the oil transnationals for the 
increase in the petroleum price, when they suggest that the 
energy problem should be analysed from the point of view of 
supply and demand. 
The Journal then makes use of the celebrated equation 
of supply and demand curves. (see figure N°1) 
Figure N°1. 
Price of 
energy 
Supply 
Quantity of energy 
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The Journal concludeds that all this means in 
layman's language is that: 
a. - At higher prices people buy less, at lower prices they 
buy more. 
b. - At higher prices more supply is forthcoming, at lower 
prices less supply is forthcoming. 
c. - Market price is established where. these two forces are 
in equilibrium. 
In the light of the revelations showed by Anthony 
Sutton in his own book, he himself asks: 
"What is the role of the multinational 
corporations in the created crisis? Are 
they on the side of free enterprise and 
the market solution? Alas, among the 
multinationals we not only find the articulate 
proponents of big government but more 
than a suspicion the multinational 
corporations are manipulating big government 
for their own economic benefit"(48). 
The reply to Sutton's questions has a crucial bearing 
on the point we are analysing, and there are two ways of 
replying to them. The first would be to make use of the 
evidence, of the facts and circumstances, which demonstrate 
to us that it is not merely a suspicion that the 
Transnational Corporations(TNCs) of the oil industry manipulate 
information and therefore governments for their own benefit. 
Contemporary history is replete with these facts, 
Sutton's book is full of details in relation to the manipulations 
of the TNCs in the very heart of the White House. 
"The Seven Sisters" by Anthony Sampson(53) also 
provides abundant information on restoration, support and 
control of dictators, both royal and military, in the oil 
producing countries. 
The second of the responses, perhaps the more 
interesting one, is that which can be made using the approach 
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of the cybernetic theory. 
Taking as the point of departure the statements 
pointed out by J. K. Galbraith in 1967(incidentally, before 
the 1973 oil crisis), in his book "The New Industrial State" 
(54), we could say that if we compare the basic theories of 
cybernetics, which we outlined in Chapter I of this work, 
with those which are outlined in Chapters I to VI of 
Galbraith's book, we shall note not only a congruence of 
both postulates in relation to the current behaviour of the 
TNCs, but in addition, those elements of judgement which 
enable us to suspect that the increases 
in price of oil since 
1973 obey an action which had already been studied in advance 
by the oil TNCs, and figured in the expansion plans for the 
world petroleum industry. 
In accordance with what Galbraith sets out, the 
market economy in which prices are established by supply and 
demand has been replaced, in the case of TNCs, by an 
authoritarian process of price determination. 
This process, which is based on so-called vertical 
integration of the industry, permits the TNCs to replace the 
market forces by a control mechanism based on planning, which 
guarantees the total elimination of the uncertainty which 
normally accompanies a market economy. 
Such a process occurs, according to Galbraith, when 
the standard of production calls for high technologies, which 
in turn demand huge investments of capital and time. 
For the great TNCs which depend on the supply of 
raw material, the control of the suppliers is transformed 
into a simple matter of elementary security precautions, and 
the cost of acquisition of additional supplies acquires a 
strategic value in their production process. 
But price control is only part of the control of 
the market. The uncertainty in obtaining capital, management, 
labour, and technology cannot be left to the judgement of the 
market forces either, and for this reason the TNCs establish 
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plans which guarantee total control over the suppliers of 
these resources in accordance with their objectives and at 
their own rate of expansion. 
When the TNCs plan at medium or long range, they 
do so with information concerning reality wnicn_they control in 
all its ambits, which is why it is difficult to believe that 
the price increases which were decreed for petroleum in 1973 
by the member states of OPEC came as a surprise to the oil 
TNCs. 
The exploration and development of the offshore 
oil began in 1965 especially in the United Kingdom sector of 
the North Sea. Since then, it is estimated that the oil 
industry has invested till 1979 US$ 22 thousand million or 
US$ 30bn at 1979 prices. 
In the early 1970s it was costing the industry 
roughly US$ 500 in development costs to produce each daily 
barrel, yet in 1979 and according to the Energy Department's 
"Brown Book" on offshore statistics, it was costing the 
industry on average US$ 8 to produce each barrel of North 
Sea oil. For fields under development at the end of 1979 the 
average was nearer US$ 10 per barrel. In some cases the costs 
were as high as US$ 23 a barrel. 
When the oil TNCs planned their fabulous offshore 
investment, not only in the U. K. sector of North Sea but in 
the United States, Latin America, The Mediterranean, West 
Africa, the Middle East and Asia, the price of a barrel of 
crude oil was quoted in the international market at US$ 3.30. 
Therefore, it would be ridiculous to think that the rise in 
1973 was a "stroke of luck". 
In other words, the so-called "energy crisis", and 
all that it has meant for the world economy, has its 
explanation not in the bosom of the OPEC countries, which 
justly claim a better share of the economic interchange with 
the industrialized countries, but in the confidential archives 
of Exxon, the minutes of the Board of British Petroleum, the 
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studies of investment and development by Shell, and the 
expansion plans of Mobil, of Gulf, of Texaco and Socal. 
When all is said and done, if the present crisis 
does not constitute the final threshold of a major conflict, 
its impact on world political and economic equilibrium and 
on the influence of new political power groups has generated 
a series of alternatives, of which war itself is one 
choice. 
In the face of this alternative, the analysis of 
technological dependence(which will be carried out in Chapter 
III) is one key factor in the understanding of the phenomena 
which we are examining in this work. 
Although our interest does not revolve around a 
deep study of the phantom of war, its introduction in the 
form in which we have employed it follows from the fact that when 
we study sovereignty and the problems of its vulnerability 
through what we have called the technological route, we must 
try not only to point out the causes and consequences of such 
vulnerability but furthermore, search after possible 
alternatives. One of them, as we will explain later will, 
paradoxically, be war. 
We do not try to be fatalistic, much less handle 
lightly the ghost of war, but unfortunately, the analysis 
demonstrates to us that technology is tightly linked to 
comtemporary power and we could not have studied technological 
dependence without searching for its implications in the 
field of the expansion or loss of power of the nations which 
today control technology. 
On the other hand, the technology of the post- 
industrial era of computing and communications, has manifested 
a new style of power, and it is within this context, where 
technological dependency is converted into an instrument, not 
only of control and domination, but also for deepening the 
development gap of the nations of the Third World. 
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Index of economic 
indicators 
,. takes -'steep plunge .. ý. BY DAVID 6UCHAN IN WASHINGTON - 
THE ` INDEX of leading econo- 
mic indicators, ' -designed to The U. S. trade deficit im. ______ Lam.. ý_L_ýý. ýý_ý_ "ýS at. gauge Loo- suture course vi tae 
U. S. economy, took " an espe- 
cially steep plunge" of 2.7 per 
cent in September, the Govern- 
meat reported yesterday. 
This was, the biggest monthly 
i drop in- the'-index since April, 
1980, and it confirmed the U. S: " 
q economy has entered its second 
recession Im two years,., as all top 
officials is the Reagan-Adminis- 
tration Snow sdntit. 
The largest factor In the Sep. 
tember index's decline was a 
sharp rise, for the second sue 
cessive month, in the rate of 
U, S. workers being laid- OL 
uh, t aioht nF tha in emmnonP_nta 
proved sharply in September, q 
dropping to $2.6bn (£1.43bn) 
from $5.6bn in August, the 
Commerce Department has 
reported. Exports rose by 3.2 
per . cent over the previous 
i 
month and imports were down I 
by 9.9 per cent. 
The Department attributed 
thr $3bn improvement largely 
to a return to normal after an 
artificially high. level of Im- 
ports in August, when the . 
', 
dollar,. was at its highest. 
Importers, suspecting that the 
dollar was about to fall, 
accelerated their foreign pur. 
'""` '"°' aý a- -" -- - chases to take advantage of used in mking. up the Septeri the high rate in Au ber index showed a downturn. gust, it 
The Administration: saläyester r . 
said. ° 
day it saw' no light at the end The weakening 
of the U. S. 
et: the' teoubmie tunnel until Economy also contributed to 
. nett 
year,. with Industrial'-pm': : the, slowdown in imports. 
duction, and 3e gross national which tell. by $2bn to $22.2bn, 
product expected- ti co'atinue the Department said. Exports, 
their slide for the Nat of this ; lu September, rose to $19.6bn. 
year. . '. t, 
' 
With the consequences of 
recession for the federal budget of $5?. 9bti-$2bn eve the 
deficit now manifest. Mr David White douse estimate. The, 
Stockman, the Reagan budget" Administration had hoped to' 
director, has äwbrned Corrgreas keep;. the cdirrerit year's defcitý 
that revenue could fall short of., , within $43ýbrr.. ' - publte spending 
, 
in, thee current, Economic recession depresses. 
19$1.82 fiscal year by as much profits' and incomes, - and thud, 
ae. , 
$1)Qbn, (£54 9bn); if, thq Federal tax revenues, while ati leglelatpra take no, furt}ýc thq Game time increasing unem"' 
action to prune spending. ' playmmesnt. and thus Government His warning, drew : weighty payments to the " jobless,,. support yesterday from Mr Paul Mr Beryl Sprinkel, the. Trea- 
Volcker, the Federai Reserve. sury under-Secretary for - Mone-' 
Board chal'rman, who told Conk tart' Affairs, spelt out the im-, 
gresamQn they Should now show ptications 
for 
the markets of' 
motle.,, vigour. -than ever irk cut-, Washington's new. budgetary' tixg Wending,, If- Goverment, 'squeeze, when he announced on 
deficits and borrowing were snot; Wednesday that the 'Govern- 
to swell out of control, meat would have, to borrow. 
A. foretaste of the deteriorit" $34.9bn" in the final three+ 
ir; g ,, picttn e, its -federal finances 'months of 1981, and another cane as- ' the; ; 
Administration " $29bn"$32bri" in the first. 
ann3unf ed A hat the t98ß8b ; quarter of. 1982. 4= 1 year had, ended ; on Seiýºfi -Moves to' ease savings beaks 
eßver$. P! je 27 
, 
x. R #*y: wwi -A 
4 
ý 
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W. German industry 
investment `will 
stagnate next year' 
BY JONATHAN CARR IN BONN 
INDUSTRIAL investment in the exploitation of dorDestic 
West Germany will in general coal to cut the country's im- 
stagnate next year, although the ported energy dependence. 
mining sector will register The institute notes that if the 
another big spending increase. economy picks up in coming This emerges from a survey months, these investment 
of the investment plans of more figures will be revised upwards. than 5,000 enterprises taken by But its survey also makes clear the IFO Economic Research that even if this occurs, a Institute of Munich this autumn, 
and published today. 
The survey shows that, over- 
all, industrialists will invest only 
about the same sum in plant 
and machinery in nominal 
terms in 1982 as they dirt this 
rear. That means a rut of nearly 4 per cent in real terms after 
allowing for inflation. 
marked improvement on the 
labour market cannot be 
expected. 
Only 19 per cent of indus- 
trialists say their main invest- 
ment aim next year is to eniarZe 
capacity-compared with 34 per 
cent who gave this aim this 
year. 
Much the worst-hit sector On the other hand, 53 per 
remains the constriction cent will he investing mainly 
industry, which will see an to rationalise. compared with 
investment cut in nominal 41 per cent this year. 
terms of 10 per cent next year, This intensification- of the 
after one of 25 per cent this drive to rationalise helps sup- 
year. port recent forecasts that the 
The mining industry will average number of jobless will 
show a rise of 17 per cent after rise to more than 1.6m next 
one of 30 per cent this year- year from 1.3m this year-even 
a boom stimulated above all by if economic growth improves. 
Real incomes will have to 
fall, says Lambsdorff 
BONN - Count Otto 
Lambsdorff, the West German 
Fronomi. cs Minister, said yester- 
day that real incomes will have 
to fall in the coming, pay round, 
and called on both employers 
and unions to show restraint 
" There is appreciably less to 
,o round this time, and this fact 
must be accepted, " he said in a 
West German radio interview. 
Too much -should not be 
expected from talks tomorrow 
between Government, unions 
and employers, which have been 
called to discuss rising unem- 
ployment. The Government has 
no new plans or initiatives to 
unveil, he added. 
Herr Alois Pfeiffer, a mem- 
ber of the West German trade 
union federation's national 
executive, told a television in- 
terviewer that real wages v: ill 
have to he maintained if econo- 
mic demand is to he stimulated. 
The unions will take account 
of the unemployment probl? r, 
in formulatinz their wane 
demands, he added. 
Reuter i 
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J. S. airborne troops fly 
to Cairo for manoeuvres BY ANTHONY McDERMOTT IN 
ABOUT 1,000 U. S. troops, many 
of them from the S2nd Airborne 
Division arrived at Cairo West 
airbase yesterday to take part 
in a three-week joint military 
exercise with Egyptian forces. 
- Code-named " Bright Star. " 
the operation will be on a larger 
scale than last year and a total 
of 4.000 U. S. troops and an 
equivalent number of Egyptians 
will be involved in three-stage 
exercises lasting until Novem- 
ber 25. The exercises will also 
involve operations at a later 
date in Sudan, Somalia and 
Oman. 
At one point eight B-52's 
CAIRO 
flown direct from North Dakota 
are due to make live bombing 
runs over the western desert. 
Operation Bright Star has re- 
ceived little attention in the 
Egyptian Press, beyond a state- 
ment by Gen. Abdel-Halim Abu 
Ghavala, the Defence Minister, 
who emphasised the benefits for 
Egypt of joint training with the 
U. S. 
Meanwhile members of two 
Egyptian Communist organisa" 
tions have been arrested in the 
first announced clampdown on 
the Left since Mr Hosni 
Mubarak became President 
nearly a month ago. 
I 
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Begin calls decision a `danger' 
to Israel 
. 
'- BY DAVID LENNON IN JERUSALEM 
THE U. S. Senate decision to 
sell Awac's surveillance aircraft 
to Saudi Arabia poses a "new 
and serious danger" to Israel, 
Mr Menahem Begin, the Prime 
Minister, said yesterday. He 
warned: "We will do what we 
have to do is order to over- 
come this threat. " 
He did not specify how Israel 
would combat this ." new danger, " but there have been 
repeated hints by other officials 
and military experts that, if 
necessary, Israel would not hesi- 
tate to shoot down the Saudis' 
spy planes. 
Mr Ariel Sharon, the Defence 
Minister, said that the supply 
of Awacs and F-15s to Saudi 
Arabia is "a very serious 
decision. " 
. 
The. danger, he said, 
lies in the tendency to give 
sophisticated weapons to the 
Arabs which will help them 
close the military gap "be. 
.,.. ..... - . u. C. r. r.: -4- :r: 
A-. v .-..... .... _ ... ..... .-.. ...... i... G.. ....... - 
tween them and us. " 
Speaking after a special 
Cabinet session to discuss the 
outcome of the Senate vote., 
Mr Begin expressed Israel's. 
regrest over the decision, since 
" Saudi Arabia is in a state of 
war with Israel, rejects they 
Camp David accords and; 
finances terror in our region. "' 
Israel waged a lengthy battle 
to try to block the U. S. -Saudi 
arms deal and especially the 
supply of the sophisticated sur- 
veillance aircraft which its 
believes will expose the coun- 
try's military secrets. 
Jerusalem was yesterday try-i 
ing to assess the significance of; 
the Senate defeat for the: 
Israeli lobby in Washington. Mr; 
Begin paid tribute. to their. 
efforts, saying '1 the friends of: 
Israel conducted the just:, 
struggle with courage and 
dignity. " 
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So what 
are Nato 
tactics ? 
by Jon Connell, 
Defence Correspondent 
THE AMERICAN secretary of 
state, Alexander Haig, was 
correct when he revealed to the, 
Senate foreign affairs committee 
last Wednesday that Nato might 
"fire a nuclear weapon for 
demonstrative purposes. " The 
statement caused horror among' 
European peace movements and 
brought a swift denial by the 
defence secretary, Caspar Wein- 
berger, that there is any such 
plan. 
But semantics apart, Haig's 
statement makes sense. Nato's 
actual "plans" for waging a 
nuclear war essentially add up 
to sets of targets designed to fit 
specific situations. A particular 
kind of Soviet attack might 
demand that certain targets be 
selected from a particular "tar- 
geting folders" at Nato head- 
quarters. 
The " plan " Haig floated 
is not among these more precise 
alternatives, which is why Wein- 
berger could deny that it exists. 
But there is nothing to prevent 
Nato leaders abandoning specific 
plans in a war and opting 
instead for such a "demonstra. 
tive strike. " 
Though Haig did not spell out 
what he meant, he was implying 
that Nato could use one bomb 
simply to demonstrate that it 
could no longer contain an 
enemy attack by conventional 
means. The idea would be to 
explode the bomb in the air- 
to minimise fallout-over enemy 
troops, over the sea or, more 
likely, over a deserted area of 
the Soviet Union in the hope 
that this might prove sufficient 
to deter further aggression. 
To a West German chancellor 
faced with the appalling pros- 
pect of having battlefield wea- 
pons devastate his - or east European soil (thus inviting 
immediate retaliation) - such 
a "demonstration" might seem 
a possible way out. And a Brit- 
ish junior foreign minister, 
Douglas Hurd. told the Cnm. 
mons on Thursday : "It has 
always been recognised that 
Nato strategy embraced actions 
that would be primarily demon. 
strative in effect. " 
The idea of a nuclear " shot 
across the bows" first surfaced, 
in fact, in 1945. Several of the 
scientists advising President 
Truman urged him not to at- 
tack Hiroshima or Nagasaki but 
to explode a bomb over the 
desert or a barren island to 
show Japan what would follow 
if it did not surrender. The 
idea was rejected, not least be- 
cause America then possessed 
only two bombs. If the demon- 
stration one failed to go off, for 
example, the threat might not 
seem plausible. 
In the first period of the cold 
war, when the West was vastly 
superior to Russia in nuclear 
weapons, there was little need 
to think about such " demon- 
strative use. " But as Russia's 
arsenal expanded and Nato be- 
gan rethinking its strategy, the 
possibility re-emerged : in the 
late Sixties, when Denis Healey 
was defence secretary in Britain, 
it was intensely discussed in 
Nato. Since then it has come to 
seem less credible but, according 
to one Nato official, it is still 
very much on " the list of 
options. " 
The problem, however, is that 
most military planners, believe 
it would achieve little: the effect 
of a demonstrative strike might 
simply be taken by Moscow as 
a sign that the nuclear thresh- 
old had been crossed and invite 
massive retaliation. But to politicians, particu- 
larly in central Europe, it might 
seem a plausible way of show- 
ing that Nato meant business: 
if a German chancellor refused 
to agree to the use of battle- 
field weapons in Europe, an 
American president would be 
unlikely to try and - overrule 
him. If he did, the Germans 
could simply surrender, prob- 
ably followed by the Belgians 
and the Dutch. As David Owen 
puts it, a demonstrative ex- 
plosion might, "in the event 
of an all-out conventional 
attack, " be "the only sensible 
political nuclear response. " 
Many Euroneans are unnerved 
by the way the whole tortuous 
debate about nuclear weapons 
has suddenly burst into the open 
after years of secrecy. 
Much of it appears to be emer- 
ging because of a private 
struggle between Haig and 
Weinberger for control of US 
foreign policy making. It is 
hardly an atmosphere likely to 
lead to enlightenment. 
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Neutron 
bomb 
for US. 
by Sunday Times reporters 
PRESIDENT Reagan has decided 
, to go ahead with the full produc- 
tion of the controversial neutron 
bomb,, the New York Times 
reports today. The move to make 
neutron bombs and artillery shells 
is bound to provoke protests from 
European anti-nuclear groups who 
are already campaigning against 
the siting of Cruise and Pershing 
missiles in Europe. 
Reagan's decision-predicted 
by the Sunday Times last month 
-comes at a sensitive time for European-American relations. The 
last time that production of the 
bomb was discussed in 1978 it led 
to strains within the alliance 
The neutron bomb is a so- 
called enhanced radiation 
weapon which is designed to kill 
people with less destruction of 
property than existing nuclear 
weapons. It is a battlefield 
weapon designed principally for 
uie against armoured units. 
Preisiden" Reagan ham repor. _1 tedly dtderetI that the new bombs 
ar artillery shells'' be deployed 
on ly in the- United States and that 
%aity decision to, base them in 
Europe would b&taken. only, alter 
f*ujl caqsit1ration.. witiv N4to ailiesw 
- According to The `Nero York Times there was a conflict of 
views . between Alexander Haig, Secretary of State, and Casper 
Weinberger, Defence Secretary, 
over when to build the new 
weapons: Haig contended that 
the decision to go ahead would 
have serious repercussions on 
relations with the allies, but 
Weinberger and Reagan decided 
that the Europeans should not he 
given a veto over US weapons 
Policy. 
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39 fi*. ngers on nuclear 
buttons 
PETER PRINGLE reports on a, chilling disclosure from Washington 
THE United States appears to 
have confirmed, for the first time, 
that in certain extreme circum- 
stances the President does not 
have to authorise the firing of 
nuclear weapons. In these circurtd- 
statbO" egeh ', of America's 39 
nuclear submarine commanders 
is empowered to arm and tire his 
weapons without receiving special 
, codes, from. the White House. This means they manoeuvre out- 
side the comprehensive ., system 
operating on land=based -missile and bombers, where technical safe- 
guards make it impossible for com- 
manders to act on their own. 
Confirmation of the submarines' 
independent capability comes from 
Admiral Powell Carter, communica- 
tions director of strategic and 
theatre nuclear warfare, in a CBS 
television series on America's 
nuclear arsenal due to start being 
shown here next Sunday. 
`There is nothing on a submarine 
system that prevents [a launch] 
mechanically through some sort of interlock system says the 
admiral 
The official Pentagon line has 
always been that the commanders of 
the 'US nuclear submarine- fleet:! 
! carrying' 4,000 tlftlear-tv arh eads- 
are unable to launch missiles " on 
their own. Admiral Powell anys they 
can, even though a tuissile isunch 
would necessitate the caption 
of practical) the entir4etsew. 
The reason for the submarines' 
independent capability is clear : in 
the event of a surprise nuclear attack, 
communications between the Presi- 
dent (or his successor if the Presi- 
dent were dead) might become 
impossible. Underwater communica- 
tion is in any case much more difficult 
than that with land and air units. Admiral Powell's statement is 
expected to cause an angry reac- 
tion among nuclear disarmament 
groups worried about the risk of an 
accidental missile launch. It follows 
two moves to strengthen . the 
L'S 
nuclear arsenal. 
Without a special presidential 
directive the Department of 
Energy, which produces the 
nuclear material for America's 
nuclear weapons, was last week 
exported to have started to produce 
radioactive tritium for insertion in 
the neutron warheads of -Lance 
missiles. The original idea was for 
these to be deployed in Europe. 
President Carter deferred pro- 
duction of the neutron weapons in 
1978, but last year approved produc- 
tion on 350 low-yield Lance war- 
heads while deciding not to allocate 
the tritium needed to turn them 
into neutron warheads. 
I 
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China: The same old tuns 
WIIEN DENG Xiaoping was 
recently asked by Italian press- 
men in Peking if it were true 
that the Chinese leaders 
thought war was inevitable, he 
replied: 
"Yes, we still believe war 
will break out sooner or later 
Is it possible that Deng 
realises the calamities that a 
big international conflict 
would in this nuclear age, 
bring on mankind - including 
the Chinese people 
themselves'. ' 
It would he useless to ask 
him that question, however. 
The Peking leaders, with their 
expansionist ambitions, have 
long proclaimed war not only 
inevitable but even desirable, 
relegating ordinary people 
to the role of cannon- 
fodder. 
R sLm what Mao said: 
It doesn't matter if ills 
Fall man in Nor will it 
matter mugT7 only ä thirrd 
survives. 
Deng has expressed the 
hope that his "inevitable war" 
will not take place for at least 
. 
20 years. " Why that period" 
Twenty years is about the 
time the Chinese leaders think 
it %% ill take them to carry out 
their "four modernisations" - 
by which they mean, 
primarily, to complete the 
militarisation of the country 
- and then begin to carry out 
their great-power plans. 
Those plans are no secret. 
Out of the 30 military con- 
flicts in Asia since the second 
world war, 19 have been 
provoked by China. And 
Chinas territorial claims on 
neighbouring countries 
involve an area as large as 
China itself. 
Deng probably hopes to cut 
that 20 years down with the 
help he expects from some 
countries in the West. 
Which explains why he has 
made it clear that China's 
strategic policy is 
"maintenance of -friendly 
relations with the United 
States. " 
This strategy, by- which 
China assumes the role of 
assistant and junior partner of 
imperialism, is meeting with 
growing "understanding" in 
Washington and Nato, where 
some groups hope to further 
their own political ends by 
playing the China card. 
These groups are gambling 
on Peking's anti-Sovietism. 
but they ought to remember 
the lesson of history: that he 
who encourages and arms an 
aggressor often falls the first 
victim. 
To sum up. 
Beng's statement makes it 
clear that, four years after 
Mao's death, Peking's rulers 
still cling to his concept of the 
inevitability of war. 
And Peking is still prepared 
to sacrifice half mankind in 
pursuit of Chinese 
domination. 
True, Deng did not say in 
which half of mankind the 
Peking leaders place 
themselves, but you may guess 
that they propose to be among 
the survivors. 
And then, no doubt, to 
build some sort of new 
Peking-style world on the 
ruins. 
YURY KORNILONo' 
ý 
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David Buchan in Washington 
, How the U. S. could *rearm 
Pe ... 1-.,.... king's. military mächine 
M"ý. "tipdatL'"'--th military 
Tl`ý9 'lird leviathan would cost in the 
, Mr, AleCxandpr 
Haig. vt3 t to Australia and New Zealand region of $300bn, according to 
. bivi , 4$$,,, y+e& was ,tS. voiced reservations yesterday one military specialist. 
Weapons 
dPcisiog' to `allow rchir i . to 
ti: iy about some aspects of U. S, expects have said that no. ones 
61. uti, ted 
yipMbO" V ietMh'police In Asia outlined by European defence industry-or' 
weapaps. ý,, 'Tbi. s, plus. 
4rttlse, Mr Alexander Haig, the U. S. even all together--could more 
aduliabioz tt, at t`ýe . 
3. . ""1ºad Secretary of State. Reuter than dent the problem, while 
set rüa. r*ssile=traeking reports from Wellington. Air the U. S. arms industry Is 
statlo U4.4ido .t Met 
Haig has been urging already under strain without" 
'. what'w gdinb »fet Increased efforts to lsotate fulfilling vact 
Union: i raise eý . S. Vietnam if It does not with- '''pn ý'" 
TF1@diADäüLp TO. Hýý"; ýý ursw iý ývuývvv uvupa rrum ¬114J1T4, ¢e ýý ý!! ' [[ýClQý : lüýjiýs 
Kampuchea. .. VofScoift' eliDtO 
It also suggested the U. S. was 
But, according to Mr Brian China Is been window-shop"" 
intent on keeping up its 'Talbot's, New Zealand's 
relationship with Peking rather 
Foreign Minister, during ping in Europe since 1977, but 
than Taiwan. Both Moscow and yesterday's meeting of the has bought very little., Heli- 
Taipei were sharply critical of Anus Cquncil, which groups copter-, have been important: 
France's Aerospatiale sold 30 in the proposed injection of 
sthe ome discussion 
a allies, 
on tthere 
was 
he extent 
ale, 
military 
if urjustifiestrength 
. into China. to which present policies 
1977 and another 50 last year. 
(Taiwan reacted with. . -; alarm. 
. might be pushing Vietnam 
West Germany's Messerschmidt- 
ý: abl 
{From Moscow's viewpoint, it further into the arms of the. 
Bolkow 
three. -and 
- 
Bell 
Bloehm 
(of th 
despatched 
U. S. ) 
has shifted the global balance 
Soviet " Union. " Mr Tony 
eight in - 1979. However, the 
of power. But what will it add 
Street, Australian Foreign eight haggling, 
However, 
on 
up to in: --terms of improved 
Minister, said however, that rice, over the British Harrier 
Chinese military capacity, when 
Australia had decided p 
i Peking is broke and already 15 
Vietnam's invasion of Jump. jet, fighter, came to noth- 
to 20 years behind? 
Kampuchea was totally ing. 
China's forces are quite out. unacceptable. -In 
1975 the Chinese bought 
classed by those of its neigh ....... 
an £SOm production line, plus 
bours. Mainly equipped with f 
technology, for the Rolls- 
' 1950s weapons, they will take 
Royce Spey engine, intended to 
i., ý .. -A power a, supersonic -Chinese vca, a a"" --Ai- "' """"ý"" - V1C1. D3111. the lAüa1CDC uaeu Mul 
to anxignuse.,, ýe ". - tb usa them. 
Peking bass, - of ' touf ,., a The navy Is largely a coastal htrurlear capability,,. ht , its defence force, but has about 100 
deliver Sy%V . Pa . 403d. submarines with one nuclear Last year,.. t successfuüy'tested vessel which is .. reported never, its flr*Interconthtentai, lisý to have. functioned properly. A= ll4i eMld'f: And it hZt a' ffa1'C 4t1Lm- 
`tier ei 
But its missiles are probably 
still liquid-fuelled. It has no 
second-strike capacity. ý 
r 
I 
A long way after this strategic 
force comes the army of 3.8m 
: men, equipped with about 12,000 gold Soviet or Soviet-type tanks. 
It has some surface-to-surface 
tmissiles and a, few wire-guided 
' anti-tank weapons, but other- 
wise mainly old-style artillery. 
The air force has 5.000 or 
more aircraft, about four-fifths 
of them fighters, of which most 
are old MMG17s and 19s or 
Chinese copies, Of the re- 
mainder, about 550 are light 
. and medium 1950s-vintage Soviet bombers. Despite the 
numbers, aircraft are precious 
tin Chinn" in thn 1070 we.. ..,; f1, 
second is thought to be under- 
going trials. It has fewer than 
40 major-surface combat ships, 
only- about -halt equipped, with 
surface-to-surface or surface-to- 
air missiles. 
Industry, and consequently 
arms production, made little 
; progress in the 1960s and 1970s because of constant political 
struggles. Even many Chinese 
seem to have lost faith in their 
ability to manufacture. arms. 
The ' 1979 Vietnam war 
revealed how inferior Chinese 
artillery was, lacking night- 
vision sights or automatic 
range-finders, The export of 
Chinese-made MiGs to Pakistan 
has shown up their inadequacy 
compared with the genuine 
Russian article, which is more 
versatile and needs servicing 
fighter. This is now completed, 
but not operating. The Chinese 
could not design an airframe 
to put it in. 
in the 18 months since hir 
Harold Brown, the former° 
Defence Secretary, announced 
after a trip to Peking that China 
would be allowed to buy non- 
lethal military equipment, the 
. 
U. S. has had much the same 
experience. Some 40 export 
applications have been made by 
U. S. companies, but few have 
come to fruition-the most 
notable being the sale of Cessna 
aircraft with special photo- 
graphic equipment. 
While small packages like this 
may have some effect, the prob- 
lems remain enormous. Ill. 
equipped Chinese infantrymen 
are sitting across the border 
from 42 well-armed Soviet divi- 
sions. 
`ý i.;. "o . ". . ýý. ý. ý .. a, """ý less frequently. 
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A might outdated: the 
power of warriors of the 
People's Republic 
A RARE glimrse of the 
Chinese military in action : 
units of the People's Libera- 
tion Army from Peking, with. 
air support and a naval pres- 
ence, are seen here staging a 
recent exercise on the north 
China plain. The display, 
which was followed by a 
grand parade, was suit3bý, y 
east. The Chinese '' armed 
fore"; at 4,750,000 "peoplen 
, all, are the largest in 
* 
, all, 
world. However. foc the party 
and state leaders watching, in 
particular for Deng Xiaoping 
(left), it must have been a 
forceful reminder of the 
problem China faces, writes 
Jon Connell. 
As chairman of the military 
commission of the central 
committee, Deng is charged 
with modernising his coun- 
try's defences: For China's Chief of the Defence Staff, 
military machine is no match has just returned from a week 
for those of its neighbours: it in Peking. 
is plagued by inefficiency and The difficulty is that China 
chronically under-equipped. is desperately short of cash. 
Its MiG fighters and most of J'ully, "¢tOderx4ing its rued 
its 12.000 tanks were salvaged Xorces would cost-: at. et 
or copied from the Russians tlr>0', [)0ý"Iiritt ? rct.,, 
in the Sixties or before. -sera =ix is 'spendinj lily 
Chiata's 
. 
top bsas>§w. . 
tlt 
- arc oun , ,t' `azyeir :1e, are shopping, araiý s)n.. ce (not including The Amerihan government is service pay). And because of Ign to hql , 3,. <. 
lij pressures on the economy the 
they ban''ýº%lfic'ý1ý'rsc Ined army modernisation pro- 
arsis* aaýufacturers:.: `fcoig gramme has recently been 
Belli , fo the Peopie's., R*pdemoted in the list of priori- 
1W.;. 
, 
EEO, c? w+tttriec, E#na. ties. It was perhaps appro- 
, re anxious to take zdyawalp ' priate that Yang Dezhi, on his 
ab# srch . a, p. utea4a14, 
British visit, should linger 
nýuu&-: markt: Recently the longest not amid the high 
chief"of`''China's general staff, technology of our forces, but 
General Yang Dezhi, visited in the more historic surround- 
Britain and General - Sir ings of Nelson's flagship, 
Edwin Bramall, our own HMS Victory. 
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Nucleärcrisis 
grips Germans 
SIEGFRIED BUSCHSCHLUTER in Cologne 
NOT SINCE the fall of lion no longer see a need for 
Willy Brandt and the additional nuclear missiles in 
detection of a communist Europe- They acknowledge 
spy in the Chancellery the unprecedented 
build-up 
seven years ago have 
of Soviet SS-20 strategic mis- 
siles, most aimed at Europe. 
But tliey maintain that 
gone through such turbo- America's' existing nuclear 
lent times as in the last shield is a sufficient deter. 
seven days. rent. 
There have been threats to At his party congress, 
quit from Chancellor Schmidt 
Genscher admitted the reason 
and Foreign' Minister Gen- 
for sticking to NATO's deci- 
scher over the issue of lion was political. 
If Europe 
American nuclear missiles in rejected the stationing of 
Europe as well as a resigna- theatre nuclear 
forces on 
tion threat from a regional a serious 
said, it would cause 
Social Democratic prime a serious crisis of confidence 
minister and the actual resig- 
in relations with the United 
nation of-the Hamburg Social 
States. 
Democrat mayor over the 
The option of sea-launched 
expansion of nuclear energy. 
missiles had been rejected by 
A chain reaction has put the 
NATO because they did not 
survival of the ruling coali- 
have the same deterrent 
tion of Social Democrats and effect 
He won the vote by 271 
liberal Free Democrats in 
to 103 with ei 'ht abstentions, but the revolt "s strength was jeopardy. a shock. Both Schmidt and Genscber Schmidt had twice threat. have won important votes on ened to resign before going the missiles issue, but have to Washington. The real test 
given hostages to fortune by will come at the party con- l;, iking their own personal gress next spring. 
f; itures to progress on arms . The SPD-FDP coalition in 
control. Bonn is going through a diffi- The fact that each felt the cult patch, each party wrest. need to threaten resignation ling v ith its own dissident 
reflects the intensity of the left wing. Last week, the backlash in their own parties Social Democrat mayor of against the NAT04cCigioWt Hamburg -resigned because ati0=Mý, se rntssüe he failed to carry his parka. d 10$üß'i1s in, WgsE mentary group with him in Europeeyyqq all-out opposition to the pro- Tlie'7ear of a nuclear holo- posed Brokdorf nuclear 
caust in a country so peri. power station. 
lously exposed to the claws In -Hessen, the Social 
of the Russian bear and Democrat Premier called an 
already bristling with hun" extraordinary party con. dreds of ballistic missiles, is gress to secure a vote of con- very real. , 4i fidence on his policies of People are frightened by expanding nuclear enerp-. 
the prospect of a limited The atom has split the SPD 
nuclear war. Frontline Ger- down the middle. 
many, where most of the 
modernised US missiles 
would be based, would be 
wiped out in any nuclear 
exchange between the super- 
Powers. 
Even after Schmidt's talks 
with President Reagan in 
Washington and their agree- 
ment that `equal weight' 
should be given to the twin 
elements of the 1979 NATO 
derision - stationing plus 
arms control talks - doubts 
persist about America's wil- 
ingness to achieve progress 
in talks with Moscow. 
Critics of the NATO deci- 
4 
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'g'rade warning to Japan f BY GILES MERRITT IN BRUSSELS 
cprted attack has wire a ýccozding to Ncnior. 
`Comniis- 
r, n surprise, however. 1Sccan"? O't" Sion officials, . hest would- 
at, anrtcýn itýýýraM+trF'i'jýrti'ftirhs " , ýz, nt"Epýt"ýCed probably, . run for. five years trede? +Alc 1'ýINiQ mi ont wl tºtr = the while EEC rettructJving took 
face tddxh Lý lt'edi; ýttapn ß+i*an ptnee: 
The threats being made M61orO ` 19tzittitetPC>r *C. % mivls. The UN161, wclcomc. to tlte- 
against Japan if it fails to lii`t'achf; Mifst f'` tt' BMC Japanese. xititsion was similarly 
Irestrain its exports and abolish 'l"kV4, -, w$s4nftelMdf&. 1a ': old. 
import barriers.. range from ifichtwttiai. " tn+restv". 1i `" or. In a format statement Ste 
action under the 'General Agree- tunitielrtn'Rnroprv$^ Guido Carli. the organisation's 
, ment on 
Tariffs and Trade But Commission officials president, accused Japan of 
( GATT) " to "breathing space" opted to use the mission's visit operating import restrictions 
icontrols aimed at protecting the to Brussels to stress the serious from non-tariff barriers to 
EEC's most vital industries. consequences of Japan's failure secret quotas and of operating 
The European Commission to curb its rising trade surplus. price cartels that cornered 
sand the Brussels-based UNICE Herr Wilhelm Hakerkamp, supplies of key industrial 
'European employers' organisa- the EEC External Affairs Com- materials to the EEC's disad" 
! tion both warned Japan that missioner, put the Community's vantage. 
urgent trade concessions were likely 1981 trade gap with Brussels officials 
hope the 
; essential if a trade war was to Japan at a record $15bn Ihnanese Government will he 
'be avoided. (fT. 9bn) and warned that able to outline a package of 
The warnings were issued to selective import controls, to trade measures to avert nrotec- 
+a mission of top-ranking curb cars, televisions and tionist action by the Commun- 
Japanese business leaders tour" machine tools may have to be ity in eavly November. 
ing EEC capitals. The con- imposed. "Super" computer talks, Page 8. 
Paoe. 10j 
.: e -12 
i'iu; i, icial . i. Jcs iJ. 11.31 
Japanese Minister 
; Ä,,,;, _ ; ý,: , ý", 
r 
ý 
world trade war. 4""_ ___ _. ý"_... __L! _ . o. v .. S+ýYýOtilR' YýO}ý"SS TOKYO nr -iosnio 
Fomoto, a Japanese Cabinet 
Minister, said yesterday that 
Japan's fast-growing current 
account surphis was pushing 
the world towards a trade war. 
Reflecting growing official 
E concern over Japan's. foreign 
trade disputes, Air "Komoto, 
director-general of the Econo- 
. mIr Ytannm! z n., apLv LCx-A-J 
said: I 
__ 
b1r Kuiiiu; 'ö'`ö 
leaders tha, discontent in the 
U. S. and Western Europe " has 
been causing a protectionist 
tendency which might deal a 
fatal blow to the world 
economy. " 
He said Japan's current 
account was likely to swing into 
a $12bn to $13bn (16. Sbn) sur- 
plus in the financial year end- 
ing next March unless- the 
Government took swift and 
effective measures to curb the 
trend. 
Mr Komoto was speaking 
shortly before the arrival of 
Mr Donald Regan, U. S. 
Treasury Secretary, for it two- 
dav visit in which he is ex- 
pected to discuss the trade issue 
in talks with Mr Zenko Suzuki, 
the Prime Minister and other 
Ministers. 
Mr Regan's visit starts three 
days after the.. U. S. submitter 
to Tokyo proposals for opening 
up the Japanese market to more 
foreign, goods. 
ý 
ý 
I 
t 
ý 
On Tuesday, a day after deli- 
very of the proposals for abol- 
ishing import tariffs on 29 
items such as computers and 
car parts, a special Japanese 
cabinet council failed to agree 
on fresh measures to resolve the 
nations foreign trade disputes. 
Japanese industrial leaders 
have joined the U. S. and 
Western Europe in seeking 4...... 
_. _I'_. _______w __ 
Mr Zenko Suzuki (above) who 
is due to hold talks on trade- 
with Mr Donald Regan (helow) 
quick government action over 
the trade surplus, which the 
Finance Ministry believes could 
reach a record $23bn in this 
financial year. 
The Keidanren, the Japanese 
employers' federation, said yes- 
terday it would formally warn 
the government by the end of 
this month that pressure in 
Western nations for trade pro- 
tection would intensify unless 
Japan worked out effective 
measures. 
Reuter 
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Oilmen ready to get into deep water RISING energy costs and 
improving technology, com- 
bined with the foreseeable 
end of oil supplies from 
JOHN STANSELL, in Texas, reports on 
the coming era in oil production. 
suiting, engineers Humphreys 
and Glasgow, working with Sir Robert McAlpine and 
Sons, already have detailed 
conventional sources, have with a massive technical chal- 
set the scene for ange. PRMUNMONEW The most favoured concept tß' far the wild waters around 
British Isles is the 'ten- 
Ü r. d ,, ýaýu. ra: 
:; Ce90uiCe 
;. iftr#rsý cluaft 
cnp, ittýrýalvPS 
At present. n-, t offshore 
oil is produced in water 
depths of about 500 feet, but 
oil companies are now look- 
ing at potential fields in 
waters up to 8,000 feet. 
The need for deep-water 
platforms has been foreseen 
by the industry for several 
years. But the Present condi- 
tion of the world oil market 
is hastening the transfer of 
concepts into hardware. Both 
sion leg platform' (TLP) 
sometimes known as the 
covered buoyant platform. 
This is a floating structure 
pulled down against its own buoyancy by massive steel 
tubes anchored to the sea- bed. The first TLP is now 
taking shape on the drawing 
boards of firms like Brown 
and Root and Vickers Off- 
shore, and will be installed 
on Conoco's Hutton field in 
four years' time. 
The next most favoured 
concept is the 'guide tower' 
C. L. ' Blackburn, senior ex- 
ecutive vice - president of 
Shell Oil, and 1)2'-id Walker, 
of BP Petroleum Develop- 
ment, emphasisfd the im- 
nortance of the western 
developed nations increasing 
the rate at which they exploit 
their offshore oil resources 
during this year's Offshore 
Technology Conference 
(OTC), the annual jamboree 
of the world's offshore oil- 
men, in Houston, Texas, last 
week. 
iºwtýý. aprnpý+qý 
. 
iv1uu : 
SUýnd ot, ýýCos7gc,,. 
ITt': tä8 4ýte, 'xTHe' wýt1e9'ý 
total., esnected " oil MS, M 
he said. were. two Oaamn ý)1]]l0AýilTClö, HESl1D i, 
abwtix32, +per cerr*eanMi Y! ýý 
ýýhe_ýiýirk eLL ý 
tractecL',; 5ome Vl re; AeJ'I 
[ýisý.. ýý; ýýi; ýreaeýýý+*e Finý, wd . wiwwwasM1"., A4ºý! ý'ý1Tý1ý býrrrels `yýi'ta°'bý'. "ctýnfitýmed 
byc. ezploratiq. h,:, teams. Arid 
neirlY 40 laRx-'aeat -of this i 
nfinned, oii. i,.. 332 bii}iesa 
A 
rrels. lies affsFiöre' with ' 
=umexhinr, lit P 411 hit? in-, bar- 
relc in 1TF{V'. "rTfiä-WAA%i#"a nd 
Fti nlan . *me*. Therc is no shortage of ideas on how to produce from 
deep water, although build- 
ing platforms in greater depths than the 600 feet 
which is today's limit has 
presented offshore engineers 
designed by Exxo for one 
of its deeper fiel in the 
calm waters of the Gulf of Mexico. A conventional plat. form - though lighter than 
used in the North Sea-will 
be supported on a single long 
leg and stayed by cables in 
the same way as a radio mast 
is kept up., 
These designs are now all in the offing; examples of 
each will be on station 
around Britain by 1985 or 
thereabouts. But for the longer term far-seeing de- 
signers are working on what Walker described as the 
` ultimate challenge, ' the so- 
called complete sea bed pro- duction system. British con- 
-a wuIyLVL jj[v 
duction platform below the 
sea. 
This futuristic solution 
overcomes all the problems 
of the massive structures 
needed to support existing 
production platforms, but ii 
introduces many others- 
particularly the need for the 
structure to resist the high 
pressures at great depths. 
Although nobody actually dismisses the sea bed solu. 
tion few of the consulting 
engineers at OTC expressed 
much enthusiasm for it. And 
-as they are beholden to the intensely conservative oil 'in 
dustry that may mean - it 
won't happen for at least 1 
years. 
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3. - Underdevelopment: the real crisis 
Venezuela, that is to say Latin America, 
does not escape, in spite of its immense 
riches -and perhaps because of them- 
from misery, exploitation and hunger. 
Each day the mechanisms, perfectly 
designed to avoid, detain or distance 
the possibility of closing the gap with 
the superdeveloped nations, functions in 
strict accuracy. Thus it is determined 
in a factual way, the impossibility of 
a capitalist "development" for our 
Countries. 
D. F. Maza Zavala 1973(1) 
Page. 110 
3.1. - Technological dependence and underdevelopment 
in Latin America. 
The process of industrialisation in Latin America 
and the growth experienced by some countries of the region 
rests on one of the most complex obstacles to development: 
technological dependency. 
The majority of these nations find themselves in 
what some authors consider to be the most advanced phase of 
underdevelopment and what Maza Zavala(1) calls the diversi- 
fication and complementation of exporting. Professor Maza 
Zavala indicates: 
"... This phase arises from the necessity to 
compensate for the effects of the disintegration 
of industry from within(embedded) with integration 
into the international market. This integration 
offers two possibilities: a. - The horizontal, that 
is between the national markets of the under- 
developed countries(i. e. Alalc, Andean Pact). And 
b. - The vertical, with the capitalist markets, 
developed by means of the partial liberation which 
they allow to the countries of the Third World 
(the UNCTAD system)". 
It is within this phase, which for some Latin American 
countries represents a sort of condition of "less under- 
developed among the underdeveloped", where we concentrate 
our analysis of technological dependence, because paradoxically 
in terms of technology, these countries turn out to be the 
"most dependent among the dependents". 
And it is precisely this. paradox of technological 
dependency and its implications for Latin American reality 
that we are trying to analyse in this chapter. 
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Of what does technological dependency consist? 
Let us begin with the easiest part, the definition of the 
term. 
Technology, according to' Webster's New Collegiate 
Dictionary, is a systematic treatment of an art, technologia, 
techno+logia-logy. It is as well technical language, applied 
science, a technical method of achieving a practical purpose, 
and finally the totality of the means employed to provide 
objects necessary for human sustenance and connfort. 
The Royal Academy of Spanish Language defines the 
word technology as a collection of knowledge appropiate to 
a mechanical function, also as a treatise Qf the technical 
terms or language, exclusive, technical of a science or art. 
The United Nations Organisation for Industrial 
Development(2) considers it as the sum of the knowledge,. 
experience, and professional aptitudes, mastery, necessary to 
make one or more products and to establish a business with 
this purpose. Also, the term "know-how" is pointed out as 
being synonymous with technology. 
Industrial technology is also defined as the sum 
of the processes by means of which raw materials or intermediate 
products are transformed into final goods. 
Industrial technology is made up of capital goods 
(plant, machinery and tools) procedures, technical information 
(patents, licences, know-how), training of personnel, and 
final product. 
The situation of technological dependence arises 
when the majority of the technological resources of a country 
come from abroad. In the case of Latin America, as in the rest 
of the nations of the Third World, these resources come from 
the industrialised countries. 
The degree of dependence is found to be tightly 
linked with the concentration of these-resources in the basic 
areas of the economy of the receiving country. Equally so, a 
nation can consider itself more technologically dependent 
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when those resources come mostly from a single country. In 
Latin America more than 75% overall of technological services 
come from the United States. 
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3.2. - How does technological dependence 
arise in Latin America? 
It is difficult to isolate the study of technological 
dependence from the global context of underdevelopment and 
from the relationships which, within the capitalist framework 
of production, are established between the nations which do 
and do not produce technology. 
If we understand under-development not as a stage 
in a historical process preceding development, nor as a 
situation of stagnation in the levels of productivity and 
welfare, but as the antithesis of development, that is to 
say: of the process which results from. the expansion of world 
capitalism which generates development in nations which never 
were underdeveloped, we must analyse the influence of this 
expansion on the formation of underdeveloped Latin America. 
Let us then try to link the politico-economic 
circumstances surrounding the most outstanding events of the 
last 400 years of Latin American history. 
We should begin by pointing out that the process 
of Spanish colonisation did not mean the transfer to the 
conquered territories of the feudal model of production which 
existed in 15th Century Spain. 
The tendency to explain Latin American under- 
development, in contrast to the Unites States, by means of 
the simple comparison between the advanced English capitalist 
industrial model and the backward Spanish feudal one, turns out 
to be inappropiate, for what was implanted in Hispano-America 
was not feudalism, nor was Spain really the nation which 
directed and controlled, in economic terms, the process of 
colonisation which followed the discovery. 
The Commission(la encomienda) as a manifestation 
of feudal structure did not fully develop, and already by 
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the end of the 17th Century was practically extinct. (3) 
The 16th Century, as pointed out by Andre Gunder 
Frank(4), meant the century when the modern history of 
mercantile capitalism was created across the Atlantic. 
The New World meant the possibility of an expansion 
of European capital accumulation, which at the time already 
existed in German, Dutch, Italian, Spanish and English banks. 
This capital not only financed the Spanish Crown 
in the enterprise of the conquest, but also joined together 
with private groups in the investment and exploitation of 
silver and gold mines and in the production and trading of 
agricultural products of the colonies. 
The so-called "Asiatic method of production" existing 
in Mexico and Peru, based on collective work and the commune, 
was destroyed, and the Inca and Aztec communers were eliminated 
or incorporated in a new production structure based not on 
feudalism, but on monopoly investment, mercantile activity 
and the slave trade. 
"A colonisation without the problems of colonising... " 
said the Marquess of Pombal, Prime Minister of Portugal in 
1755, referring to the way Spain and Portugal had become 
satellites is a result of British and Dutch financing(5). 
In accordance with what Gunder Frank points out, 
during the first three centuries which followed the conquest, 
the flow of capital from Latin America to Europe reached a 
figure equivalent to approximately 1,000 million pounds 
sterling. This sum represents more than the total value of 
European shipping industry at the end of 1800, and a quantity 
equivalent to half the whole investment carried out by Great 
Britain in its metallurgical industry up to 1790. 
It was centuries of exploitation and depredation 
which stimulated the development and consolidation of the 
great European metropolis, to the detriment and submission 
of Latin America. 
The Spain pictured by Cervantes in Quixote, with 
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its 9,000 convents, 625,00.0 noblemen and 200,000 priests, 
received 1,000 ships each year with products manufactured by 
other European countries and in its own territory 160,000 
foreigners monopolised its external trade. 
"And by the-17th Century", points out Eduardo 
Galeano(5)"Spain, even when it possessed the 
juridical control over its possessions in 
America, only controlled 5% of the commerce 
with its colonies. Holland controlled the 
equivalent of 30%, France 25%, Italy 15%, 
Germany 13% and England aproximately 12%. 
A similar situation occurred in the territories 
colonised by Portugal, with the difference that the gold of 
Minas Gerais and the rest of the riches of Brazilian soil 
served to enlarge the capital of only one beneficiary, the 
English bankers and investors. 
By 1750, the volume of gold which arrived in London 
proceeding from Brazil was so high(the equivalent of an income 
of 2,500,000 pounds sterling per year) that the principal 
centre of European finance, which at that time was to be found 
in Amsterdam, was moved to the English capital. 
"All Englishmen of good heart who acknowledge 
their King, their Country and their Religion, 
hate the French and damn the Pope, are permitted 
to enlist in a ship of war and receive the 
bounty given by His Majestiy of two months spay 
in advance at the following tariffs: 
Able Seaman .......... 5 pounds 
Ordinary Seaman...... 2 pounds and 10 shillings" 
This was part of a notice which called for volunteers 
for the Royal Navy to fight the French. It appeared in 
the streets of London at the end of the 18th Century(6). 
The gold of one year's production at Minas Gerais 
was enough to pay 500,000 able seamen. Perhaps, had it not 
been for Minas Gerais, Napoleon would not have lost. the 
battle of Waterloo. 
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We have said that Latin America was discovered, 
conquered and colonised within the ambit of the expansion 
and consolidation of the great centres of European economic 
power, which enjoyed not only the greatest riches ever 
conceived as a result of the subjugation and exploitation 
of a continent, but also the greatest concentration of labour 
force conceived at that time. 
The business of the Spanish colonization then, was 
in reality the best business of European history, but also 
the greatest genocide in the history of humanity. 
In the 150 years after the discovery, the population 
of the Aztecs, Mayas and Incas, estimated for the year 1500 
at between 70 and 90 million inhabitants, was reduced to 3.5 
millions. 
The transmission of Latin American riches abroad 
remained unchanged in every respect after the process of 
independence and-continues even today. 
The absence of an interdependent economic nexus 
between the different regions of Hispano America, produced 
by a system which is structured fundamentally on the action 
of plundering, not of colonials, but of merchants, whose main 
interest consisted in the finding and extraction of resources, 
or in the representation of those who, from abroad, enjoyed 
the riches, motivated the fragmentation and formation of 
isolated economic regions after independence. 
The splitting up of Gran Colombia, formed by 
Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Panama, was 
a consequence of this process. 
The efforts of Simon Bolivar to create a republic 
inspired by the English and French liberalism of the time, a 
republic capable of-confronting what he perceived as the 
expansionist power of the United States, failed to bear fruit, 
and after 6 years, Gran Colombia ceased to exist. Its creator 
died in 1830. 
Six year before, in 18 4, when Bolivar himself was 
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engaged in the decisive battle for the emancipation of these 
nations, Lord Canning, British Foreign Secretary declared: 
"Spanish America is free; and if we do not 
mismanage our affairs sadly, she is English"(7) 
The War to Death Decree issued in 1813 by Bolivar(8) 
apparently was not what it should have been. 
Jose San Martin(9) suffered the same fate and so 
did Jose Artigas, who also died dissillusioned, and from what 
had been the Viceroy-ship of the River Plate arose Argentina, 
Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
Francisco de Morazon was shot dead, and what could 
have been the Federal Republic of Central America, became 
Guatemala, San Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. 
From the fragmentation of Latin America, technological 
consequences arose which we will analyse later. 
"Spain in the 15th and 16th centuries, Spain 
of the arts and letters, the magnificent 
Spain of Velasquez, El Greco, Goya, Quevedo 
and Gongora but without science and techno- 
logy" . As Marcel Roche points out(10), it is the Spain which 
saw its economic sunset, perhaps at the expense of its own 
riches ahd through its inability to generate the transformation, 
both social and economic which in other countries was produced 
after the birth of industrial capitalism. 
"For much of the time the principal economic 
preoccupation of the Spaniards was the 
business of salvation", as it was also pointed 
out by Marcel Roche in "Discovering Prometheus"(10). 
Simultaneously with the progressive deterioration 
in the Spanish economy, another phenomenon was ocurring in 
Europe. The concentration of riches and its financial mobility 
established the basis for what much later would be "the 
transnational capital". 
In this way, the brotherhood of capital extended 
its bonds to the other side of the Atlantic and, like the 
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"promised land" the United States began to convert itself 
into a seat of European capital, even before it transformed 
itself into a nation. 
By the time of the War of Independence in 1783, 
there already existed manufacturing centres in areas such 
as steel, textiles, paper, glass, ceramics etc., important 
banks such as the Bank of North America, the Bank of New 
York and the Bank of Boston were in operation, and an 
abundant commerce with France, Holland, the Near and Far 
East had already been established(11). 
This process of reproduction of capital, promoted 
mainly by England and within a scheme of colonisation, different 
to the conquest and rapacity which they practised in their 
Caribean colonies, permitted the development of the colonies 
of North America. 
According to the study by R. W. Van Alstine(12) in 
these excolonies, the concept of an American empire and the 
principal projects of its future growth were already complete 
by 1800. 
Nevertheless the major transmission of capital was 
produced after 1870. The major exporter was, without doubt 
England. According to the figures published by A. K. Cairncross 
(13) between 1870 and 1913 the net export of capital reached 
2,400 million pounds sterling. 
2,400 millions pounds at the prices of the time(see 
annex N015) and mobilised in conditions different to those 
which the United States itself would later mobilise in Latin 
America, plus the outflow of qualified European emigrants(see 
annex N116) which also took place at this stage, are 
circumstances which are sufficient to have developed a nation 
such as the United States any where else on globe whether in 
Rio de la Plata, Brazil or Gran Colombia. 
It seems that when Karl Marx wrote "Das Kapital" in 
1867 and supposed that England would be the first Communist 
country(14) of the world, because of the economic impact of 
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the accumulation of the export of capital, among other reasons, 
cne English capitalists were so "frightened" that they moved 
off to a distance of 3; 000 miles. 
The great mobilisation of capital took effect 
and soon history witnessed the birth of a new world centre 
of power. Latin American riches no longer had to cross the 
Atlantic, and during the. 19th Century England, France, Italy, 
Holland and Germany seemed to be re-born in the United 
States. 
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3.2.1. - U. S. A. and the sovereignty of .a new empire 
Between 1803 and 1853 the 13 original British 
colonies which formed the United States, with the aid of 
annexations, treaties and purchases, expanded to the South 
and West, building a country which today is bounded by two 
oceans(15). 
In 1845 the United States annexed the Mexican 
territories of Texas and New Mexico. Later, in 1848, Mexico 
"ceded" the territories which today form the U. S. states of 
Colorado, Arizona, California, Nevada and Utah(see annex N°17). 
The totality of territories "ceded" by Mexico to 
the United States, represent an extension equivalent to 11 
times the size of Great Britain. 
So it seems that by the beginning of this century 
the political and economic destiny of the Latin American 
nations had been decided anew. 
In 1912, the President of the United States, William 
H. Taft declared: 
"The day is not far distant when three stars 
and stripes at three equidistant points will 
mark our territory: one at the North Pole, 
another at the Panama Canal, and the third 
at the South Pole" and not happy with this 
he added "The whole hemisphere will be ours 
in fact as, by virtue of our superiority of 
race, it already is ours morally"(16). 
The same Taft, according to what he thought U. S. 
foreign policy should be pronounced that: 
"... a correct path of justice may will be 
made to include active intervention to 
secure for our merchandise and our capitalist 
opportunity for profitable investment"(17). 
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The military actions of the beginning of the 
century we. re, without doubts, the response to the pronouncements 
of President Taft, as was confirmed by one of his own generals 
who in 1935 said: 
"I spent thirty three years and four months.. in 
active service as a member of our country's 
most agile military force, the Marine Corps. 
And during that period I spent most of my 
time being a high-class muscle man for Big 
Business, for Wall Street, and for bankers. 
In short, I was a racketeer for capitalism. 
Thus I helped make Mexico and especially 
Tampico safe for American oil interests in 
1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent 
place for the National City Bank to collect 
revenues in... I helped purify Nicaragua for 
the international banking house of Brown 
Brothers in 1909-12. I brought light to the 
Dominican Republic for American sugar interests 
in 1916. I helped make Honduras 'right' for 
American fruit companies in 1903(18). 
In the same period, as E. Galeano(5)points out, ex- 
President Theodore Roosevelt loudly recalled his succesful 
amputation of land from Colombia: 
"I took the Canal Zone and let Congress debate", said 
the proud Nobel Peace Prize winner as he related how he had 
invented Panama. Colombia soon afterwards received US$ 25 
millions in indemnity: it was the price of a country that 
was born so that the United States could have a route between 
two oceans"(5). 
The history of great empires has always been 
accompanied by the development of gigantic military structures., 
capable of guaranteeing not only the expansion of the empire, 
but also the control of the dominated territories. 
In this study we will analyse how technological 
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dependence in a certain way changes this concept of control 
by military means and in its place generates a mechanism for 
domination which is more sophisticated, and difficult to 
eradicate. 
The United States, as Paul Baran (19) points: -, out 
"... during the whole period 1914 to 1945, 
augmented its relative strength more or less 
continually at the expense of both allies 
and enemies, and at the end of the Second 
World War, rose up as the indisputable 
leading nation, with an absolute position 
in the capitalist world, as dominating as 
that occupied by Great Britain after 1815". 
By 1959, according to the work of D. F. Fleming(20) 
the United States had a total of 275 military complexes in 
31 countries and 1,400 bases in all the places where they 
then had North Americans in post and the places for occupation 
in emergency. These bases were garrisoned by approximately 
one million North American troops. 
This gigantic military structure, which still exists 
outside U. S. territory, was developed in accordance with the 
so-called post-war Marshall Plan. This Plan consisted of a 
rapid rehabilitation of the traditional centres of Western 
power and their integration in a military alliance, dominated 
by the United States. 
This Alliance, signed in 1949, received the name of 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). 
Nevertheless, since 1917, the central proposition 
of the United States has been to rub Communism fron the face 
of the earth, and that explains the development of this 
enormous military structure and of alliances such as the 
above. 
Pursuing this objective, the phantom of communism 
and Soviet aggression has been converted into the excuse to 
justify their incursions, direct and indirect, into the 
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countries of the Third World. 
In Latin America the military presence of North 
America is made manifest by the so called military 
aid missions to the armed forces of the countries of the 
region. Already by 1957,40 of these missions formed from 
personnel of the Army, Navy and Air Force of the United 
States, were to be found on Latin American soil. 
No one can imagine that the United States, needs 
to conclude pacts or military alliances with the countries 
of Latin America to confront the Soviet Union. 
The "aid" for development, the "alliances for 
progress" and the pacts to confront communism have typified 
a good part of the relationships of "friendship and mutual 
aid" between the U. S. A. and Latin America. 
Certainly Bolivar did not lie when at one point 
in his life, with astounding political vision, affirmed-, 
"The United States seem to be predestined 
by providence to subjugate Latin America 
in hunger and misery in the name of liberty" 
r 
This he said at Guayaquil, 5th August 1829 (21) 
"We had to get rid of a communist government 
which had taken over"(22) 
This said President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1963 to 
justify the invasion of Guatemala carried out 9 years earlier. 
"The Iron Curtain is falling over 
Guatemala", 
announced the North American dailies in 1954" In 
reality, the Iron Curtain was nothing but agrarian reform, 
which, favoured by the nationalist government of President 
Jacobo Arbenz Gusman affected the interests of the United 
Fruit Company in Guatemala. 
As time went by, United Fruit continued in 
Guatemala and a dictator supported from abroad brought back 
"order" to the country. 
26 years later the story of the red phantom 
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repeats itself but this time it 
is. not the Iron Curtain, it 
is the red flag with the Hammer and sickle. 
"If we were to insist on overnight change 
we would end up with a red flag and hammer 
and sickle flying over Guatemala City". 
General Robert Schweitzer made these declarations 
on 10th July 1980 in a television programme on BBC 1 
in 
London(23). General Schweitzer, present Director of 
Strategy of the State Department of the United States, was 
referring to the violently disturbed situation in which the 
people of Guatemala live today. 
In reality, Guatemala in 1954, was only one of the 
many military incursions of the United States into Latin 
America. A summary of events listing the sequence of these 
interventions has been provided for us by Robin Jenkins in 
his book "Exploitation"(24). 
1854. - USA intervenes in Nicaragua 
1867. - USA burns the capital of Nicaragua 
1860. - Walker(a buccaneer in USA service) burns Granada 
1860. - USA invades Mexico and annexes Texas 
1871. - USA occupies Santo Domingo 
1881. - USA sets up a naval base in Peru 
1901. - USA annexes Puerto Rico and submits Cuba to its contrc;,. 
1903. - USA takes the Panama Canal Zone 
1915. - USA occupies Haiti 
1903. - USA intervenes in Honduras 
1917. - USA intervenes in the elections in Nicaragua 
1926. - USA invades Nicaragua 
1934. - USA intervenes in Cuba 
1948. - USA bombards the town of Catavi in Bolivia 
1954. - USA invades Guatemala 
1958. - USA gives military aid to the dictator Batista in Cuba 
1961. - USA finances an invasion of Cuba(Bay of Pigs) 
1965. - USA invades the Dominican Republic 
1981. - USA intervenes in San Salvador. 
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Once in 1500 it was the pearls of a Venezuelan island 
called Margarita. In 1600 it was the ornamental gold of the 
Aztecs in Mexico, the Mayas of Central America, the Chipchas 
and Timotocuicas in Colombia and the Incas of Peru. In 1700 
it was the gold and silver of gigantic mines at Guanajuato 
in Mexico, of Potosi in Bolivia, and Minas Gerais in Brazil. 
In 1800, the sugar plantations of the Carribbeam, Cuba, Santo 
Domingo, Barbados and Jamaica as well as the plantations of 
coffee and cotton of Brazil and Colombia and the nitrates of 
Peru and Chile. 
But in 1900 technological development established 
new necessities. The raw materials needed by the new industries 
acquired a strategic value for the maintenance of the great 
cities. Once again Latin America was the "Pandora's Box" and 
from its prodigious soil rose the so-called strategic resources: 
petroleum, iron and bauxite from Venezuela; iron, asbestos, 
manganese, bauxite, and uranium from Brazil; antimony, tin 
and tungsten from Bolivia; lead, mercury, sulphur, zinc and 
petroleum from Mexico; lead, and zinc from Peru; oil from 
Ecuador and copper from Chile. 
Both the raw materials and their destinations 
insofar as they concern the countries of the Andean Pact are 
quantified for 1977 in annexes N018 and 19. 
From annex N018 "Andean Region's Main Exports 
products 1977" it may be appreciated that these products continue 
to be raw materials, and in annex N°19 "Andean Region's Exports 
Geographical Distribution 1977" we note that a significant 
diversification has not been produced and that market 
dependence is demonstrated by 34% going to a single market, 
the-United States. 
"The insolent foreign foot print has 
profaned the national soil", 
said the Venezuelan President Cipriano Castro at 
the beginning of the century, when the blokade by British 
Navy together with the Italian and German Navy in 1908 
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took the principal ports of this country(26). 
The United States intervened as mediator 
and in 1909 President Castro was deposed, and a dictatorship 
which lasted 27 years sent Venezuela's oil riches to the 
United States. John D. Rockfeller met in Scotland with his 
colleagues of Royal Dutch Shell and together they shared 
out Venezuelan's black gold. 
One year before his fall President Cipriano Castro 
had suspended relations with the United States and ordered 
the confiscation without compensation of all North American 
interests in the country. 
His Minister of Defence General Juan Vicente Gomez, 
taking advantage of a foreign visit by President Castro, 
indicated to the Government of the United States his desire 
to resume relationships and bring to a successful conclusion 
the outstanding claims. 
Castro was not able to return to the country and was 
accused of betraying his country. Eight days after the coup 
the Secretary of State of the U. S. government sent the Secretary 
of the Navy, George von Meyer, the following memorandum: 
"Department of State, Washington March 1909 
Huntingdon Wilson: from the declarations 
contained in the telegram from our Minister, 
you can see that Castro is expected to be 
arrested in Venezuela, under criminal 
accusation, in the event that he seems to 
intend to return there confident in his 
capacity to overturn the government, an 
eventuality which would be disaster not 
only for the Americans but for all the 
foreign interests in that republic"(27) 
On 24th November 1948 the first democratic government 
in the history of Venezuela is destroyed. The ex-president 
Romulo Gallegos, from his exile in Mexico blames the United 
States for his overthrow. 
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"The Democratic Action party of President 
Gallegos planned to take over the Army 
and impose a Marxist government in Venezuela"(28) 
Thus said Colonel Carlos Delgado Chalbaud, Head of the 
usurping junta a few days after assuming power, in 
conversations with Walter J. Donnelly, the Ambassador of the 
United States. Three years later, Delgado Chalbaud is 
assassinated and one of his comrades in the junta, Colonel 
Marco Perez Jimenez, is installed in power and once more 
another bloody military dictatorship gives away more oil 
concessions and promises the conveyance of Venezuelan iron 
to the Orinoco Mining Co. 
In Venezuela as in the rest of Latin America, 
the search for guarantees in the supply and control of 
strategic raw materials, produces a succession of coups d'etat 
and military dictatorships, backed by the United States. 
"Terrible forces have been unleashed 
against me" 
Said Janio Cuadros on 21th August 1961 when he 
renounced the presidency of Brazil. Four days earlier President 
Cuadros had signed a decree restoring the iron of Minas Gerais 
to the National Reserves and annulling the illegal rights of 
exploitation which were owned by the U. S. enterprise Hanna 
Mining Company. 
The Vice-President in Cuadro's government assumed 
power and while the courts decided on the turbulence thrown 
up by the decree of Cuadros, the new incumbent attempted to 
establish new possibilities for negotiation and direct sales 
of iron with European countries, including the Socialist ones, 
but in March 1964, the "bomb" of the Hanna Company exploded 
again and another coup d'etat finished the. similarly 
progressive government of Joao Goulart(30). 
During the years that followed 1964, Hanna Mining 
Company re-established itself and collaborated with 
Bethlehem Steel to increase the exploitation of iron. 
Thanks to an open-door policy towards 
Page. 128 
foreign investment put into effect by the successive 
military governments of Brazil, an area of land in the heart 
of the state of Amazonas comparable in size to England has 
passed into the ownership of the United States, by way of 
purchases of Brazilian soil by North American business. 
The conquest of the West of the United States from 
1800, with missionaries of the Protestant Church teaching 
English in the Indian reservations is being repeated now 
in South America and in lands which supposedly have nothing 
to do with the territorial sovereignty and supremacy of 
United States. 
The only difference is that the 20 missions which 
. teach 
English to the natives of this area of Amazonas, also 
introduce contraceptive devices to the women, to avoid an 
increase of population in an area which, paradoxically, is 
one of the least populated in the world'. " 
Together with the missionaries, an army of biologists, 
geologists, chemists, physicists and entrepreneurs, extract 
and evaluate the reserves of gold, silver, diamonds, gypsum, 
heematite, magnetite, thorium, bauxite, niobium, uranium, 
zinc, chrome and mercury, which previously had been detected 
in the region by the United States Government with the aid 
of the Air Force and NASA. 
In 1973, the U. S. interests, allied to the copper 
business and what Anthony Sampson calls "The Sovereign State of 
ITT"(31)brought about the downfall of the Chilean President 
Salvador Allende. 
In November 1981 Alexander Haig, the U. S. 
Secretary of State, in an interview with the New York Times 
said: 
"... military options being considered by the 
Pentagon are a blockade on Nicaragua and 
operations against Cuba, including naval 
exercises, a quarantine on the shipment 
of arms to Cuba, a show of air power and 
a general blockade"(32) 
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As we have seen, the recent history of the Latin 
American countries has been distorted by continuous aggression. It 
has been a history of political and economic manipulation, of 
military threats, of foreign intervention and exploitation. 
During the last 60 years, the economic history of 
the countries of the Third World, which has been conditioned by the 
technological and political control of the United States, has 
been the history of dependence and anti-development. 
For those whose land remains exhausted and whose 
economy lies in ruins it has been nothing but the road toward 
hunger and the international financial begging bowl. 
The problem of underdevelopment and stagnation, in 
the form we have described, permits us now to analyse the 
phenomenon of technological dependence as the continuation 
of a process which, for Latin America, began 400 years ago. 
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3.2.2. = Technological dependence 
It is a well known fact that the technological 
development which took place at the end of the last century 
and the beginning of the present one(1880-1915, a period 
considered by some authors as the second Industrial Revolution) 
permitted the explosive expansion of the industrial and 
mercantile activity of the United States and its international 
commerce. 
Nevertheless it was not until after the Second World 
War that, with the exception of Standard Oil of New Jersey, 
the concept of the transnational corporation, as a business 
conceived world wide, came into vogue. 
And it is this circumstance which in our opinion 
represents an important aspect for the concrete explanation 
of the process of formation of technological dependence, since 
the seeking of industrialisation by means of import substitution 
plays a significant part in this process; this seeking does 
not obey an action which is merely nationalist for the 
governments which take these measures, nor is this done behind 
the backs of the expansionary interests of the great 
corporations which for the moment control the Latin American 
markets 
During the years after 1946, the overseas profits 
of U. S. companies turned out to be substantially greater than 
those which they received in their domestic markets. The 
result of this has been that between that date and 1963, the 
direct foreign investments of the United States were raised 
from 7,200 million to 40,600 million dollars(33) 
The higher potential of the post war market began 
to be exploited on grand scale and in a new style: direct 
investment associated with the construction of plants 
developed with U. S technology. 
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"Foreign markets can generally be better 
exploited by a local operation than by 
exporting from the United States. An 
overseas plant can avoid tariffs and other 
barriers to trade, which impede the exports 
of this country", concluded a special article 
in "U. S. News and World Report"(34). 
Before the Second World War, very few countries in 
Latin America showed traces of industrialisation. The British 
investments between 1870 and 1914(35), oriented basically 
towards textiles and foods, had generated an increase in the 
industrial sector in the so-called non-durable consumer 
products(cloth, skins, processed foods etc. ), which'by 1929 
represented the following shares of the Gross National Product 
of the following countries: 
Argentina ...... 22.8% Mexico ...... 14.2% 
Brazil ......... 11.7% Chile ....... 7.9% 
Colombia....... 6.2% 
In the year 1929 and in accordance with 
the statement of Celso Furtado(37), the impact of the economic 
and financial crisis in the United States contributed to the 
deterioration of the already weakened process of industriali- 
sation of these countries. 
The collapse in the capacity to import, the contraction 
of exports, and the blocking of the international financial 
channels, created by the crisis, obliged the governments of 
these countries to adopt economic means which in the opinion 
of Furtado, began the process of import substitution. 
By means of this process, the countries indicated' 
achieved an expansion of their internal market for manufactures 
as a result of the manufacture and substitution of goods which 
they had previously imported. 
With respect to this process Professor Maza Zavala 
is of the opinion that: 
"It has been attempted to explain the process 
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of import substitution in Latin America 
as being imposed by dificulties with 
balance of payments deriving from the 
persistent deterioration in the primary 
exporting sector of the economy. Although 
this could be the concrete historic 
circumstance of some South American countries 
as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and 
Colombia, it does not have the significance 
of the principal determining factor, since 
the necessary condition for the initiation 
of such a process is, from the point of view 
of the laws of capitalism in underdeveloped 
countries, the formation and growth of a 
local market until it reaches a size where 
it represents the economic minimum from 
which it becames viable to establish some 
light industries, which can operate to take 
advantage of the already existing demand 
up to then satisfied by means of imports"(38)' 
For other countries such as Venezuela and Peru this 
process began at the end of the 1950s. 
This form of industrialisation which fitted in with 
the plans of the expansion of the TNCs to which we have 
drawn-attention before, not only signified the ruin of the 
embryo Latin American industry but in addition, has been the 
carrier of a new style of political control by the United 
States in her relationships with South America. 
By 1965, the gross investment of the United States 
in Latin America reached 9,371 million dollars(39) of which 
2,741 million corresponded to manufacture. A good part of 
this investment did not effectively leave the United States, 
because over and above the financial incentives which some 
countries such as Venezuela conceded to the companies which 
wished to produce in their territories, in many cases, the 
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patent rights, or the intangible Good Will of a brand or a 
name, constituted a considerable part of the import of 
capital of a transnational for the establishment of a sub- 
sidiary or affiliated company abroad. 
The monopolistic conditions obtained by the total 
control of the patents on the manufacturing processes, 
machinery and equipment, conferred upon them a situation of 
pre-eminence over the Latin American industry, which saw 
itself pushed to one side or converted into the advocate 
of the interests of its powerful associate, by the 
impossibility of competition with the owners of the 
technology. 
In this way, the TNCs began to operate in many 
areas in a monopolistic or at least quasi-monopolistic situation, 
achieving excessive profits. By the end of the decade of the 
70s, the Department of Commerce of the United States itself, 
in one of its announcements, pointed, out that the U. S. business 
installed in Latin America obtained an annual return of more 
than triple that which their parent companies received at 
home. 
The criteria expressed with the aid of the historical 
review of the process of formation of technological dependence 
in Latin America leads us to expose with care the 
characteristics of this dependence, from the consideration 
that today there tends to exist a broad consensus in the sense 
of assigning to technology a key role in the contemporary 
explanation of social, political and economic evolution, 
pointing to the decisive weight which it bears in the 
general progress of the developing countries. 
This circumstance and the undeniable fact that 
technology. constitutes an indispensable resource for the survival 
of the modern world has, without any doubt, oriented the 
policies which Latin American countries have been implementing 
in the matter of development in this century. 
Nevertheless, the great question which the search 
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for technology for development suggests, belongs to the 
ambit of the conditions for its negotiation. 
In today's world, no country is autarchic in terms 
of technological development. Technological interdependence 
or technological commerce between industrialised states is 
an irrefutable fact. But when this interchange takes place 
between countries with deep inequalities in the levels of 
their economies, e. g. U. S. A and Latin America, and at the 
margin of true cooperation, the process of technological 
negotiation is converted from a transfer to a kind of quasi- 
rental of the technology implicit in the transaction, and 
consequently into a mechanism for generating dependence. 
From this point of view, the industrialised 
countries which have devised a system for commercialising 
technology, based on the property rights in "know-how" 
which can be sold, encounter in the Third World not amarket 
of buyers, but rather a market of "renters" of technology. 
This establishes a dependent relationship, "enthroned", in 
which technology plays a double role, a kind of useful article 
which in some cases is built as a "turnkey" factory and at 
the same time a means for perpetuating a relationship which 
allots the provider other additional advantages, within the 
scheme of capitalist production. 
In the countries with a centralised economy, the 
in terchange of technology is effected in accordance with a 
scheme of integration promoted by the so-called Council for 
Mutual Aconomic Assistance -CMEA or COMECON, and since 1971 
within what is called the Comprehensive Programme or Integrated 
Programme(40). It presents different characteristics. 
If we observe the process of industrialisation of 
such countries as Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Roumania etc., in 
the context of their relationships with the Soviet Union 
since 1946, and compare them with the same process during 
the same period with countries such as Greece, Turkey and 
Latin America, in the ambit of their relations with the 
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United States, we shall note a difference not only in respect 
of the process of negotiation or technological transfer but 
fundamentally in the results of the implementation of this 
technology in respect of development. 
Whilst the underdeveloped countries which have been 
neg. otiatingwith the United States and other industrialised 
nations since 1946 go on being underdeveloped and without 
sight of a technological "take off", those which use the 
socialist (scheme of negotiation have achieved highly 
significant levels of technological development during the 
same period. 
Hungary, for example, is a nation of 12 million 
inhabitants. Before 1950(41) she possessed a fundamentally 
agricultural economy. Nevertheless in the next 20 years she 
achieved a spectacular industrial development and already by 
1970 had a Gross National Product of 16,000 million dollars 
and a per capita income of 1,534 dollars. 
The example of Hungary is interesting if we consider 
that the major part of the raw material which she imports 
comes from the Soviet Union and her major market for 
manufactured products is also the USSR. 
This relationship of interchange is rather as if 
Hungary were the United States and the Soviet Union Venezuela, 
that is to say, Hungary the developed country and the USSR 
the underdeveloped one. 
At the margin of the political considerations and 
of the analysis of the benefits of the so-called "free world" 
for the developed countries, there is an evident fact, and 
that is that this small nation has achieved a technological 
development which no country in Latin America has achieved, 
including those with better natural, human and capital 
resources. 
Of the technological achievements of these countries 
little is known in Latin America. From Hungary perhaps we 
know the "Icarus" motorbuses, but what we do not know is that 
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for 1978 in this field of industry,. th_ýs country placed 
itself at the head of the principal producers in Europe 
with a production of a 12,800 units(42) higher than British 
Leyland(England) with 6,500 units, Daimler Benz(Germany) 
with 5,533 units, Iveco-Fiat-("I-caly) with 5,249 units etc. 
For a country which in 1950 began by producing only 
170 units, this is significant enough. 
The study of technological dependence is also 
found to be closely tied to the conditions of development 
of the technological infrastructure of the receiving country. 
We have pointed out that technological dependence 
comes from abroad(when we speak of abroad we mean to refer 
to the so-called command levels of the international 
capitalist system), but we ought to clarify the point that 
there are countries like Japan and West Germany which even 
when they u5e'a good deal of imported technology in their 
production, cannot be included in the list of the dependent 
nations. 
These countries are simultaneously importers and 
exporters of technological services(43)as showed in the 
following table: 
Receipts and payments for licences and patents (-`) 
1973 1976 
Japan......... Receipts...... 82 175 
Japan......... Payments...... 661 799 
West Germany.. Receipts...... 219 306 
West Germany.. Payments...... 602 806 
(-`) million dollars. 
The Soviet Union between 1920 and 1950(44) 
incorporated in its industrial development a high proportion 
of foreign technology, which helped to strengthen the 
bases of its own technological development. 
In reality, all the countries of the socialist 
block use technology which comes from the capitalist states(45). 
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Between 1973 and 1976 around 133 agreements for 
technological cooperation have been concluded between East 
and West( see annex N°20). 
-Among these agreements which take the form of 
joint ventures, licensing agreements, cooperation in research 
and development; these examples stand out: Massey Ferguson 
Perkins Ltd, with the Agromet Motor Import of Poland, to 
produce tractors; The Control, Data Corporation of the United 
States with the Commitee of Science and Technology of the 
USSR in an agreement for research and development in 
computer technology; Agreements with Singer of USA to produce 
sewing machines in Poland; With Olimpia Werke to produce 
typewriters in the USSR; and in general an extensive list, 
in which figure Nissan Motor, Toshiba, Phillips, Fiat, Volvo, 
Shell, Xerox, General Electric, DuPont, Lockheed and even 
ITT. 
A similar situation is occurring increasingly in 
Mainland China, where the so-called process of modernisation 
put into practice by the government of Deng Xiaoping and the 
new Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang is opening the doors to a 
profound process of technological negotiation with the Western 
countries. 
The experience of these countries demonstrates that 
if previous preparation on the part of the recipi ent nation 
does not exist, in the matter of selection, assimilation, 
development and control of the technology it is going to 
import, the capacity for negotiation is reduced to levels 
of such inefficiency that the excusing of direct investment 
as a"necessary evil" acquires significance. 
The process of introduction of technological 
elements in Latin American economies present characteristics 
which, as has already been said, correspond fundamentally 
to the ambit of foreign direct investment, or to the 
establishment of "turnkey" plants by means of governmental 
contracting and finance. 
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No government or private entity in Latin America 
seems to have trespassed into the world of so-called industrial 
espionage, nor has it participated in the capture or purchase 
of brains, technicians, formulas or technological secrets 
which could signify advantages in their possibilities for 
development. 
It would seem to be that not only technological 
information is the patrimony of the industrial countries, but 
also the unconventional methods of obtaining it. 
Whoever said that there are laws which only the 
poor respect could have said at the same time that in the 
matter of technological information, there are also laws 
which only the underdeveloped countries respect, 
"The espionage connection is a reality. 
Many senior executives doubt that it is 
widespread until they realise they have 
been victimized. Sometimes victims never 
know they have been'had" 
points out Leonard I. Krauss(46) in a book published 
in 1979 and dedicated to the analysis of the extraction of 
computerised information. 
Foreign direct investment constitutes a mode of 
operation which has allowed the transnational enterprises 
to use their own capital, and often that of the Latin American 
financial institutions to create affiliates or fully 
owned companies, or associates with national investors, 
for the commercialisation or manufacture of products made 
with their own technology. 
Technology transferred in this way represents a 
sort of cost of usage, which includes the ownership of the 
process of manufacture, product specifications, trade mark, 
name of affiliated company, management system, training, 
patents, licences, and technical services. 
This "cost of usage"(47) comes generally accompanied 
by a monopolistic action in the market, which permits the 
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enterprise a return in excess of the costs plus a normal 
profit, which in practice constitutes a sort of quasi-rent 
of the technology implicit in the process. 
This apparent contradiction, between a business 
which controls its market and which at the same time accepts 
a high "cost of use" for its technology, is resolved by 
the evidence that when this business sits down to negotiate 
with the outside world as provider of patents and techno- 
logical licences, this outside world is its parent house, so 
that when it pays its "fathers" for services rendered, it 
is paying with the money which deep down, belongs to the 
country in which it is operating. 
The significance, then, of the system of techno- 
logical imports(when the importer responds to the interests 
of the country and not of the TNC) depends on what will be 
done with the imported technology, and it is precisely here 
where other elements are involved, other elements which 
respond to the political orientation of the model of develop- 
ment followed, of the conception which is held in the 
political and economic ambit of development, and of the 
correct deployment of resources, human, natural and financial 
of the receiving country. 
Technological transfer, and not dependence, confers 
significant advantages on the receiving country, when the 
former is used to increase or modify the country's internal 
processes, adapting to its own necessities, and preventing 
the transposition of or competition with other, already 
existing technological resources. 
When the expectation of industrialisation is 
satisfied by the dependent or peripheral way, as is the case 
in Latin America, this exposes a combination of consequences 
both real and potential, which react negatively in the 
political and economic plane. 
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3.2.3"- Consequences of technological dependence 
3.2.3.1. - Prices 
The first of these consequences is seen in prices. 
It becomes extremely difficult to measure the exact total of 
the costs involved in technological importation, because of 
the fact that the payments for this concept take such diverse 
forms and mechanisms. 
The payments for royalties and licences cover only 
a small proportion of the total cost. The cost of plant and 
machinery, salaries of foreign personnel, of intermediate 
goods, and expenses and the remission of profits themselves, 
represent together a considerable cost. 
Also in these costs has to be included the so-called 
hidden transfer of profits, in virtue of which, the subsidiary 
enterprises of the TNCs which operate in Latin America, by 
reason of evasion of taxes and other means, pay to their own 
head offices an excessive price for the supply of intermediate 
goods and raw materials, and in the same relationship export 
to them manufactured products at prices below the norm. 
The Confederation of the United Nations for Trade 
and Development(UNCTAD)(48) estimates that about 5% of the 
global value of the exports of the countries of the Third 
World(Asia, Africa and Latin America) and which represented 
a total of 1,500 million dollars in 1968, correspond to 
payments for patent concepts, licences, know-how, trade marks 
and technical and management services. 
Equally, they pointed out that for the same year 
of 1968, the total sum paid for plant and machinery was 
18,240 million dollars, and that the annual increment of the 
cost of what we have called the "use of technology"(patents, 
licences, know how etc. ) would be 20%, reaching 15% of the 
total of exports in 1981. 
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This evidence induces us to think that by the end 
of 1981, the so-called "nations of the South" will have paid 
more than 54,000 million dollars for the concept of techno- 
logical usage and will still continue to suffer from the 
consequences of a situation of "quasi-rental" for their 
technology. 
Sadly we do not possess figures which will allow 
us to determine the sum of these distributions for the Latin 
American case. But one of these countries, Venezuela 
shows the following in a study on technological transfer 
by 
a group of investigators of CENDES(49): 
"The business remits_ligh amounts for conceptual 
rights, utilities, over-pricing in imported 
raw materials, payments to managerial personnel 
and foreign technicians, technical assistance 
etc. It is estimated that such payments exceed 
30,000 million bolivares(US$ 6,976 million) in 
the decade between 1960 and 1969", 
This amount is truly considerable, if we appreciate 
that 70% of this quantity corresponds to payments made to US 
companies(US$ 4)883 million) -that is to say that, of the 
amount of US$ 9,371 which the United States had invested in 
all the countries of Latin America up to 1965, more than 
half of it was recovered in a single country four years 
later. 
3.2.3.2. - Discouragement of creativity 
The second of the consequences of technological 
dependence is the discouragement of the creative capacity 
of the receiving countries. 
When technological transfer takes place between 
affiliated companies, the form of transfer is presented as a 
sort of private agreement between associates, and in which 
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one of them, the parent company, permits the other(the 
affiliated company) the use of its technology in return for 
an elevated contribution. 
The circumstances which surround technological 
transfer between businesses only separated in geographical 
terms and accountable one to another(characteristic of 
direct foreign investment) and which negotiate at the margin 
of the interests of the receiving country, generate a picture 
of relationship in which the use of the patent plays a 
predominant role. 
The system of patents was designed and established 
by the developed countries with the object of stimulating 
applied research, adding to the number of inventions, and 
protecting the rights of the inventors. 
"The patent allows to its possessor the 
possibility of restricting-the diffusion 
of the invention, until such time as the 
inventor is able to obtain the benefits 
conferred by a short period of monopoly 
exploitation". 
points out M. Kranzburg in "Technology in Western 
Civilisation(50). 
Nevertheless, the patent, analysed as a means of 
technological commercialisation, has suffered a change in 
its structure of ownership. The majority of patents which 
are produced today do not come by the efforts of individual 
inventors. They have left this world, to become within the 
ambit of ownership of the great corporations. 
The concentration of patents in the hands of a 
small number of firms confers upon them a situation of 
privilege and control of the markets in, which they operate, 
especially in the underdeveloped countries where less than 
1% of patents are produced locally. 
This fact, protected by the legal support which is 
conferred upon them by Continental legislation in the form 
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of the Register of Intellectual Property and Patents, signed 
and respected by all the countries of the Continent, allows 
them to register patents which are never exploited, thus 
achieving the safeguarding of the market against possible 
local or foreign competitors(51). 
In other words, what this means in plain language 
is that all the international regulation relative to the 
protection of so-called intellectual property, is for the 
direct benefit, and protection of the industrialised countries. 
In Latin America, and in accordance with an 
investigation carried out by Constantine Vaitsos(52), the 
registration of patents has done nothing but contribute, with 
legal support, to guaranteeing a better control of local 
markets and a substantial reduction in the possibilities 
for development of the industrial sector of Latin America. 
In Peru for example, of 4,872 patents authorised 
between 1960 and 1970, in the electronics, textile, chemical, 
pharmaceutical, transport, mechanical engineering and food 
industries, only 54 were exploited. 
In Colombia, of 3,513 patents registered, only 10 
were exploited. This situation is repeated in the same way 
in the rest of the Latin American countries. 
The mechanism introduced in the legal system of 
patents of the countries of the Andean Pact, in order 
to halt this situation, turned out to be insufficient and 
after long and costly legal and administrative process, the 
working teams which respond to the interests of the Pact, 
found themselves enslaved and neutralised by the great power 
of political and financial play of the TNCs. 
All the mechanism of the system of patents, the 
privileged and monopolistic action which takes places through 
direct foreign investment, is translated into a disincentive 
for invention and creative capacity in the receiving country. 
In Chile for example, 35% of the patents registered 
in 1937 were of national origin, nevertheless in 1967 only 
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5% were of national origin. 
The patents of invention registered in Venezuela 
by Venezuelans, have continued to decrease progressively 
and those registered by foreign business (most of which are 
incidentally not developed in the country) have been 
increasing up to a point where they provide these foreign 
business with a complete monopoly in important sectors of 
the economy in this nation. 
Of course, the production of patents of invention 
also is tightly linked to the structure and functioning of 
the system of research in science and technology. 
In contrast with the scanty investment in areas 
of science and technology which is made by the developing 
countries, in the industrialised nations, the private 
sector and the governments invest gigantic sums in what has 
come to be called R&D (Research and Development). 
To establish a means of comparison between 
countries in relating to the scientific effort which each 
one has achieved, a measure of investment, based on a 
percentage of Gross National Product of the respective 
has been devised. 
In accordance with this measure, the industrialised 
countries invest between 2 and 3 per cent of their Gross 
National-Product in R&D, whilst the developing countries 
find it difficult to exceed 0.3% of their own GNP. 
If we analysed the figures showed by the "Guide 
to World Science"(53), of the totality of Latin American 
countries only five displayed data relative to the investment 
in this area. 
For 1970, Argentina showed 0.28%, Mexico 0.13% 
Peru 0.25%, Venezuela 0.25% and only Cuba out of this group 
showed 1.2%. 
Equally, the number of workers in science and 
technology(scientists, professional engineers, technicians 
etc. ) registered by each country are as follow: 
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Argentina 10,820; Brazil 8,000; Mexico 3,665; Venezuela 2,056. 
and Cuba 11,820. The total amount invested by the previously 
mentioned countries appears to be US$ 100 million. 
Thus, in 1970 Latin America disposed of 35,911 
people dedicated to research, and had invested for this 
year 100 million dollars. If only for the purposes of 
comparison we estimate by the first arithmetic rule an 
annual increase(exaggerated)of 10% (at constant prices)for 
1975, we would have a global investment for all Latin America 
of 150 million dollars and a figure of workers dedicated to 
research which would reach 39,911 people(calculating the 
wages of the workers at the low level of US$ 1,000 per month). 
For the same year 1975, the United States had 
invested(see annex N°21) 32,100 million dollars and had 
530,000 workers employed in scientific activities. 
We can conclude from this comparison that for each 
US dollar invested in Latin America in science and technology, 
321 are invested in the United States. And for each Latin 
American scientist there exist 16 North American ones. 
Another country which has also made great investments 
in R&D is Japan. In an article published by the English 
magazine "Physics in Technology"(54) Japan appears to have 
invested, in 1976, US$ 15,900 millions, with 523,000 people 
working in the field. 
But the increase in production and registration 
of patents as a consequence of development in science and 
technology unfortunately is not produced only by the increase 
of investment, in R&D. 
The symbiotic character of the relationship between 
science and technology is universally accepted. 
"Science without technology is converted 
into a sterile action, while technology 
without science is converted into something 
moribund" says D. J. de Solla(55). 
Nevertheless, this relationship does not come about 
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in Latin America; in those countries, as everyone knows, the 
development of science and technology cannot be a policy of 
simple scientific investigation, studied in isolation and 
with its back turned on technological transformation of 
industry and agriculture. 
All Latin American planners know the role of 
technology as an important factor for growth and development 
of the economy, but in spite of this the major part of the 
effort produced by our researchers is comprised of the study 
of problems or phenomena which only interest the developed 
world. 
A. publication of UNESCO "Science Policy in Latin 
America"(56) points to the circumstance that the majority 
of Latin American countries which invest in science and 
technology do so principally in the sector of basic or 
fundamental science and very little in applied research on 
the concrete problems of material well-being 
The Latin American science is certainly a sterile 
science insofar as it refers to its community, it is more 
oriented to the enhancement of universal knowledge than 
bringing solutions to our "own" problems. 
It would seem that seeking after individual 
recognition, participation in the so-called international 
scientific community, or contributing to the national 
prestige, impels our Latin American researchers to enlist 
in the race for the Nobel Prize instead of participating in 
the race for development. 
But even if this were true, it would only be an 
additional consequence, which has to be added to the list, 
of those produced by technological dependence. This third 
consequence we-designate: 
3.2.3.3"- The isolation of science 
Economically speaking, in the capitalist industrial 
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countries, the evaluation of the investment made in R&D is 
established when technological invention produced as a 
result of research has been commercially exploited(57). 
There exists, then, a chain linking scientific 
research, (fundamental and applied) market research, invention 
(patents), development of a design, machinery or teams to 
produce it and the marketing or commercialisation of the new 
product. 
The first link in the chain, the research and 
initial development, receives a relatively low proportion 
(5 to 10%) of the total cost required for the overall 
development of the technological innovation(see annex N°22). 
This means that innovation and investment are very 
close together, from the point of view of the application of 
technology, to economic growth. 
But investment always needs its return, which in 
our case is profit. This only is possible when a market, 
capable of demanding the new product or the innovation, 
exists. 
So that, then, those who determine the investment 
in the development of new goods and with that the direction 
of the applied research for producing the technology are 
not the researchers, but ultimately, the conditions of the 
market. And it is precisely these conditions, which in the 
underdeveloped countries are characterised by a substitution 
of the demand for local technology by a demand for foreign 
technology, within a structural malformation of the economy, 
which generate the obligatory divorce between our scientists 
and applied science, forcing them into isolation, which 
means doing basic science unconnected with the country, and 
without any possibility of influencing its development. 
We pass now to the analysis of the condition 
under which patents and licences are negotiated in contracts 
of technological commercialisation and how in this way, 
another consequence of technological dependence is reached. 
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This fourth consequence we have called 
3.2.3.4. - The loss of control of national reality 
The analysis of the agreements on technological 
commercialisation constitutes an element of judgement which 
is important for the study of the loss of control over local 
decisions. 
One of the principal and most prejudicial clauses 
which is found in the majority of contracts is the one 
relative to the prohibition of exporting. This clause 
affects directly the advantages derived from the economy of 
scale, as a result of the under-utilisation of the capacity 
of the installed plant, which generally uses high technology, 
devised for the great markets of the developed countries. 
The narrowness of the national markets of Latin 
America and the impossibility of exporting result. therefore 
in higher production costs and in consequence higher prices 
at the consumer level, which, in their turn restrains the 
potential of demand, thus forming a vicious circle: - capacity 
unused = high costs high prices = insufficient-demand = 
capacity unused. 
For example, of 409 contracts of this type signed 
in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Chile, 319 showed absolute 
and complete prohibition of exports and in the other 92, 
only export to certain countries was permitted 
The major part of these contracts of commercialisation 
also contain clauses which oblige the recipient of the 
technology to import(usually from its own parent company) 
raw materials and intermediate goods which are required ' 
in its production process. When this clause does not figure 
in the contract, it is because the characteristics of the 
technology implied assumes the use of inputs with specific 
levels of yield which can only be supplied by the provider 
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of the technology. 
Thus, in the same way that one clause forbids the 
recipient to export, another obliges, - him to import. 
If we add to the contractual restrictions indicated 
other clauses(also very popular in such contracts) such as 
those relative to the volume of sales and production, to 
the quality and price of the goods to be made, to the hiring 
of personnel, and those which specify that any legal 
controversy between the supplier and recipient shall be 
settled in the courts of the supplier's country, we find 
ourselves face to face with a table of decisions of which 
the only local decision is whether to accept the terms of 
the negotiation, or not. 
It is clear that as in almost every case the 
recipient of the technology is the supplier's own affiliated 
company, the terms of the agreement are, logically, accepted. 
Of course in this sort of "development game" 
those who participate and always win are the TNCs and the 
loser is always Latin America. Local minorities also benefit, 
corrupt politicians and fortunate advisers who apparently 
promote development do so from what is in reality a techno- 
logical trap. 
For some Latin American countries this "development 
game" results in dependent industrialisation under the 
conditions established from abroad by the consortia which 
possess the technology. We can appreciate this in terms of 
figures by analysing the "Statistical Bulletin No 6" 
published by the central banks of the Treaty of Cartagena(58). 
By the examination of some data contained in this 
bulletin we should be able to find the answer to our"process 
of industrialisation"by answering the questions: What do we 
export? and Who do we export to? What do we import? and 
who do we import from? 
On page 208 of the Bulletin (see annex N018)appears 
the "Exports of Important Products of the Sub-region" and 
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by examining them it is easy to see that all the products 
come from the primary sector of the economy, that is to say, 
raw materials. If there is any product coming from the 
manufacturing sector, it does not represent more than 1% of 
the total exports, and since they do not appear anywhere in 
the list, we must suppose they are hidden in the column of 
Other Products. 
To whom do we export? On page 216 of the quoted 
Bulletin is displayed the geographical distribution of 
exports(see annex N°19) and as one might expect it is 
appreciated that the principal purchaser is the industrialised 
world. 
The response to the question What do we import? 
can be found by studying the data on page 226 of the Bulletin 
(see annex N°23)under the designation "Andean Group's Imports 
1977", we observe that for 1977,99% by value of the whole 
imports of the grou-? corresponded fundamentally to manufactured 
goods or chemicals. 
And finally Where do we import from? On page 234 
of the same bulletin appears the geographical distribution 
of imports(see annex N°24) and again we note that the largest 
percentage of imports come from Japan, the European Economic 
Community, and especially the United States. 
In other words, for 1977 and after 30 years of 
"industrialisation" we continue to be, just as we were 300 
years ago, fundamentally exporters of raw materials and 
importers of manufactured ones. 
The text of a publicity notice taken from the 
Venezuelan paper "El Nacional"(. 59) of Ist June 1980, is very 
eloquent in typifying the true industrialisation and techno- 
logical development achieved in Latin America. Part of the 
advert reads: 
"Venezuela is proud to possess the biggest 
assembly plant for country vehicles in South 
America. 'To cars', a business with completely 
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Venezuelan capital, has reached such a level 
of technological development that a 'Macho 
Toyota' rolls out of the plant every eight 
minutes 60 units a day". And later, the tale 
continues: "As the response of 'Tocars' to 
the increasing development of the country, in 
1981 the extension of the Toyota plant which 
will enter into service in*1981 will increase 
the capacity to 87 units a day". 
There is no doubt that with this type of "techno- 
logical development" the "industrialisation of Venezuela is 
assured" and the interests of the Japanese economy will be 
"seriously affected". 
The problem of the loss of autonomy in the matter 
of local decision-making needs to be analysed in the ambit 
of Latin American economies, and within the context of their 
relations with the industrialised world. 
From this point of view, when we speak of the loss 
of control of national reality, we should be able to analyse 
this situation from the level where the particular lack of 
control is determined in each specific area of technological 
action(because of the dependence), to the general plane of 
the economy as a whole, in which each industrial sector should 
have its own importance and its specific meaning for develop- 
ment. 
The absence of local control or the presence of 
foreign control in each sector is then translated into a 
global loss Of control, or what amounts to the same, into a 
dependent economy, or one managed from abroad. 
If we understand the meaning of political and 
economic independence as defined by H. R. Green(60): 
"Situation in which national institutions 
(including private business and interests 
groups) have the right, capacity and power 
to take and implement decisions-affecting- en 
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the national economy and its component units 
without a de jure or de facto veto power being 
held by foreign individuals, enterprises, 
interests groups or governments". 
We arrive then at the other aspect of technological 
dependence which is the possibility which entices whoever is 
in control to produce, from abroad, situations of psychological 
political and economic pressure with the effect of neutralising 
any decisions which although within the sovereign ambit of 
a government could damage the system of dependent relationships. 
"After his call of yesterday I had news. from 
Washington and a representative visited me 
this morning. He was the same man whom you 
encountered with Merrian some weeks ago. We 
discussed the situation in detail and he 
made suggestions based on recommendations 
of our representative on the spot and on 
analysis in Washington. The idea presented, 
with which I am not necessarily in agreement, 
is to apply economic pressure in accordance 
with the followin suggestions: 
1. - The banks should not renew credits or 
should delay in doing so. 
2. - Companies should drag their feet in 
sending money, making deliveries, sending 
replies etc. 
3. - The saving and lending companies there 
have problems, if pressure is applied 
they will have to close their doors, 
so creating greater pressures. 
4. - We should withdraw all technical aid 
and promise no technical assistance in 
the future. The companies which could 
do so should shut their doors. 
He was given a list of companies and it 
was suggested that we should approach them 
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as had been indicated... The visitor added 
that money was no problem. He indicated that 
certain steps had been taken, but he was 
seeking additional help to induce an economic 
collapse I discussed these suggestions with 
Guilfoyle". 
This transcript is part of the text of a message 
cabled from Washington by the company ITT to one of its 
agents(61). 
The cable message was sent on 29th September 1970 
two years before the destabilisation of the government of 
the Chilean President Salvador Allende. 
Recent history gives very significant examples of 
this type of pressure or 'technological blockade' with which 
countries that are technologically dependent find themselves 
menaced. 
In all of them, the technological blockade has 
succeeded and its consequences have been disastrous for 
the economies of. these nations. 
In 1960 a process of destabilisation similar to 
that carried out in Chile began in Cuba, and in the midst 
of other problems faced by the Cuban revolution since 1959, 
such as the flight of human resources and of capital, and 
the very scarcity of natural resources, the technological 
impact produced by the blockade of the United States and 
her allies forced an almost total restructuring of the 
technology implicit in basic sectors of Cuba's economy. The 
initial efforts, to keep working or replace the machinery 
and equipment employed in transport, communications, 
electrification, the sugar industry, the liquor industry, 
in textiles and in general in all those areas where western 
technology was present, became extraordinary, and only Soviet. 
aid and the tenacity of a people determined to advance 
prevented the total crumbling of the economy. 
Another country where a process of destabilisation 
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by techno-economical means is now well under way is Iran. 
This nation, in the middle of a revolution which is different 
from the Cuban one, and not Marxist but Islamic, is trying 
to achieve its own scheme of development. 
Without taking into account the analysis of the 
possibilities of succes of such a scheme, there is one certain 
fact and that is that the government of Ayatollah Khomeini, 
like that of Fidel Castro in the 1960s, has begun, in its 
own way, a process of social transformation which has placed 
it in confrontation with the interests of the developed 
capitalist world. 
Within this world, led by the United States, once 
again the solidarity of international capitalism becomes 
manifest, and at the request of the USA, a summit meeting of 
the European Economic Community, which took place in Brussels, 
decided to carry out a technological and economic blockade 
of the government of Iran from June 1980. 
The characteristics of this blockade and its impact 
on the Iranian economy is particularly important in the 
analysis which we continue to pursue, above all if we realise 
that in this case, we are dealing with a revolution which is 
far from being communist, but which in any case turns out to 
be, in principle, anti-imperialist and destructive of the 
dependent relationship which up to the time of the revolution 
was maintained with the United States. 
In accordance with what we have already pointed out, 
if the present government of Iran does not receive techno- 
logical assistance immediately or at least in a short time, 
all its production structure and its defences will be seen 
to be seriously affected and in consequence, in the medium 
term, a political and economic collapse could be produced, 
or the fall of the government, or a prolongation of the 
conflict through its extension to other areas of the system. 
In any case, what the future of Iran will show us 
in the next few years, should serve to confirm the truth of 
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the thesis of the loss of control of national reality by the 
technological route. 
In other words, if the Iranian revolution, in the 
terms in which it has been conceived up to now, succumbs, 
we believe that this will be fundamentally due to economic 
and political deterioration caused by the technological 
blockade. 
When we point out that technological dependence 
constitutes the best and most sophisticated instrument of 
domination, deep down we are trying to establish a criterion 
in relation to the modern manner of relationships of domination 
which in Latin America began in the years of colonialism. 
During the last 400 years of Latin American history, 
it is evident that the mechanism of this domination has been 
changing in accordance with historic circumstances and the 
style of the dominant nation, indeed, the very concept of 
the term has changed, in relation to the modern concept of 
power. 
The mechanism of domination by the technological 
route is found to be much further from the 'apparent reality' 
that everyone sees, and is moreover a process which belongs 
to a different style, in which the factors to be controlled 
are different from those in the past. 
This new style, which uses control of information 
as the central element of of its operations, has permitted 
the perfection of the mechanisms of dependence and domination. 
The "technological style" as an expression of the 
so-called Third Industrial Revolution has structured a 
system which in practice permits a permanent vulnerability 
of sovereign nations and a constant neutralisation of the 
actions of government. 
In this new structure, any Latin American nation 
which aspires to change its re. ality, has to be aware of the new 
role of the information as a key factor for change and to 
avoid sterile confrontation, revolution without control, and 
defeat. 
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:?; si: ýn^., d^r -i Cor' Pel-rti y: e Caaac' Ir dý-1 ejercicio 
dP la P: "esiden" :a de .... ^zueia al z-neral Ciprianu C? stro el i7, cie 
febrero de i949, quedü cunsumado "legaime nte" ei hsbil golpe pa- 
laciego tramado 'y ejecutado por J. V. Gnmez y su can; anila, 
q,: iene. i sin disparar un "iro. ni tener que disolver el CongresoNa- 
cional, in enfrentacse al problems del reccnoci: nlento oiplomati- 
co de las naciones extranjeras, desalojaron del peder al üder de Is 
°evolucion Liberal Restauradora, acusado de "traici5r+, a ia Pa- 
tria, atentar contra los poderes naclonales, tratar de asesinar al 
general Gomez. encargado entonces de la Presidencia de is Repti- 
biica.. y nomicidio intencional en la persona del general Antonio 
Paredes". 
Como ! as relaciones dipiom, iticas entre Venezuela y Estados 
Cr, idcs se habian suspendido en julho de 11908, , ra: z de g"le el Pre- 
sidente Cipriano Castro ordenara la confiscacibn de todos los inte- 
reses norteamericanos en el pais y se negara a paganinriPmniza- 
cmin aiguna, J. V. Gümez se apresurö a manif"! star su deseo de 
roanudar de inmediato las relaciones y ultimar satisfactoriamen- 
te todas las reclamaciones pendien*. es. 
A tat efecto fue numbrado William W. Russel Enviado Ex- 
traordinario y Ministro Plenipotenciario de Estados Unidos en 
Caracas; quien uns vez instalado, en la ciudad envui al Secretario 
de Estado norteamericano Huntington Wiison, un informe eva- 
luando la situaciön politica imperante en nuestra capital. cuyo 
'. exto ori; i-nal 3e hails en el Arcnivo Histärico del Departamer, to 
co? Estado en Washington, unto con cientos de legajos que contie- 
-ien importantes documentos relacionados con nuestra historia 
politica contemporanea, clasificados para entonces de secretos, y 
que arrojan nueva luz sobre la implacable persecuciön que sufriö 
Cipriano Castro por parte del gobierno norteamericano. 
-"Cnrr". pnndencia del }tini. tro americano en Caracas it Se- 
cretarin de Eaado. LeKuci. in Americana, Caracas, inarzo *. 'I de 
1'an9. 
"-ýefror: Cengo cl honor de informarle que he Ilegado a Cara- 
cas ei II de marzn. De conlormidad a la, instruccio-aes del Minis. 
tro traje conmigo nucmias cartas eredenctales para el general Gil- 
nu"z, a cargo de la Presidcneia de is Repubtica, y con ei propnatio 
! i, - presen4tr dicinu. cartas, . oiiciti- audiencia del >linistro de Re- 
I; rr imtt'. Exleriore.. Fui recibido por el general (: cimcz el wsbado 
al de nutrto. a la. I p. m, 
Confidencial: F, icil es ohservxr que ha:. ta Pi momcnto no .e ha 
pr-u, lucidu uns co! upleta reaccion en contra de Castro. Casi modus 
le. ý iý"; us eguidor", de Castro .e encuentran on C'. lracas o prrp; t" 
r: rndn. c pura venirwe acs. EI general G. innez es un hombre de 
hucnaiii iutencinnes, pere absolut, unelºte t"arentc de educacir, n o 
es perienci, l v en tndo depende up sus cnnsejeras. Hasta el mo" 
rueulv In hit het-ho utu, " bien ,v 
ha inspirado confianza al rP%ocar 
ln. ndiu. o. devretns (lei generýnl Castro, Su principal cnn5eiern } 
practic, unwnte el hombre quo tleva el liohieTno, es el doctor Leo- 
pnldo Baptista. Secretario-Gen. °ral. Baptista es un hombre nn1y, 
intcligcnte y nlu} ambieioso. Tudo el ntundo espera con gran an- 
ý crl:! J v gran preocupacinn la prroxltna se. lün del CuoKreso, el s: t 
d, nta. n. E. tc es e1 n! isrno Congnrso eleKido por el general Castro 
que era , thsolutamentc cotttrolado por PL 
Lit Alta Corte Federal, de aqui, respecto del intento dc! a. e. i" 
n. ttn (lei general Gomez. ha deetdr; +do procedente el juicio contra 
eI qeueral Castro, ordenaudo pasar los autos it tribunal en In cri. 
utin, tl para, el correspondtente juicio y at misnto ticmpo, dccla- 
r, urdo (jut, Castro. de contormidad a tos preceptos de Is Cnnstitu- 
chin, quedxha on consecuencia suspendido de sus lunciones presi- 
dcnciales. En otrt, palahras, el general Castro ha . tdo sontetidu a 
prnceso poor intentu de , a. esinato de C. (Hne/. y el tribunal en to cri- 
minal ests conociendo de la causa. El juez del tribunal donde de- 
but incoar. c Ia causa, reconocido amigo ne Ca, tru. tue aprisiona- 
do c todavut pern, ner'e en la r, trcet, alegando el Gnhierno quo 
tue encarcetado por haber insultado a un funcionario del gobierno 
i ". I 
Ocho dias mas tarde, ei Secretario de Estado del Gobiernc 
Norteamericano, dirige al Secretario de Marina, Gecrge von L 
Meyer, el siguiente memorandum: 
"Uepart. unento de P: aadn-NashinKton, marao 3I de lw9. 
Huntington Wilson: Pur la% diýcLtraeioncs contenldas en el t,, 
i. -igrant: t de nuestro Nliaistro, ustcd podra ui: servar quc Castro c- 
ta r ; pueaýe a%er arre, tado en Veneaoela hajo acusacion cntui 
nal, en Linto que cI ntisntu parecc intcutar ro-"turnar allt contiadc. 
-, ýi su capacidad para dorrocar iil Gohierno, eventualidad que sc 
ri: e dcsastrosa no sdlo para ios anteric. tnos, yinu para todos los in- 
irrcacs e%tranjero8 on esa reptibiica, 
El Ministro norteamericano Russel, como casi todos los politi 
ý que para entonces rodearun ": apoyaron a Juan Vicente Go 
; nez, se equivocaria rotundamente a la hora de evaluar ia perse" 
nalidad. sagacjdad y capacidad politica. de aquei tiombre desti" 
nado a ser el patrlarca de los dictadores, 6 enezolanos. Y los intere- 
ses extranjeros que menciona el Secretario de Estado Huntington 
Wilson, fueron los que verdaderamente se encargaron de impedie 
el retorno del general Cipriano-Castro a Venezuela, quien aesde 
entonces fue sometido a estricta vigilancia por parte de las poli- 
cias secretas de Alemania, Inglaterra, Francia, Holanda y Esta- 
dos ünidos, como jamäs se habia hecho antas contra otra persa; 
nalidad politica de America Latina. 
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CHAPTERIV 
4. - Transnational corporations and sovereignty 
"Transnational corporations may attenmpt 
to exert influence on the host country's 
political system by actively supporting 
or opposing the Government, or particular 
persons and groups of the country". 
United Nations. Commission on 
transnational corporations. 
Fourth session May 1978. 
E/C. 10/38 - E. 78. II. A"5"P"74 
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4.1. - What does sovereignty mean 
In etymological to-rms and in accordance with Klein's 
Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language 
(1), the word sovereignty comes from the medieval Latin word 
"superanus" which means leading chief and is a word which, in 
its turn comes from the word "super" which in Latin suggests 
above, over, and "soprano" which like a variation of "sovrano" 
means the highest, the supreme. 
The Oxford English Dictionary(2) defines it as 
something which holds supremacy, rank or authority over others. 
A superior, a governor. And incidentally, it also considers 
sovereignty the authority of a husband in relation to his 
wife. 
For the Dictionary of Social Sciences edited by J. 
Gould and W. Kolb under auspices of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization(3)sovereignty 
denotes: a. - The authority to make and amend law conferred by 
the rules of a legal system; b. - The political or moral 
authority of the state ; c. - The effective source of or 
influence upon the exercise of political or legal power; d. - 
The independent legal or moral status of a community. 
In constitutional law and political science 
sovereignty may be defined as the legislative authority defined 
by a constitution from which all the rules of a legal system 
derive their validity and by whose action all the rules may 
be amended or the entity or collectivity in whose name a 
constitutional system is promulgated. 
In international law and international politics it 
is used to denote the independence or autonomy of a state in 
relation to other states. 
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But for the purpose of this work, the definition 
which interests us most is that which applies to the field 
of political economy, where it refers to the riaramount Hower 
of the people of a nation state over both its internal and 
external affairs, that is the right to refuse to accept any 
other authority over its own affairs, which also signifies 
self-determination and free choice of economic policies 
which it considers to be most convenient for the achievement 
of its objectives. 
Sovereignty thus conceived, nevertheless, is the 
object of severe criticisms. It is believed that the concept 
of sovereignty is out of fashion, that modern states no longer 
function as a political unity or as Werner Levi pointed out 
in"International Politics Foundations of the System"(4): 
"The mutual penetration of states or their 
integration are no longer merely foreign 
policy devices -bad or good- but almost 
inevitable consequences of advanced techno- 
logy. The linkages between the internal 
and external politics of states are such 
that the division aimed at by the principle 
of-sovereignty becomes virtually impossible". 
This view also seems to be supported by the violation 
of the principle of what in terms of sovereignty is considered 
"Territorial sovereignty". This is the right of the 
State to control or safeguard its national frontiers 
by its own military means. The cases of Germany and Japan, 
where the control and defence of the territories of both 
countries seem to be in the charge of other States would 
be a modern example of the violation of this principle. 
For many states planning integration involves, in 
certain cases, the elimination of its frontiers rather than 
their protection, at least insofar as economic and defence 
relationships are concerned. 
Also prestige, reputation, or the so-called 
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"National Honour", have become secondary to the analysis of 
sovereignty. More important than honour for some nations 
would be the political and economic implications of any 
intent to rescue the lost honour. The case of the kidnapping 
in Iran of United States Embassy personnel in 1980 would 
be a good example of this situation. 
Nevetheless sovereignty in the form which we are 
trying to analyse in this chapter vould allow us to affirm 
that in spite of the circumstances which at present tend to 
negate the feasibility of its implementation, we believe it 
should be taken up again and analysed as an important element 
not only for its contribution in the explanation of the 
economic stagnation of some countries of the Third World, 
but also, for its aid in the formation of government policies 
for development in those nations whose main problems in 
decision making are how to face the increasing power of the 
transnational corporations(TNCs) and their impact in terms 
of sovereignty. 
It is said that sovereignty without power is nonsense, 
and consequently we should deduce that only the nations 
capable of concentrating or demonstrating power have the 
right to enjoy sovereignty, but-we have also pointed out that 
nowadays the natural way to power is more a function of control 
of information than of control of the resources or of the 
traditional instruments of power(natural resources, capital 
and labour) and how technology is converted into the key 
factor for the-control of information. 
In other words the control of information is converted 
into a problem of national sovereignty, and the control of 
technology possesses not just an economic value, but also a 
political value converting itself into the fundamental 
platform for the exercise of power. 
In chapter III when we showed that the loss of 
control of national reality constituted one of the consequences 
of technological dependence, we also analysed the role of 
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the TNCs in the control of this technology, which logically 
and in accordance with what was indicated above, permits us 
to establish a relationship which we consider mainly valid 
for the Third World and which we would enunciate thus: 
Seemingly, in peace time the sovereignty of the government 
of a nation state ends when the loss of control over its 
information and know-how occurs. 
This affirmation obliges us to analyse what could 
be the link between TNCs and the trilogy sovereignty, 
information and technology, from two points of view: 
1. - Within the context of the international political system 
(we shall call it: TNCs within the international political 
system). 
2. - Within the specific ambit of its behaviour in a 
technologically dependent state(we shall name it: TNCs 
within the technologically dependent states). 
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4.2. - TNCs within the international political system 
First of all we would like to make clear that this 
analysis, even if it is not in great depth should nevertheless be 
oriented fundamentally towards a study of the international 
political system of the so-called capitalist world and as an 
extension of the consideration which we have given to the 
point called "Information a new factor of power" which we 
included in chapter I. 
While it is impossible for conceptual as well as 
methodological reasons to determine precisely the impact of 
the TNC= on the international political system, it is important 
in this plan to identify ways in which TNCs can affect the 
sovereignty of the states where they operate(host--states). 
The role of TNCs as foreign policy conduits is pointed out by 
David ii. Blake(5) : 
"There is the much talked about fear with some 
. justifying examples that multinational corporations 
may serve as conduits for parent state foreign 
policy actions. There is the example of US 
government efforts to hinder the development 
of a French nuclear force by prohibiting IBM 
from selling needed equipment. Certainly the 
well-known ITT-CIA case regarding the Allende 
Government in Chile heightens the fears and 
suspicions that multinationals may be the 
vehicle for U. S. foreign policy efforts", 
Sovereignty as a principle is laid down in 
Article two of the United Nations Charter: 
"The Organization is based on the principle 
of the sovereign equality of all its Members". 
Nevertheless, within the international political 
system the relationships which are established between the 
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developed and underdeveloped economies present special 
characteristics in the context of sovereignty. In these 
relationships sovereignty holds sway in one sense only and 
that is it exists in some countries at the expense of its 
deterioration or non-existence in others. 
The formulation and execution of foreign policy in 
the industrialised countries acquires a key content in the 
maintenance of this. relationship, given that, by representing 
an outline of the strategic character of what the state desires 
in relation to its own interests, this necessarily means the 
central expression of its economic behaviour as a capitalist 
state, which is: expansion. 
This expansion, as we have analysed in the course 
of this work, is only possible at the expense of the political 
and economic submission of those nations towards which they 
are also directing their foreign policy. 
Thus, the execution of foreign policy of Western 
industrialised nations could acquire a content of subjugation 
when it is oriented towards the nations of the Third World, 
making the principle of sovereignty take up a purely formal 
character, since, substantially the principle loses validity 
when for these countries there remains no alternative within 
this scheme but to act under the permanent pressure of the 
international political system. 
In the international political system, as Werner 
Levi establishes(6): 
"The inherently, directly and undoubtedly 
political processes can be broadly categorized 
as diplomacy, propaganda and pressure. All 
international political processes fall into 
one of these categories" and later he points 
out: "And because making political decisions 
effective is virtually always a function of 
power, diplomacy, propaganda and pressure 
are tools of power. They are the transmission 
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belts through which one state applies its 
power upon another". 
Of the three categories indicated by Levi, that 
which is most interesting for us to analyse is pressure; it 
interests us to investigate the contemporary methods used 
to manipulate or exercise this pressure and the role which 
the TNCs assume-in perfecting this process. 
It is clear that when one talks of external pressure, 
one accepts the politico-formal scheme of pressure of one 
state upon another, and that theoretically in the formulation 
of political decisions it is assumed that such pressure is 
not due to the intervention of the TNCs and that is simple 
because their interference within this scheme does not 
concern them because they find themselves outside the authority 
structure of the state. 
However, the facts tell us something else, and 
when we analyse the modern means for exercising pressure, 
we find that increasing technological development has imposed 
a different way of doing things, and the military resource as 
the traditionally valid and formerly exclusive method by which 
a state brings pressure to bear has been replaced. In its 
place, besides the ways of technological pressure we already 
showed in chapters I and III, a new way has come into play: 
the action of many international organizations which have 
been created for the regulation of economic matters, from 
trade to currency values. These organizations tend to regulate 
the world economic behaviour, seemingly on behalf of the 
interests of the TNCs. 
Alongside these organizations, such as the 
International Monetary Fundation, or, for the Latin American 
case, the Interamerican Development Bank, the TNCs have an 
important role as participators in the formulations of the 
policies of these organizations. If we can remember the 
participation of the IMF before and after the elections of 
1980 in Jamaica(7), (8) then we can find a good example of how 
Page . 172' 
these organizations can make use of economic tools as political 
instruments. 
The influence of the TNCs in the formulation of 
foreign policy is an undeniable fact, the mechanism which 
allows them to manipulate the decision-making process at the 
political level is constantly revealed in the elaboration 
of this policy. The conclusions which we presented in chapter 
I are clear examples of this fact. 
The participation of the TNCs in the execution of 
foreign policy is also an. irrefutable fact. The processes 
which allow them to manipulate the economies of 
the host countries through the direct or indirect control of 
key institutions, in commerce, industry and finance are shown 
in the execution of this policy. The many examples and 
arguments put foward in chapter III provide a convincing 
demonstration of this participation. 
Some authors and analysts of international politics 
try to deny the role of the TNCs as participants in the 
formulation and execution of the international policies of 
the developed states. 
There are those who try to attribute a non-national 
character to the TNCs, even pointing out that they might even 
be able to reach a point where they join the United Nations 
Organizations, and enjoy the same prerogative, rights and 
privileges as this Organization confers on its member States. 
And as Wayland Kennet indicates(9): 
"There are even those among the leaders and 
philosophers of the TNCs(one of them, George 
Ball, former undersecretary of the US State 
Department)who believe it will be possible 
to see the. first appearance of a supra- 
national world order in which the conflicts 
of nationalism would be superseded by an 
international organization for production 
regulated by the impersonal motive of profit". 
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According to Ball, the TNCs are the means for 
achieving the objective of a new order, including the demise 
of the nation state in favor of a supranational government 
guided by the TNCs. 
This concept of the TNC as an organization of the World 
and not of one country in particular, which mobilises its 
interests and technology in the places which it considers 
most convenient, and dissociates itself from the foreign 
policy of any state, as even some Latin American writers 
affirm(10), appears implausible. 
We know that the internationalism of these 
corporations only functions at a level which has no other 
explanation, which can only be expressed in accounting and 
administrative terms as costs and benefits. However, it 
doesn't mean that the industrial base of countries like 
United States will be undermined and narrowed by its corporate 
investments abroad and the people of this country will wake 
up some day and say: "Oh my God we ran out of jobs, the 
runaway investors from Wall Street have sent all the money 
to the Third World and now the Brazilians, the Taiwanese and 
the people of South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore are enjoying 
our technology and our money" 
The_. effects of TNC investment upon world trade, the 
U. S. balance of payments, domestic employment and transfers 
of technology were studied by the U. S. Tariff Commission at 
the request of the Subcommittee of Finance(11). That study 
found that all of the consequences of TNCs' investment 
abroad were favorable to the United States. Such investment 
made a large positive contribution to the U. S balance of 
trade and payments(see annexe N025). 
Nothing would be more convenient to a TNC than to 
place itself under the protection of a powerful State and 
enjoy the advantages of its influence in its own profit. 
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4.3"- TNCs within the technologically dependent states 
Within the scheme of operation of those economies 
which are strongly dependent on foreign technology, the link 
between TNCs, information and technology and its impact upon 
sovereignty show characteristics which are very special. In 
those countries which we have placed within the most advanced 
stage of underdevelopment, (see chapter III-technological 
dependence), the level of deterioration of their sovereignty, 
we believe, follows a proportional relationship to the 
participation of foreign technology uncontrolled by national 
interests. 
We know that to establish this proportional relation- 
ship does not turn out to be easy, even less when it implies 
the determination of a measure of information expressed as a 
pa'aportion of the control of the technology implicit in the 
productive process of a country. 
Nevertheless, within the complex mechanism which 
underlies the economic activity of a nation, there exist 
elements clearly measurable. In our analysis we shall only take 
those which act specifically in the area of production of 
goods and services. 
The table below shows indicators of foreign 
participation in selected industries in some Latin American 
countries and in selected years : 
Estimated percentage of foreign share of: 
Year Country Chemicals Rubber Iron-st. Non-Elect. Elect. Motor. V 
1969 Argentina 37(0) 75(0) .... 82(0) 33(0) 84(0) 
1976 Brazil 51(0) 44(0) 61(0)b 55(A)b 33(A)b "100(0) 
1973 Mexico 67(0) 84(0) 37(0) 31(0) 63(0) ... 
1969 Peru 67(S) 88(S) ... 25(S) 62(S) ... 
Source: (12) Note: A= assets, 0= output, S= sales. 
b= based on the 5,113 largest non-financial TNCs 
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As we can see, almost all the industrial activities 
shown in that table are under TNC control with parent 
companies outside these countries. The criterion usually 
employed by the United Nations Centre on Transnational 
Corporations to determine the control is according to the 
Balance of Payments Manual(13) which suggests as criterion 
of control, the ownership by a closely associated group of 
25 per cent or more of the voting stock of the enterprise in 
which the investment is made. 
So if we can identify and measure the participation 
of foreign interests in each industrial activity and express 
it in terms of foreign control over shares, why can we not 
do the same by using a different criterion? 
In other words, if so much participation by TNCs 
can be-determined as well as the technology in the productive 
process, it would then be possible to establish a differentia- 
tion between the production of goods and services controlled 
by local interests and those which would be within the ambit 
of direct or indirect control of foreign interests. 
The criterion employed to assess this separation 
would not be a function of the ownership of the shares of 
the enterprise, but of the control of the technology implicit 
in the productive process of that enterprise, so that by these 
means a business with national capital, but which would not 
be capable of assimilating and getting under control the 
technology which it used in its process, would be considered 
to be under the indirect control of non-local interests. 
The concept of control over technology must be 
understood as a process by which any enterprise whicn uses 
foreign technology can keep running without any supply from 
abroad. 
Since this point of view, and again making reference 
to the table already shown, when we said for instance that 
37% of the chemical industry of Argentina is under control 
of foreign interests, we ought assume that the other 63% of 
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of this output is under control of Argentinian interests, But 
the question is: have they actually absolute control over 
their output? 
To know that and according to our view, we would 
have to identify in this particular example how many 
enterprises are producing this 63% of chemical goods and how 
many of them are in fact able to control their technology. 
Another example comes from the pharmaceutical industry. 
In this particular area, which incidentally shows very high 
levels of foreign control in underdeveloped countries 
(see annexe N026), a study carried out by L. Schauman: 
"Pharmaceutical Industry Dynamics and Outlook to 1985"(14) 
indicates that 88% of the pharmaceutical market in Venezuela 
in 1975 was under foreign control and the other 12% was held 
by Venezuelan enterprises which showed heavy dependence on 
foreign technology supplies. 
That is to say then that in this example there is' 
88% of the market under foreign direct control and the other 
12% under foreign indirect control. 
Now let us analyse what happens in terms of 
information with the subsidiaries under TNCs direct control. 
The TN. Cs possess an extensive system of communication 
for transmitting routine information, which apparently 
possesses no political or strategic value. 
The progress and results of their administrative 
management are communicated by various channels which run 
from simple correspondence sent by international mail to the 
sophisticated communications by electronic mail(15) or 
teleprocessing via satellite. (16). 
The structure of relationships between the head 
office of a TNC and its subsidiaries takes different forms 
ih accordance with its size and the economic area in which 
it operates. We present on of these structures in the 
following diagrams: 
see next page. 
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In this structure the information flows in two 
directions: one descending (instructions, know-how, publicity 
support, technical support, administrative support etc) which 
comes from the President or international directorg(finance, 
marketing and production) to the base of national subsidiaries, 
and, and the other upwards (reports, statistics, balances, 
market studies etc. ) which goes from the national subsidiaries 
to the international directors through the regional President. 
The levels which exist between the top and the base 
or periphery of the system establishes what is called the 
"organizational distance". According to the writing of 
Michael Brooke in his book "The Strategy of Multinational 
Enterprise"(17), information circulates across the 
organizational distance subject to a mechanism which should 
be rigidly adhered to, and making use of procedures which 
guarantee that communication flows completely and at a speed 
-Subsidiary- 
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compatible with that at which the activity of the subsidiary 
occurs. 
The information so transmitted constitutes an 
analytical description not only of the microeconomic behaviour 
of the organization, but in addition its_ interaction 
within the general context of the economy in which it operates. 
Between the balances and the statistics submitted 
there exist studies concerning market conditions, the trends 
on supply and demand, the forecasts of sales and receipts 
both in short and long term, technical studies referring to 
location, production, availability and price of raw materials, 
economic studies, sociological studies, etc., and, the most 
important, the detailed analysis of the possible impact of 
political and economic decisions by the local government on 
their particular interests. In a word, a permanent, "X-ray", 
almost "live" of what is happening in the economic area in 
which they are involved. 
The information collated and submitted by the 
subsidiaries to their head offices often exceeds what they 
particularly need for their own operations. 
"We are compiling statistics for headquarters far in 
excess of those needed here for practical operations" said 
a British executive in a letter which he sent to his Head 
Office in London(18). 
The significance of the transmisssion of information 
by we have called the "transnational route" constitutes an 
important aspect for the study of sovereignty. This information, 
analysed in isolation, does not present apparent risks for 
the country which produces it, but when it is processed and 
analysed globally and in the context of the phenomenon we are* 
investigating, it permits. the prediction of reality from 
wherever it comes, acquiring in this way a political and 
strategic value. 
From this point of view this kind of underlying 
value of information which is produced as a consequence of 
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the production of goods and services and by those enterprises 
which are under foreign control, both direct and indirect, must 
be taken into consideration by any government which wants to 
face the power of the TNCs and for those who inside the Third 
World are working for the formulation of policies for 
development, but are aware of the vulnerability of the politico - 
economic decisions which will have to support these policies. 
The effectiveness of the direction and control of 
an economic policy, which for the Third World countries are 
devised in response to the objectives of development, should 
depend on what Manea Manescu describes in his book "Economic 
Cybernetics"(19) as the management of the economic process. 
In accordance with Manescu this management should 
be a function of a dynamic executive process of decision- 
making on the daily happenings in micro- and macro-economics 
of the country. But for this to be possible he p--oj-nts out, it 
requires the construction of a cybernetics mechanism for 
collection and permanent evaluation of the information produced 
for this micro- and macro-economic activity. 
This mechanism, which in the industrialised countries 
is implemented with sophisticated cybernetic models and 
with the aid of data-processing systems, is lacking in those 
countries which we have classified in the most advanced phase 
of underdevelopment, and as a consequence of this, the 
gigantic volumes of information which the very dynamics of 
the execution of development plans generate, not only is not 
controlled in an efficient way, but also, by taking flight 
through the transnational route is converted into information 
for input into the international political system. 
To illustrate the way in which the information flows 
towards the international political system, we are going to 
simplify the process of political and economic relationships 
maintained between the international political system and the 
underdeveloped countries. 
Let us suppose that such relationships are held 
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mainly between two entities and in this case they are only 
two countries which are United States and a Latin American 
country, say for instance Venezuela. 
Within the international political system these 
two countries have their specific economic and political 
relationships; from them, we are going to take only those 
relationships acting in connection with the production of 
goods and services. 
Now let us call the relationships between these 
two countries"The Continental American System"(CAS). 
Who within"CAS" actually owns the technology or 
holds a substantial portion of the equity share capital 
of the enterprises which produce the goods and services to 
supply the Venezuelan market? 
Answering this question and having a precise idea 
about who they are, we have examined a wide range of source 
material including press coverage, information from 
Venezuela's Foreign Investment Superintendent (Superinten- 
dencia de Inversiones Extranjeras)(20), United Nations 
publications(13), and Dunn & Bradstreet directories(21), 
(22), (23), (24). 
In this examination, all the enterprises have 
been classified by country of origin and in alphabetical 
order of parent company name. 
The outcome is shown in annex N°28 and from it 
we can observe that the distribution of companies by country 
of origin is as follow: 
Country Number Percentage of total 
I. - United States 380 65,51% 
2. - United Kingdom 40 6.90% 
3. - W. Germany 27 4.67% 
4. - Netherlands 24 4.15% 
5"- Italy 18 3.10% 
6. - Japan 17 2.93% 
7. - France 15 2.59% 
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8. - Canada 14 2.41% 
9. - Sweden 13 2.24% 
10. - Belgium 11 1.90% 
11. - Switzerland 7 1.20% 
12. - Spain 6 1.03% 
13. - Denmark 5 0.86% 
14. - Australia 1 0.17% 
15. - Austria 1 0.17% 
16. - Finland 1 0.17% 
Total .......... 580 100.00% 
If we classified all these firms into the main 
industrial sectors(Primary, Secundary and Tertiary) and if 
we codified them by type of industrial activity according to 
United Nations International Classification Standard(ISIC) 
(see annex N°28), then, we could conclude that there is no 
industrial activity in Venezuela outside the transnational 
corporations' interests. 
Five hundred and eighty firms of which 66% are 
U. S. parent companies have taken over directly or indirectly 
almost all the industrial sectors as far as economic 
information is concerned. 
The Continental American System which we describe 
in the diagram N°1, shows the leak of this information through 
the transnational route and how such information flows 
and turns itself into an important input in the decision- 
making process of the foreign policy of the United States. 
As we can see, the TNCs inside the technologically 
dependent states become a means for the leak of economic as 
well as political information. 
We know that to try and stop the flow of such 
information within the "CAS" could be an impossible task. 
However, if we must to induce changes towards 
development, while accepting the rules of the TNCs'game, 
then, in a democracy, we must be aware of how important 
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it is to develop a pragmatically effective information and 
control system. As mentioned in the introduction, such a 
system must be robust and adaptable and should provide 
reliable information relevant to the needs of decision 
makers at all levels in the nation without producing 
information overload. 
A pragmatic information system such as this must 
be able to interact with the data flows of the "CAS" and 
provide outputs that allow the nation to monitor and control 
events-to support, and allow it to develop, its strategy 
of sovereign actions in dealing with the TNCs. 
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"IMIF, Owing to the. Columbus Day holiday in the U. S. I 
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U. S. Postal Service' ý.. ýw..........,,. ý..... _. ... } 
switches into the 
"ý 
electronic age 
ý.... . _ý: ý. ý:., _. _. M... ý. BY NANCY DUNNE AND PATTI REAU IN WASHINGTON f 
...., ß: 
i A 
THE U. S. Postal Service, beset The service is now calling for hand delivery services and the 
by competition from the private bids to install the cotnmunica- increase of advertising inserts 
sector and quarrels with official tions network itself. Business into newspapers. 
agencies, is moving into elec- users will have access through A study of consultants: tronics in an effort to ensure their, own computers, through Arthur D. Little said that if the that it has. a future. telecommunications companies-Postal Service did not enter the From January 1982, the Post like Western Union or through electronic field, private telecom- Office will run a full electronic magnetic tapes handed in " over munications servitýes from such 
postal service-known as E-Com the counter. " 
, companies as 
AT and T. RCA 
-for large-volume business The decision to enter the and Western Union might 
computer age was strongly sup- replace over 15 per cent of the 
post, transmitting messages ported by the U. S. Postal Union first-class letter market by 1985. 
Tram computers-to any of 25'ý which, as the third largest U. S The U. S. electronics mail post offices across the U. S. work force, has considerably industry is still in its infancy. The messages will be printed 
lobbying power. but is now earning about $70m 
at high speed, automatically The union, whose workers a year. Electronics messages 
folded and sealed in envelopes earn an average of . 
$17,000 a can be sent by a variety of 
and placed in the first-class year for a 40-hour week, have devices-copiers, word proces- 
I 
mailstream, which guarantees seen proposals to close 92 post sons; facsimile transmitters, delivery within two days, offices in the past two years, telecopiers or terminals-over 
I 
according to the Post Office. and recognise the post offices any communications network .... i ,. ý; "», ý.,:.,.,.... -existence is threatened by com- with the right equipment. 
petition. Systems now in operation allow 
While the post -office has a 
home offices to send and receive 
monopoly on the delivery of written messages 
from Their 
branches. letters, its other ser. i 
vices have been losing ground. The Postal Service -moves 
l 
United Parcel Service earned over 1.04bn items. a year. 80 per 
$2.8m last year and delivered cent of which comes from the 
3.3 times as many parcels as the business community, and the 
Postal Service. Post Office deli` volume is expected to increase. 
very of third-class advertising' Officials estinsate that E-Com 
mail has been hurt by the rising will cost its users 34 cents for 
use of sales phone calls, private the first prinf'ed page and 10 
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Satellite 
Business 
Systems 
under way 
By Paul Betts in New York 
THE FIRST satellite in a $375m 
programme designed to relay 
computer data, telephone calls 
and electronic mail exclu- 
sively for business was. 
launched from Cape Cana- 
venal in Florida at the week- 
end. 
The venture, known as Satellite 
Business Systems (SBS), 
which will involve the launch- 
ing of two more similar spaW- 
crafts during the next three 
years, is a partnership includ- 
ing International Business 
Machines, the electronics 
group, Communications Satel- 
lite Corporation and the 
Aetna Life and Casualty 
Insurance Company. 
The launch of the first SBS 
satellite this weekend is ex- 
pected to open the way to a 
new age of high-speed office 
communications. The system 
will enable computer data, 
voice, vbdeo and other 
material to be transmitted at 
considerable speeds through- 
out the U. S. 
Among the customers of the 
new high-speed communica- 
tions system are such giants 
of U. S. industry as General 
Motors, Boeing Computer Ser- 
vices, IBM and Aetna. 
Satellite 
`channels' 
auctioned 
By Ian Hargreaves in New York 
RCA and Sotheby's yesterday 
successfully auctioned off an- 
nual leases on seven trans- 
ponders on board RCA 
Americom's Satcom 4 communi- 
cations satellite, but the total 
price of $90.1m (£49.5m) was a 
little lower than the most opti- 
mistic forecasts. 
The unique auction attracted 
50 bidders, and successful bids 
ranged from $10.7m to $14.4m. 
for each transponder. Every 
transponder represents a chan- 
nel on the satellite, which can, 
be used either for transmitting 
a single television signal or a 
cluster of telephone-type sic... 
naffs. 
The legal status of the auc-j 
tion was not cleared up in; 
advance of the sale, although' 
the Federal Communications 
Commission has warned that 
the sale may be illegal as it 
represented a transparent 
attempt to get round Federal 
limits on transponder leases, 
which currently sell for about 
$50,000 a month. 
Among the successful bidders 
were Home Box Office, the 
Time Inc. pay television com- 
pang, and Warner Amex, 
another cable television com- 
pany which has also filed a suit 
to declare the auction illegal 
on the grounds that it is en- 
titled to a transponder on 
Salcom 4 to replace a lease on 
a transponder on an earlier 
RCA satellite. 
Satcom 4 is due to be 
launched from Cape Canaveral 
in January. It cost about $65m 
to build and launch and will 
carry 24 transponders in all. 
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CHAPTERV 
5. - The cybernetic alternatives 
"It is a grandiose idea to attempt to create only 
one nation from the New-World with one link only 
that can bind their parts together and with the 
Universe as a whole. If those nations have the 
same origin, the same language, the same customs 
and the same religion should, therefore, have 
only one government who can form a confederation 
between the different states, that will be created" 
Simon Bolivar 
Jamaica's Letter. 
Kingston 6th Septemb. er 1815(1) 
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5.1. - The peacetime alternative 
5.1.1. - What should a host-state 
know about its TNCs. 
Up to now, we have tried to identify the process 
by which the TNCs work within both the. international political 
system and in the productive activity of the underdeveloped 
countries. Also we have analysed their influence in the 
formulation of foreign policy of the industrialised nations, 
and their role in the capture of a part of the information 
which serves as a basis for the decision making process which 
regulates such foreign policy. 
The analysis of what could be the link between 
TNCs and what we call the trilogy Sovereignty, Information 
and Technology served to establish a relationship between 
the loss of sovereignty and the absence of control over both 
the technology and the information implicit in the production 
processes of some underdeveloped countries. 
On the other hand we also postulate that apparently, 
in peace time, the sovereignty of the Government of a Nation 
State deteriorates when the loss of control over its informa- 
tion and know-how occurs. 
So the question is: could we measure the way in 
which any nation is losing access and control over its 
information and technology? 
This question has a global character and by that 
we mean that when we say that sovereignty is deteriorates as 
a result of the loss of control over information and techno- 
logy, we must embrace, in order to be consistent with the 
above postulate, virtually all the information which can be 
identified as relevant information in connection with the 
sovereignty of any particular country. 
But the identification of such a wide range of 
information is an enormous task and is impossible to achieve 
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within the time and resources available for the present 
project. Furthermore, the actual source information required 
by a cybernetic information system-i. e. a pragmatically 
effective information system- can only be fully determined 
as the system is put into operation and the specific needs 
for data input are identified. Such a system will necesarilly 
evolve and adapt and will itself generate new data sources 
to fulfil its needs. 
However, standard financial data is already 
generated and used by firms for their own management purposes 
and such data will certainly be one important input source 
for a cybernetic information system. Since this data is 
fairly standarized and produced by all firms, the nations 
can make a start towards effective information control by 
attempting to secure reliable access to such standard 
financial data. In what follows, a simple measure of access 
to company financial data is outlined for the productive 
sector of a nation, to indicate what is meant by the degree 
of control of information. It should be emphasised that such 
a measure takes little account of the pragmatic value that 
may be extracted from the data concerned but it does at 
least demostrate that some measures can be derived. 
A cybernetic system of the above type assumes the 
identification of information not only from the production 
of goods and services as we are going to analyse in this 
chapter, but in addition information which comes from other 
parts of the whole reality of the country considered. 
If, by way of example, we conceive such a reality 
as an ensemble composed of some of the parts(subsystems and 
systems) we have already illustrated in chapter IV graphic 
N11(Continental American System), then we have Production 
subsystem, National Resources subsystem, Defence subsystem, 
Social-political subsystem, TNCs subsystem, the Industrialised 
countries'Foreign Policies subsystem and the International 
Resources System, and we could say that the control of this 
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reality would be a function of the control of the information 
generated by each one of these parts 
Under these circumstances it will be very difficult 
or impossible, to obtain all the information that we should 
take into consideration. Because of practical limitations 
we have chosen to restrict our range of analysis only to 
one part of the whole reality. This part will be the Production 
subsystem. 
So, our original question ought to be reformulated 
as follows: Could we establish a measure of the access to 
the standard financial information implicit in the productive 
process of a country? 
Let us suppose that the maximum access to informa- 
tion that we could achieve in the Production subsystem is 
represented by 1.0. It is of course very likely that full 
access would never actually be achieved. Actual access can 
then be represea,; ed by a number between 0.0 and 1.0. 
Within the Production subsystem we can identify 64 
industrial activities (subsystems)clasified into the three 
main economic sectors(system) as follow: 
Primary System: 
Subsystem code Subsystem's name 
110 Agriculture and Hunting 
120 Forestry 
130 Fishing 
210 Coal mining 
220 Crude petroleum and Natural gas 
230 Metal ore mining 
Secondary System: 
Subsystem code Subsystem's name 
311 Food manufacturing 
313 Beverages 
314 Tobacco 
321 Textiles 
322 Clothing 
323 Leather and Leather products 
324 Footwear 
331 Wood and Wood products 
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332 
341 
342 
351 
352 
353 
354 
355 
356 
361 
362 
369 
371 
372 
381 
382 
383 
384 
385 
390 
Furniture and Fixtures 
Paper and paper products 
Printing, Publishing, and allied industries 
Industrial chemicals 
Other chemical products 
Petroleum refining 
Products of petroleum and coal products 
Rubber products 
Plastic products 
Pottery, China and Earthenware 
Glass and Glass products 
Cement, Concrete, Asbestos etc. 
Iron, Steel and Ferro-alloys 
Non-ferrous metals 
Fabricated metal products 
Machinery 
Electrical machinery, Aparatus and supplies 
Transport equipment 
Professional and scientific instruments 
Other manufacturing industries. 
Tertiary System: (code 3) 
Subsystem code Subsystem's name 
410 Electricity, Gas and Steam supply 
420 Water works and supply 
500 Construction 
611 Wholesale of consumer goods 
612 Wholesale of producer goods 
613 Wholesale of motor vehicles and fuel 
614 Commission broking 
621 Department stores 
622 Retailing of foods, Beverages and Tobacco 
623 Retailing of clothing and textile goods 
624 Retailing of furniture and furnishings 
625 Retailing of hardware, Paints, Glass etc. 
626 Retailing of optical and musical instruments 
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627 Retailing of motor vehicles and gasoline 
629 Other retailing 
631 Operation of restaurants and cafes 
711 Land transport 
712 Water transport 
713 Air transport 
719 Services allied to transport, storage 
720 Communications 
810 Financial Institutions 
820 Insurance 
831 Real Estate 
832 Business services 
833 Machinery and equipment rental and leasing 
920 Sanitary and similar services 
952 Laundries 
All the indicated subsystems have been codified by 
type of industrial activity according to the United Nations 
International Classification Standard (ISICC). 
With respect to the gathering of the sixty four 
subsystems into three main system (Primary, Scondary and 
Tertiary), the standard procedure which, has been taken is 
the correspondence between each one of these subystems and 
their location inside the country's economic activity. 
Nevertheless all the subsystems shown are not the 
totality of the industrial activities that can be identified 
inside each industrial sector of the economy, but as an exemple, 
they represent almost all the subsystems that we believe must 
be, included in this analysis. 
Each one of these subsystems possesses its own 
dynamic of change. This dynamic, even when it is produced as 
a result of the interaction between them, in cybernetic terms, 
can be separately analysed, that is to say, observing each 
subsystem as a system and identifying the flow of information 
corresponding to each one of them. 
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The detailed study and the functional description 
of each one of these sixty four subsystems analysed as systems 
turns out to be extremely complex and extensive and is not 
the object of this work. Therefore and for the purpose of our 
analysis we shall assume that . in, these subsystems the information 
that ought to be known by the Government of an underdeveloped 
country, and in consequence under their control, is the micro- 
economic information(-, )(2) produced by each one of these 
sixty four subsystems. 
The best way to determine this microeconomic 
information is by identifying in the first place who are 
the producers of such information inside each subsystem. 
These producers are the manufacturers of goods and 
the suppliers of services and as we analysed in chapter IV 
(TNCs within the technologically dependent states) for some 
underdeveloped countries they are mainly Transnational 
Corporations. 
So if we can identify who are these TNCs(see in 
annex 27 a detailed list showing who they are in each one 
of the sixty four subsystem of the Venezuelan Production 
system) then the question will be: 
What is-exactly the microeconomic information that 
the nation needs to know from each one of these TNCs? 
We suggest that one answer in plain language is: The 
same information that each TNC has to send periodically to 
its country's headquarters in order to be controlled by its 
parent company. 
The characteristics of this information depend, 
upon the location of each enterpise inside the economy(Primary, 
Secondary or Tertiary system), but its meaning as well as its 
(*) Microeconomics: The part of Economics concerned with the 
detailled workings of the economy, that is, the study of 
particular cases, such as the supply of butter, unemployment 
in the shipping industry, the best output for a firm etc. 
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impact on the decision making process of both users(the 
host-state and the parent company)are completely different. 
For the TNC's parent company, such information concerns 
the management of a business and the way to control it. 
But for the host-state this information could be important 
source data for a cybernetic information system designed 
for the control of the. TNCs within the country. 
We should also take some account of the relative 
value of each item of financial data produced by a firm. 
Clearly some data, such as an income statement is more 
valuable as indicator of the firm's health and profitability 
than, say, isolated market analysis information. Of course, 
assigning useful relative values will be a difficult task 
but should be done in order to arrive at a balanced measure. 
Brooke and Remmers(5.03) attempted to carry out 
such an assignment of relative values for international firms 
and those are used in the example below. The values are 
referred toas'arbitrary" in this present work to remind the 
reader that a definitive assignment of values has not yet 
been achieved. 
Thus, we can catagorise the financial information 
that makes up the source-data we have been considering as 
follow: 
1. - Financial inforriation: (-`) 
1.1. - Balance sheet 
1.2. - Balance sheet supporting data 
1.3. - Inventory analysis 
1.4. - Income statement 
1.5. - Income statement supporting detail 
1.6. - Product line income statements 
1.7. - Cash flow 
1.8. - Sales analysis 
1.9. - Order backlog analysis 
1.1). -Local borrowing position 
Arbitrary 
value 
13 
7 
6 
14 
10 
6 
4 
6 
8 
10 
(*)"-Regular financial reports to corporate management(3) 
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2. - Market information: 
2.1. - Market developments 
2.2. - Market share(compulsory report) 
2.3. - Market analysis 
Arbitrary 
value 
2 
4 
2 
3. - Production and technical information: 
3.1. - Production and productivity figures 4 
4. - Personnel information 
4.1. - Personnel-turnover, absenteeism, disputes 3 
5. - Other key information that applies to the 
industry subsystem 
Total arbitrary value ............. 100 
The access to all this information could be 
measured but this measure can only be balanced and meaningful 
in terms of comparision if the systems(Primary, Secondary and 
Tertiary) which produce the information employ similar 
accounting procedures and, in addition, similar accounting 
policies in implementing the procedures. 
By degree of access to the financial data of an 
enterprise we mean nothing else than the sum of values for 
all the data items to which we have access for the enterprise 
concerned. Normally, of course, we will not have complete 
access so we will have a degree of access less than 1.0 
Using the above approach, we can obtain measures 
not only for degrees of access to financial data of individual 
enterprises but also for complete sectors of the productive 
process. With such a measure the nation can monitor the 
effectiveness of its gathering of source data for its cybernetic 
information system and can identify where there are significant 
0O. -Regular financial reports to corporate management (3) 
Page. 200 
gaps that need to be filled by extensions to its powers and 
systems of data requisition. 
It is clear that when we talk of the above approach 
it is understood that this kind of access can only lead to 
control if the government which tries to implement it has 
suitable mechanisms with which to process such information 
and knows what-to do with it. 
From this view it is necesary to analyse several 
aspects usually linked with this kind of mechanism(cybernetic 
mechanism). Those aspects could be categorised as follow: 
1. - The definition of the information's users 
within the host-country. 
2. - The reliability of the information which is 
3"- 
supposed to be gathered and processed by 
the system. 
The effects of this information on actions, 
beliefs and plans of the users. 
The idea of the cybernetic mechanism that we are 
refering to, even when it actually can be categorized as a 
simple information system, shows all the typical constraints 
of any cybernetic organization, so let us briefly start 
with a discussion of the information's users.. 
When we head-lined this point as "What should the 
host-state know about its TNCs" we were making an implicit 
assumption that the host-state, apart from being represented by 
the government of the considered nation, must also represent 
the nation as a whole. 
In our analysis we are considering a nation to be 
a cybernetic organization, which is one that contains 
distributed control and an ability to adapt and envolve 
mechanisms to face disturbances and threats to its continued 
existence. This means that at bottom the mass of the people 
must find through the nation's activities an expression of 
their personal aims, desires and beliefs. It is only when 
the population is so integrated that we can expect to obtain 
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timely and effective adjustment to changing conditions 
and expect to overcome attempts of destabilization. Thus 
a cybernetic information system assumes the cooperation 
of the mass of the population for its effectiveness, it 
cannot hope to succeed in any political system that denies 
the populace free expression of its will. 
The behaviour of the TNCs as we have pointed out 
in chapter III, could sometimes be against the interest 
of the people and cons uently against the interest of the 
nation as a whole. Therefore the government who makes decisions 
(within the context of development) for the people and not 
for the TNCs, can sometimes be, in its turn, against 
the behaviour of the TNC. So if our proposal in this "informa- 
tion system" is to use as input, the information which is 
produced by the TNCs, then the obvious aspect to be considered 
in this analysis is the reliability of the information to be 
gathered and processed by the system. 
The reliability of information is a complex problem 
to be considered in any cybernetic information system. As 
we know, information can be manipulated and at the end of 
the day inaccurate information. can lead to wrong decisions. 
A cybernetic organization must minimise this as 
far as it can. So the question is how can our information 
system improve the reliability of the information produced 
by and recived from the TNCs. 
It is not easy to point out what should be done 
in terms of technical procedures in order to guarantee the 
accuracy of the financial information, market information, 
or production information which normally is written down 
in Balance sheets, Income statements or in any statistical 
analysis made by an enterprise. 
This problem is exemplified by the hard work which 
has to be done by governments to improve the accurracy of 
the financial informatioi. received from its tax payers, and 
by the efforts it must make to counteract the many ways in 
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which the tax payer and especially enterprises breake 
rules in order to manipulate their financial information 
(Income statements etc) and avoid tax. 
However apart from any suitable control that could 
be implemented to improve the reliability of information 
the main guarantee of its trustworthiness is the people 
themselves, the people involved in the production of company 
information: the employees who make the calculations, the 
workers who can watch the production of the factory, and in 
general the people who, even when working in a TNC, are 
aware of their committment to the nation's interests. 
But to gain the solidarity of the people in this 
kind of control requires that hard work be done in the 
political and social fields. Hence, only a democratic 
government with very clear ideas about progress and develop- 
ment and capable of stimulating the support of the people 
in this sort of activity, can be successful in the 
implementation of the cybernetic mechanism we are talking 
about. 
The third aspect to be considered in the 
implementation of this cybernetic mechanism is the effect of 
the information on action and plans of the users. This will 
be discussed at the end of the section 5.1.3 which describes 
a cybernetic organization. 
Before ending this section we should re-consider 
the role of the sort of basic financial- data that the "goods 
and services information system might supply. 
What we have done is try to describe a way in 
which the government could identify, say in percentage terms 
the quantity of information obtained from the TNCs. 
However, this information alone doesn't make any 
sense as far as control over the behaviour of the TNCs 
inside the host-country is concerned. 
We said earlier that the identification of the 
information and its relative value that must be obtained 
5 
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in order to determine the measure of access to information 
required deep research. But as well as these problems there 
are other problems relating to, for example, overcentralisation 
when gathering information, its management, the information 
processing capacity of the organization(we have been calling 
"government") in charge of the system, and the means of 
communicating and filtering the information, which have been 
intentionally avoided in this analysis. 
Therefore, we have to be perfectly clear that 
there remain many further problems to be solved before we 
can talk properly of the nation gaining control over the 
TNCs. 
We are aware that these remaining problems are 
very complex and require a huge amount of work. In particular 
in this phase the effect of information in terms of the 
user's decision-making processes will have to be defined. 
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5.1.2. - The cybernetic change toward sovereignty 
In the previous parts of this chapter(5.1.1), we 
have tried to explain how important, for the decision-making 
process of any government it is to know the quantity of 
information that it must know from its reality and the 
quantity that is actually known. 
We pointed out as well, that perhaps no strategy 
of development would be successful--(for the underdeveloped 
countries which have resources) if at first a strategy of 
control of information is not planned and executed. 
However, the execution of such a strategy would 
mean changes, and these changes do not occur either continuously 
or spontaneously but are induced discretely. So they 
could possibly be measurable and controllable. 
"The most fundamental concept in cybernetics 
is that of 'difference', either that two things 
are recognisably different or that one thing 
has changed with time-"" said W. Ross Ashby(4). 
Thus, all the changes which we are going to refer 
to in this point, even when they do not mean a difference 
between two things, represent two different states of the 
same thing. 
Each one of these changes can be linked together, 
so there might be several steps in a chain of changes that 
we believe have to be planned and executed by the government 
before it can reach the situation where it could be successful 
in carrying out any strategy of development. 
The first step in this chain of changes crust be the 
transition bf a state with a lack of information or no 
information at all from its reality(the four subsystems), to 
a state with full, or nearly full, information from the same 
reality. We already discussed such a transition in part 5.1.1. 
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" Thus the first change should be: 
Actual information Expected information 
This change could be measurable, as we pointed 
out, but it does not occur in aspontaneous way and this means 
that somebody has to lead it. 
We have mentioned that such a change must occur 
in the four subsystems in which we have divided the reality 
of an underdeveloped(rich) country. The actual and expected 
information from these subsystems are: 
First: 
Actual information from the Productive subsystem ........ AIPS 
i! 11 Expected informat. from the Productive subsystem ........ EIPS 
Second: 
Actual inf. from the National resources subsysterrm.... AINRS 
Expected inf. from the National resources subsystem.... EINRS 
Third: 
Actual information from the Defence subsystem.......... AIDS 
Expected informat. from the Defence subsystem .......... EIDS 
Fourth: 
. Actual informat. from the Social-political subsyst.. AISPS 
11 
Expected informat. from the Social-political subsyst.. EISPS is 
This change, relating to the fourth subsystems, we 
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suggest can be led by the entity which actually runs the 
whole system, which is the Government. 
The second step of changes that the Government 
could carry out as well, is to change the expected information 
into control. So the change should be: 
Expected information Control 
However, to do that, the Government must use an 
appropiate tool in order to get an effective control. This 
tool should be a kind of cybernetic organization capable of 
supporting such control. 
In point 5.1.3., we will give a brief description 
of that cybernetic organization. 
The third step in the series, is the transition 
which occur, %, when the Government, having the new power of 
control, should transform itself into a real sovereign state 
(in the sense we have pointed out in chapter IV). 
Hence, we might say that the Government could 
convert control into sovereignty and the change should be 
expressed: 
Control Sovereignty 
The fourth step in the chain of changes, should be 
therefore performed when the Government, as a sovereign state 
and using a suitable model for its development strategy, can 
be capable of producing invulnerable decisions. In this case 
the change could be expressed 
Sovereignty + Strategic 
Development Model 
1IIVUlIICi'e1U1C UCC1510II1ý: i 
In the fifth step, if the Government is successful 
in executing the invulnerable decisions through the closed 
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system we will show in point 5.2.2., of this chapter, then it 
should be able to change the underdevelopment into development. 
That change could be expressed as: 
Invulnerable decisions » Development 
Finally, the chain of changes should finish when 
the development as a system achieves its stability and 
therefore the Government can consider the information from 
such a developed economy as actual information without any 
expectation of additional information. This last change 
should be expressed: 
Development > Actual information 
As we can see, in the explanation of these six 
changes briefly described, the idea of transformation of an 
underdeveloped economy into a developed economy has been 
pointed out as a result of a chain of changes which we must 
suppose have been carried out by the Government. 
We ought to notice that such a transformation was 
defined, not by any reference to any political reason as a 
cause of the change, but by givinga set of statements and 
relations of what each state has change into. The transformation 
showed is concerned with what happens, not with how it happens. 
Similarly, it is clear that the ideological conception 
about what does development mean is a very important factor 
in relation to such changes. However, though we should know 
something of who actually carries out the changes and 
the country's sociol-economic and political characteristics 
which are going to be changed, this knowledge is not essential 
in, this particular theoretical explanation about cybernetic 
transformation. So, in this case, all we must know is how the 
Government acts in its reality; that is, we must know the 
transformations that it is able to produce. 
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According to Ross Ashby's theory of change(4), a 
change can be represented unambiguously as a "transition" 
which is specified by two states and the indication of which 
changes to which. 
The transition is produced when something is acted 
on by a factor and is changed to another thing. 
"That which acted on, said Ashby, will be 
called the 'operand', the factor will be 
called the 'operator', and what the operand 
is changed into, will be called the 'transform'. 
The single transition is, however, too 
simple. Experience has show that if the 
concept of change is to be useful it must 
be enlarged to the case in which the 
operator can act on more than one operand, 
inducing a characteristic transition in 
each". 
Taking into account Ashby's theory of change, then, we 
might say that in our example of the six changes, the Government 
should represent the operator wnich can act on more than one 
. operand 
in order to induce a number of transitions, among 
which are: 
Operator Operand Transform 
1. Government Actual Inform .... AIsExpected Inform... EI (underdevelop. Inf. ) 
2. Government Expected Inf..... EI - control............ C (cybernetic Org. ) 
3. Government Control .......... C )Sovereignty....... S 
¢. Government Sovereignty...... S>Invul. Decisions... ID 
(Development Model) 
$. Government Invul. Decisions.. ID--->Development....... D 
(Resources + Closed 
system) 
6. Government Development...... D--, Actual Inform..... AI 
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But the more interesting thing that we can find 
when applying Ashby's approach to our case, is that of the 
test of "closure". 
Ashby said that "when an operator acts on a 
set of operands it may happen that the set 
of transforms obtained contains no element 
that is not already present in the set of 
operands, i. e. the transformation creates no 
new element". 
Taking into account this Ashby's view, in the 
transformation we are analysing(page 200): 
AI EI CS ID 
ID 
EI C ID D AI 
every element in the lower line occurs also in the upper. 
"When this occurs", Ashby said, "the set of 
operands is 'closed' under the transformation. 
The property of 'clousure' is a relation 
between a transformation and a particular 
set of operands; if either is altered the 
clousure may alter". 
Again, it will be noticed that the test for closure 
is made, not by reference to whatever may be the cause of the 
transformation but by reference to the details of the 
transformation itself. So it can be applied even when we know 
nothing of the cause responsible for the changes. 
The other way to test for the closure property is 
by showing its representation in a matrix. 
All the indicated transformations can be represented 
in a single schema, which shows clearly their mutual relations. 
If we write the operands in a horizontal row, and the possible 
transforms in a column below and to the left, so that they 
form two sides of a rectangle. Taking our particular case, if 
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we put a "+" at the intersection of a row and column if the 
operand at the head of the column is transformed to the 
element on the left-hand side; otherwise we insert a zero. 
We would have the following matrix: 
AI EI CS ID D 
EI +00000 
C0+0000 
S00+000 
ID 000+00 
D0000+0 
AI 00000+ 
In this matrix we can observe that the symbols of 
the principal diagonal "+" are all equal, thus, and in 
accordance with Ashby's criterion, the positional relationships 
of the said matrix corresponds to a closed system. 
This fact brings us to state the theoretical 
assumption that when a politically independent couantey(analysed 
as a system) does not possess sufficient resources it has to 
become an open system in order to survive. If it fails to 
obtain such resources from the external world, it is then 
inevitably obliged to exchange sovereignty for the resources 
which it does not possess. 
However, when the situation has changed(from the 
resources' viewpoint) as is the case with some countries of 
those we have called "rich underdeveloped", we believe that 
it is possible to develop closed transformations which by 
guaranteeing an increment in the level of sovereignty to 
levels compatible with the development option, could allow 
the selected development model, to be actually converted 
into a realisable alternative. 
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"An unclosed transformation is thus like 
a machine that takes one step and then 
jams" said Ross Ashby(4)p. 2/12. 
In our case, the importance of closure will become 
particularly useful to support the idea that no Latin American 
transformation(development) is at the moment possible in an 
unclosed way. It could start taking some steps and then jam 
(if we applied Ashby's criterion quoted above), so a proposal 
for a "Latin American closed system" will be explained in 
point 5.2.3. 
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5.1.3. - A cybernetic organization 
If we interpret the national economy as a dynamic system 
of a very high complexity, composed of a multitude of parts 
connected directly or by feedback generated by flows of 
information from the four subsystems(Productive, National 
Resources, Defence and Social-Political subsystems) we have 
pointed out, then we are prepared to understand that nowadays 
there are no ways to manipulate such complex system and to 
gain control over its information without making use of a 
suitable cybernetic mechanism. 
"The tool for handling complexity is 
organization" indicates Stafford Beer(5). 
"We shall not succeed in reforming our 
concept of organization or in creating 
new institutions that actually work 
simply by hard work or even hard thought. 
We need to invoke science, and science 
offers the means to design complex systems 
through General System Theory and to 
devise viable organizations through 
cybernetics". 
According to this point of view and taking the 
systemic approach as a basic method, it. should then be possible 
to develop a cybernetic organization using modern computer 
technology and design a national model suitable to explain 
the behaviour of the four indicated subsystems and to under- 
stand the performance of the national economy within the 
whole country's reality. 
We could create a cybernetic mechanism which could 
even modify the model itself in order to cope with any 
disturbance from outside and inside the economy. 
However, that is not the aim in this work. Instead 
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of that, we shall concentrate on the idea of how important 
it should be for any government, and specially for those in 
rich developing countries, to get control over the information 
specifically related to the "destabilization" problems. 
The concept, of destabilization means to make 
something unstable, thus we must understand that destabili- 
zation is only possible if we accept the sine qua non fact 
that it has to start from something stable. 
Therefore, what interests us is to analyse the 
possibility of developing a cybernetic organization capable 
of producing the pragmatic information that the nation 
needs to know in order to overcome difficulties proaucea 
when the relatively stable amount of goods and services, or 
both, produced by any producing units, that is, by a firm 
or an industry in its economy, begins to become unstable. 
Likewise, we are not interested in analysing 
destabilization when it is produced by bad administration 
in the producing units or by inadequate conception of economic 
policies. Instead, we shall consider only destabilization 
produced by factors exogenous to the economy which means 
those originating from or due to external causes such as 
revolutions or counter-revolutions, which should be taken into 
consideration. 
So, from the four subsystem previously pointed out 
we are going to concentrate our attention only on the 
Production subsystem. 
Any disruption in such subsystem or any restriction 
in the supply of goods or services to the market in a way 
that could-lead to an economic breakdown should be analysed 
as a"destabilization action". 
Obviously, this kind of destabilization is always 
promoted for political reasons and its main objective is to 
overthrow governments. Hence the survival of the government 
as a system becomes a very important aim in this analysis. 
The survival of many systems can be explained using 
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the cybernetic approach, and specifically the laws of 
homeostasis. 
As we pointed out in the first chapter, we can say, 
according to S. Beer, that homeostasis is the tendency of a 
complex system to run towards an equilibrial state. and the 
ultimately stable state to which a system can run(that state 
where its entropy is unity) Is finally rigid and that means 
the system's death, so if we want the survival of the system, 
which in our case should be the Government, we need the extra 
concept of an equilibrium that is not fixed, but on the move. 
What causes the stable point to move is the total 
Government's response to environmental changes, that is the 
changes that have happened in its four subsystems(National 
Resources, Defence, Social-Political and Production subsystems) 
and this kind of adjustment is called adaptation. 
The other homeostasis notion that we need to under- 
stand in order to analyse the problems of government's survival 
as a. system, is the idea of a"physiological limit" introduced 
by R. Ashby and emphasised by S. Beer. 
If the Government as a system wants to remain running 
it must keep moving its stable point, but it cannot afford 
to move it so far or so fast that the system itself can be 
made to collapse. 
The physiological limit then, should be described 
as the range of action among which the Government can move 
and keep its rate of change according to a tolerance fixed 
by its own physiology or structure and without danger of 
destruction. 
Therefore, destabilization action must be understood 
as any intentional action that deliberately can take the 
Government system outside its physiological limits and that 
i, s precisely the sort of phenomenon that should be detected 
by the cybernetic organization which we are referring to 
In order to understand the kind of cybernetic 
organization we are talking about, we must turn back to point 
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5.1.1. (A measure of information in the production subsystem). 
If the main aim of such cybernetic organization is to satisfy 
the nation's information requests in relation to its reality, 
then we have to start by measuring the information that we 
actually know from such a reality, and the best way to 
do 
that could be using the same cybernetic structure that we 
suppose has been developed in doing what we suggested in 
point 5.1.1. 
So our cybernetic organization should be one 
capable of facilitating rapid acquisition of the information 
produced by the 64 economical activities comprised by the 
production subsystem analysed in point 5.1.1. 
Therefore, the electronic data processing system 
that ought to be made up in order to acquire and measure 
the quantity of information that the government needs to 
know from its reality, should be the same system which after 
being developed could be used for the purposes of the 
cybernetic organization. 
The technical details of such a cybernetic 
organization, as well as the characteristics of the computer 
technology it demands cannot be analysed in this work. Only 
one brief suggestion will be made here, and it is that the 
successful implementation of this cybernetic organization 
depends upon the reliability of the information to be 
processed, the flexibility of the means of communication 
to be implemented and the quaff. ifications, interests, beliefs 
and attitudes of the people involved in the organization. 
All those limitations have political as well as 
management connotations and none of them can be avoided by 
the power of one centralised group of people(as in any 
isolated government). Hence the participation of the people 
involved in the periphery (industrial activity or any other 
source) as well as the distribution of the power of the 
decision-making process and control over each source become 
an essential condition for the successful- development of 
this cybernetic organization. 
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5.2. - The wartimes alternative 
5.2.1. - The cybernetic preparedness to survive 
The United States, China, Japan, Germany and the 
Soviet Union could be the key words for attenmpting a modern 
measurement of the "balance of power". 
However, in the thermonuclear era, the balance of 
power analysed in terms of the "theory of games", presents 
completely different characteristics from those which were 
obtained in the past. 
During the 17th Century for example, when Britain 
"gained" in power, other nations had to "lose", in this case 
Spain and France, and equally, in the 18th Century, when the 
United States gained, she did so at the expense of Britain 
and other nations. 
According to that view, the thermonuclear era, or 
more precisely, the era of "possible apocalypse"(-`), presents 
a scheme of analysis in which the absence of "winners in the 
game", eventually would transform everyone into "losers", in 
accordance with the above-mentioned theory. But that is not 
the thinking of the American strategists who nurture plans 
for a limited nuclear world, neither the Chinese who are 
prepared to sacrifice half mankind in pursuit of Peking 
domination, nor the Japanese who could gain at the expense of 
the destruction of Europe's production structure. In one word: 
all of them believe that they could " push the button and win". 
Thomas Hobbes(7) defined power, as "the present 
possibility of obtaining future goods", in other words, the 
possibility of controlling the present to guarantee the future 
(in cybernetic terms). 
(* ). - Apocalypse: is one of the Jews and Christian writings of 200 B. C. to 150 A. D. marked by 
pseudonymity, symbolic imagery, and the expectation 
of an imminent cosmic cataclysm in which Good 
destroys the ruling powers of evil and raises 
the righteous to life in a messianic kingdom(6) 
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Herbert J Spiro(8) taking into consideration Hobbes's 
definition, suggests that nuclear devices cannot be used as 
a "means to obtain some goods in the future" and explains that 
this is precisely due to the comtaminanting effect on future 
goods which would be entailed in the use of this type of 
weapon. 
When J. K. Galbraith(9) refers to the role of planning 
in the growth of great corporations, he suggests to us 
relationship between power and decisions which, in a certain 
form, would be linked to Hobbes's definition, but with the 
addition that the organised intelligence, or "technostructure" 
(-) of which Galbraith speaks, when it plans, directs and 
controls the behaviour of the organization, certainly 
establishes a control of the present to guarantee the future, 
but it always does so under conditions of "profit and growth" 
and never in other way. 
This technostructure has been trained only for this 
binomial of decisions, and as is well indicated by Galbraith, 
it is they who really wield the power, it is they who L. Shoup 
and W. Minter(10) call the "Imperial Brains Trust", and in the 
final instance, it is they who regulate the political and 
economic behaviour of the reality in which they operate. 
In this way of thinking, if the United States drops 
nuclear payloads on Soviet Union, say the strategic ones, and 
the retalation lead to mutual assured destruction(MAD), what 
could the supposed winner do in terms of power and profit(or 
profit and gr_owthif you want)with a country"radioactively 
mortgaged"? 
In accordance with the work of nuclear specialists 
like Alan Martin and Samuel Harbison(ii), the radioactively 
mortgaged country to which we refer would present a population 
with the following characteristics: people who present somatic 
injures, that is to say, those who have survived the attack 
but have been biologically affected by the radiation. 
( ). - Technostructure. It embraces all who bring specialized knowledge, talent or experience to group decision-making. 
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The characteristics of the injury would depend on 
the intensity of the dose received during the exposure. A dose 
of 1 Gray(-`) would produce nauseas, vomiting and serious 
damage to the cells which cover the intestinal walls-But doses 
around 1.6 Gray, produce a whole range of effects which vary 
from changes in the pigmentation of the skin, blisters, 
ulceration and loss of hair, through the so-called secondary 
effects such as the formation of cataracts in the eyes, 
leukemia and other types of cancer. 
A second group of the population would be formed by 
people who, although they would not present visible somatic 
injuries, had suffered a deterioration in the cells of their 
reproductive organs(the gonads). 
The effect of the radiation on these cells produces 
so-called genetic mutations, which would be transmitted from 
parents to children for generations. 
A few lines are sufficient to describe the spine-chilling 
consequences of a war of this type, and sufficient 
also, to make us understand the magnitude and importance of 
peace for the survival of the mankind. 
Nevertheless, the crisis which nowadays grips a world 
dominated by uncertainty, instability, and even the contradictory 
pressures which are moving in the landscape of international 
politics, should be analysed from the point of view of their 
repercussions on world peace. 
The views worded by people like Henry A. Kissinger, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Alexander Haig, which we have already 
quoted, and the most recent ones made by Ronald Reagan, who 
in October 1981 said: 
"I could see where you could have the exchange 
of tactical weapons against troops in the field 
without it bringing either one of the major 
powers to pushing the button"(12). 
("). - Gray: According to the International Commission on 
Radiation Units and Measurements(ICRU)The Gray is 
the units of absorbed dose, and Absorbed dose is a 
measure of energy deposition in any medium by all 
types of ionizing radiation. 
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should call us to the reflection. It seems that they are 
prepared to carry on a war looking for a political victory 
and that could mean a limited nuclear war which must be 
carfully controlled in order to avoid the destruction of 
their own system. 
The cybernetic preparedness to survive could be 
a way of reflection for those Latin American countries which 
are convinced that the overcoming of underdevelopment and 
dependency would unfortunately be linked to solutions which 
are unachievable, and therefore inexorably to the study of 
war as historical alternative. 
For this reason, when the world trembles in the 
expectation of a world war, when the European nations begin 
to dust off their nuclear shelters, when the BBC in London 
begins to transmit programmes for training people for survival 
in the event of a nuclear attack(13), when the British 
Government shows how it could keep making decisions from an 
underground operation-centre(14), when "integrated battlefield" 
is now the new popoular word in Nato forces jargon, when 
developing and training tactics for use in a nuclear war in 
Europe(15) and when both panic and error begin to play their 
part as variables in the unleashing of a war(16), we Latin 
Americans should ask ourselves: could war transform itself 
into an opportunity for the reconstruction of our nations 
starting from the idea of a disaster? 
The cybernetic reply could be affirmative. 
Nevertheless, if we think of the unthinkable and try to see 
war as an option, we should be clear that this option, more 
than as an alternative which could be established after the 
occurrence of a phenomenon which should be waited for, rather 
could transform itself into a historic contingency capable 
of generating preliminary counter-action, which, within the 
plan of a political strategy based on preparedness for its 
arrival could be considered as an possible alternative. 
The characteristics of impact of a war on Latin- 
American reality, apart from the fact that it would be 
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unpredictable, does not represent the objective of this study, 
nevertheless, among the reliable unanswered questions, a 
theoretical circumstance exists, which, in hypothetical terms, 
would permit us to establish the possible parameters of 
behaviour of such a reality, on the basis of "limited nuclear 
war" which we outlined at. the beginning of this chapter. 
The possible parameters of system behaviour could 
be classified as follows: 
I, From the point of view of the breaking up 
of the system. 
Latin America, as it was analysed in the previous 
chapters, forms part of the base of a system. This base is 
made up of sub-systems which possess political, economic, and 
technological structures of predictable performance, that is, 
they operate under conditions determined by rules which 
fundamentally obey the mechanisms of control established in, 
the summit of the system. 
In other words, regulation summit-base(centre- 
periphery) is possible by virtue of the sequence of the 
relationship information-prediction-control, that is to say, 
the regulation obeys the predictability of behaviour of the 
subsystems, permitted by the"knowledge" of their realities 
which is communicated to the summit. 
Part of this"knowledge" would be subject to 
deterioration or loss, because of the temporary or permanent 
interruption of the information, produced by the isolation 
of the base in times of war. 
This circumstance could generate an accelerated 
"entropy" of the system in its entirety, producing a 
concentration of its control resources in the more indispensable 
parts of its structure, abandoning the periphery and permitting 
in this way the creation of partial or total mutilations of 
its base, which would mean partial or total independence of 
the subsystems of the periphery. 
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2. - From the point of view of the formulation 
of a strategy of survival. 
A breakdown of relations between the periphery and 
the centre would affect both parts of the system, but its 
level of incidence on the periphery, owing to dependence, 
would be greater. 
The magnitude of the collapse of the peripheral 
sub-economies would be a'function of the degree of techno- 
logical dependence and of availability of resources of each 
nation. 
This situation obliges us to pose the following 
question: Given the assumption that our physical space is not 
affected by the war, how long would our productive apparatus 
continue to function after the severing of the "technological 
umbilical cord"? 
A strategy of survival makes itself clear, to prepare 
ourselves for the war would also be a necessity, with the 
difference that while the developed world prepares to defend 
its life system, we ought to prepare ourselves to change our 
life system. 
During one of the-many Nato war exercises, simulating 
the Third World War carried out by the Royal Air Force(RAF) 
in the Air Operations Centre of Wildenrath in West Germany, 
the British jornalist, Mick Brown(17) after participating in 
the combat operations of this warlike nightmare, interviewed 
one of his compatriots of the R. A. F. Group Captain Danny 
Lavender. One of the questions was: 
"If war broke out would you be fighting 
to defend an ideology? 
NO, only to defend our way of life" 
he replied. 
Interested to know the opinion of a Latin American 
soldier, two weeks after having seen this programme on London 
BBC 2, we had the opportunity of meeting another Air Force 
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Captain of a South American state, and in the middle of a 
sincere and frank interchange of opinions we asked him: 
"If a war broke out would you fight to 
defend our way of life? 
His reply was quite eloquent: 
"If I had to do so it would be strictly 
for reasons of military discipline, but 
I would be prepared to take the risk 
of a courtmartial by opposing or rejecting 
an order which meant I would die for the 
so-calleddefence of a way of life which 
for my country has meant nothing but 
hunger and misery for our people". 
Preparing ourselves for war, then, does not mean 
preparing ourselves to fight, but simply preparing to survive, 
and this last has technological implications which ought to 
be studied. 
In the middle of the macabre rules for survival, 
like those which are outlined in the so-called "nuclear 
family" in times of war(18) and which among other things 
establishes: 
"During the 14 days following a nuclear attack 
families which remain in their shelters should 
get rid of their own casualties. The corpses, 
previously identified with their names and 
addresses should be covered with plastic sacks 
or cloths and placed in a visible position 
outside the shelter". 
Amongst the official circulars, distributed to the 
various national and muicipal organizations: 
"When radiological conditions permit movement, 
district and borough London controllers should 
assume that one of the priority tasks for their 
staff, in areas where survivors were to continue 
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residing, would be. to collect and cremate 
or inter human remains in mass graves(19)" 
Amongst the publications, such as the "Nuclear 
Survival Handbook"(20) a sort of manual of 370 pages dedicated 
to the possibility of survival before and after a nuclear 
attack. 
And within a gloomy environment, which for some 
could presage business or political advantages and for others 
death and destruction, an irrefutable truth exists, and that 
is that -a vast sector of the European community are 
beginning to condition their actions in the present thinking 
in terms of a future war. 
For Latin America and the technologically dependent 
countries this perspective could signify an alternative. 
The handling of the perspective of the nuclear 
destruction ghost as an unwelcome but possible or perhaps 
inevitable alternative, could transform itself into the 
impulse which would force many people to think and make 
decisions in the present stimulated by the prospect of our 
own future destruction. 
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5.2.2. - A Latin American closed system 
As we pointed out in part 5.1.2., the importance 
of clousure seems to be particularly useful to support the 
seemingly unthinkable idea of the possibility of a "economic 
closed system" as an alternative for transformation and 
development in some Latin American countries. 
Through the history of mankind, countries like 
China, Japan and Russia were f_o. r a. long time closed to the rest 
of the world, but nowadays, the economic interdependence and 
the advantages of technological interchange make it difficult 
or rather impossible for any country to subsist as a closed 
system. -Even a whole group of countries like the eastern bloc 
need the western nations as much as. the capitalist bloc needs 
the communist market. 
However, there are some reasons which from a 
cybernetic point of view should be taken into consideration 
in order to understand the above mentioned idea. 
A closed system, it seems to us could be an alternative 
specifically suitable for those underdeveloped countries 
which, having achieved a high level of capital formation(-`) 
as in some Opec countries, have the benefit of a good degree 
of propensity to invest(* ). 
Propensity to invest plus raw materials and 
management should be the "keystone" for any government to 
keep successfully running its production subsystem, but this 
situation becomes possible only when the government can 
enjoy the capability to make decisions in a sovereign way. 
(-10 .- 
(;, -) - 
Capital formation: is the process by which money 
capital is accumulated and converted into capital 
goods(2). 
Propensity to invest: is the relationship between 
total income and that part of income not devoted 
to consumer expenditure(2). 
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Sovereignty, ' as we have analysed in this work, does 
not exist for the underdeveloped states, so the possibility of 
development, even for those governments which apparently 
have such a "keystone", will be very remote unless they find 
the way to eliminate the technologically dependent relationship 
with the developed world. 
What we are suggesting in this chapter as "cybernetic 
alternatives" could be one way out, but this way. out means 
some kind of isolation from the world technological race, as 
well as hard work, deep state intervention and a substantial 
reduction in the standard of living for those who are enjoying 
the advantages of the "consumer society"(-*). 
Therefore, when we choose Latin America as one of 
the places in the world where a closed system should be build, 
the immediate questions are: 
1. - Who could lead the construction of such closed system? 
2. - In which country specifically should the system be developed? 
Both questions are extremely difficult to answer - 
perhaps the reader could give his own answer. All we can say is 
that the idea of a closed system is not only due to theoretical 
cybernetic reasons but because there is definitely a chance 
for some keystone countries like Venezuela to be successful 
in building a closed system together with its neighbouring 
countries. 
In order to consider how such a closed system could 
be achieved we must suppose a political and economical 
federation made up of six countries, say Venezuela, the other 
Andean Pact members and Panama. Let us call this federation 
Latin American System "LAS"(see annex N129) 
We must remember as well that the "LAS" is a closed system 
only as far as its possibilities of growth and development are 
concerned. Therefore, for us it is only a hypothetical example 
(-), - Consumer society: is the society where the act of 
using or buying consumer goods or services, is 
extremely influenced by advertising, fashions and irrationality. 
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which, without any detailed analysis we hope can be useful 
to explain the idea of clousure as a cybernetic alternative. 
"LAS" is an independent system but it has to face 
the international political system(see chapter IV), Therefore 
survival, growth and development become its essential aims. 
Survival in this case means the chances "LAS" has 
of subsisting in spite of all the internal or external 
disturbances(-`) which acting as forces could put pressure on 
LAS in order to move it from its independent state to its 
former dependent state. 
These "forces" could be called"destabilization 
forces". Thus LAS, in trying to cope with the destabilization 
forces, is the survival in question and in our view only a 
closed system could be successful in coping with such forces. 
According to the factors of production(`*)available 
in LAS, its production subsystem can show itself a variety of 
states;. thus LAS, as a dynamic system could survive depending 
on how strong are its physiological limits(see point 5.1.3), 
and this in turn depends upon the quality and quantity of its 
raw material, technology, man power, energy, communications, 
management, the size of its market, capital etc. 
Of these variables, market and technology should 
be the main problem for LAS, but at the same time they must 
be as well the main support for its growth and development. 
Nowadays, as we pointed out in chapter III, technology 
and the size of the market have a special relationship. We 
already know that modern and high technology is being produced 
only. by developed nations and for developed markets, so the 
(*) 
(,. ;, - ) 
Disturbances: "is simple that which displaces, 
that which moves a system from one state to 
another"Ross Ashby. page 77(4) 
Factors of production: The traditional classification 
is into the following groups: LandLabour, Capital and 
Enterprise. For some peoples, Enterprise or management 
might come under the heading Labour. (2) 
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technology that in a sovereign way (see point 4.1) LAS could 
buy or deal with, requires a big market and that is precisely 
what 90 million inhabitants which make up LAS would stand for. 
On the other hand, no underdeveloped nation, and 
that includes LAS, could plan its development(in the way we 
un erstand such a concept-See point 3.1) thinking in terms 
of external markets as a basis for its self-sustaining economic 
expansion, when countries with industrial tradition and good 
technological backgrounds like England and Italy are losing 
their external markets because of technological lack of 
competitiveness. Therefore, only a captive market(-`) such 
as the one we can get through a closed system like LAS, can 
be the way toward self-sustaining expansion. 
(-). - Captive market: is a market strictly reserved to specific buyers and sellers. 
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Tae Sunday :'i: aes . 
he 
kni 
fe 
soothes 
I1urope's nuclear 
nerves 
by Jon Connell, Defence Correspondent, in London and David Blundy in Washington 
THE REMARK which sent a (the Europeans) have begun to hood of Europe being sacrificed 
nuclear shiver down Europe's realise what the Soviets are in a limited nuclear wer. 
mine last week came just after doing. Finally we have begun to It was the clumsiness of 
the stuffed shrimp had been react. It's leading to a situation Reagan's statement and his 
served in the White House and in which the Soviets believe they timing rather than what he said 
Ronald Reagan was at his most can coerce us. Nuclear black- that caused such alarm. 
But 
relaxed and amiable. mail. They are engaging in -ttten, on Monday, a senior, ) 
Mr. President, " asked one g1ý_ aggression all over the world. " member of America's 
National 
the American newspaper editors la response t ,a question about 
Security Council, Major-Genera 
. tssembled in the cabinet office 
Robert L. Schweitzer. broke' 
where . _d: war might , 
begin, he 
ranks to make a speech in which' for their annual lunch with the 'gave this bizarre answer: "The 
president, "I'd like to take you war is going on now. What is 
he painted a blood-curdling 
hack to strategic weapons in the cam picture of 
Soviet intentional 
Europe again. " It is evident What ispsign the 
in thSoviete Cincursionaribbeanin The Soviets are on the move, 
from the transcript that Reagan Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa and 
he warned. " They -are going tg 
was uncomfortable about the all those places ? These 
cke. 
y drift in the conversation. His chweitzer was promptly 
grammar disintegrated, senten- represent 
strategic steps towards sacked (" He was always off the 
cos began, than trailed away. 
the strategic goal of enveloping wall ", said one member of Rea- 
One, however, was coherent 
Europe. When that process is gan's transition team), but his 
enough: complete 
the Soviets have the remarks had done nothing to 
"¢L could see tuhet! `. }eotCOeL 
control of oil and other raw restore confidence in Washing- 
materials. Why are they devoting ton's grasp of overall military have the exchange o, C., tactic:,,. so much time to Africa ? It's 
weapons agaittst trooTis" in the° strategy. 
As one western diplo- 
raw materials. And then at that mat put it, the cliche that the t etd without it bringing either moment there's not much choice. US was being run by a pack of one of the maja powers td you must never forget that the trigger-happy 
Pusaing the -. buttan, " sa 
cowboys suddenly 
Red'gani Russians are chess players. seemed to to contain more than it 
It is, perhaps, evidence of the 
That's not our national game. grain of truth. 
gap that has opened up between 
We play poker. 
American and European con- Against this background 
cerns about the nuclear war Europe has become increasingly 
game that no one listening in jumpy. Governments have begun the 
cabinet office that day, nor to worry seriously about the 
any of the presidential aides who growth of anti-nuclear move. 
pored over the transcript later ments and their impact on the 
looking for any of the famous electorate. Reagan's remarks 
Reagan gaffes, spotted anything coincided with the run-up to 
.: ntoward about the remark. United Nations Disarmament 
It was, after all, no more than Week, and yesterday massive 
a- estatement oi., current- Nato peace marches were flooding 
trategv', first laid. our by Bear the streets of Rome, Oslo, Brus- 
Kissiqg r in-'1957 and endorsed sels, Paris, Madrid and Helsinki 
defence ministers. in Europe as well as London. 
. acid America eve: 
)` sthre: this To the demonstrators Reagan 
in the, )rv, for the had- merely reinforced su. pi' 
týnssihility of a limited nuclear rionsrthat American strategy ic"' 
; ar (see right). to rely on ktltTope as the battle 
What does seem to have tisidd in- a limited nuclear war; " 
cironged, however, is the willing- that Reagan', hard-line policy 
e "s of senior officials in America towards the Soviet Union, and discuss that possibility openly. the deployment of Cruise and Last week Eugene Rostow, direc. Pershing missiles in Britain and 
:, x- of the US Arms Control and on the continent, reinforces Disarmament Agency, who will this possibility; and that the 
soon be negotiating with the American decision to develop Russians on arms limitations, the neutron bomb, which is 
told The Sunday Times: designed for Nato use on the 
"Gradually, reluctantly, they battlefield, adds to the likeli- 
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Training for 
nuclear war from PETER PRINGLE in Washington 
`GENERAL, if early in the Training officers talk dis- 
battle you begin using the passionately of `entire units 
smaller nuclear weapons, 
disappearing in the flash of 
say, the howitzers which 
an eye, ' and of soldiers being 
travel only about nine 
degraded because of the 
amount of protective clothing 
miles or so, in the con- they would have to wear to 
fusion of battle and the keep out radiation and chemi- 
moving around, how do you cal agents. 
avoid hitting your own The US Army assumes that 
troops ?' radiation, rather than blast, 
`Well, that's a real prob. will 
be the main killer and 
lem, and it's one of the 
teaches its troops to calculate 
realities of our modern-day 
the range of the fallout. The 
rule of thumb is simple. As integrated battlefield. ' an officer explains :' You 
This chilling exchange perceive the brilliant flash of 
comes in a five-hour CBS light, and you start counting 
Television documentary start- . and you estimate the time 
ing this evening in America. that it takes for the bang to 
The General who gave the' reach your location. That is 
answer is Niles Fulwyler, the the flash to bang time. ' Then 
commander of the US Army you know how much fallout 
nuclear and chemical agency. to expect. 
The battlefield he is talking Like any in ilitary 
about is Europe. For the first manoeuvres, the integrated 
time the film shows NATO battlefield has its element of 
forces developing and teach- farce. Consider this ex- 
ing tactics for use in a nuclear change from a war game in 
war in Europe. progress in snow-bound Bav- 
The film is a stark reminder aria. 
that Western nuclear strate- 
A large oil drum, packed 
gists actually do believe that with an explosive substance 
a limited nuclear wer in that gives off a 
brilliant flash 
Europe is possible. ' There are of 
light has just been deton- 
some people, ' says the much- ated and the referee 
is 
decorated General Fulwyler, quizzing troops in the area. 
`who think, regardless of the 
He approaches a tank where 
cities or anything else, it may all 
the crew appear to be in- 
be impossible to fight a nu- side with the hatch closed. 
clear war ... 
but I don't think 'Hey, tank commander, 
that. There are plenty of come on out a minute. Did 
places that we could use you recognise anything over 
nuclear weapons without hit- that way a few minutes ago? ' 
Ling cities. ' 
Just a puff of smoke, sir. ' 
But, the film points out, in 
`That's all? Didn't you 
hear a loud boom, see a 
Europe there just aren't that brilliant flash of light? ' 
many empty spaces. And if 'Not a flash of light, sir. ' 
the Russians were to hit 'What would that indicate 
Brussels with nuclear to you if yoti saw that ... a weapons, the city of Antwerp brilliant flash of light? ' 
could be flattened, too. If they ' Artillery. ' 
attack The Hague, Rotterdam 'What kind of artillery? 
could go, and if they attack What's the signs of a nuclear 
Bonn, Cologne could' be des. weapon? ' 
troved. . not familiar with that Nevertheless, the Allied subject, sir. ' 
army in Western Europe, like 'You're not, huh? Well, 
their Russian foe, train for that was a nuclear weapon. 
what they call the ' integrated Your tank is dead. 
battlefield, ' one in which 
conventional, nuclear and 
chemical weapons will be 
used, perhaps all at once. 
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and approaching obsolescence. " 
Then, in December last year, 
Wimex was the subject of a 
scathing report by the General 
Accounting Office, which acts as 
watchdog on government agen- 
cies. The GAO criticised the 
Defense Department for failing 
to provide crucial information 
and found that Wimex, on which 
S15 billion has already been 
spent, so inefficient that it recom- 
mended Congress to withhold 
funds until the faults were recti- fied. 
The incident on June 3, which 
was repeated three days later, 
resulted in a" low-level " state 
of nuclear war alert and warned 
US nuclear command centres 
across the world. The alert was 
The Sunday 'i'i. nes. Loudon 22-10-8v 
The computer that 
keeps declaring war by David Blundy and John Bierman, Washington 
A SMALL piece of silicon the 
size of a penny was identified 
last week as the faulty computer 
component that set off a false 
alarm of a missile attack on the 
United Stares on June 3, alerting 
the entire North American 
defence command. 
Military experts are wortied 
about the lengthy catalogue of 
failures in the US computer sys- 
i. em that warns of nuclear attack 
-the Worldwide Military Com- 
mand and Control System, known 
as Wimex. This is despite 
reassurances from the man who 
rroduced the guilty silicon chip, 
Gerald Dineen, the assistant 
secretary of defence. The 
Defense Department, too, said: 
" We weren't remotely close to 
World War Three. " 
Two leading generals and the joint chiefs of staff in Washin; - ton have complained about the 
constant failures of Wimex. 
John Bradley, the former chief 
test engineer on the computer 
network, says it is so un- 
reliable that senior military 
officials have learnt to mistrust 
it. He estimates that there are 
10 false alerts for every one 
that the Press is told of. 
The system, he says, is now 
10 years out of date. It is slow, 
cumbersome, and inaccurate. 
It has mistaken a rolling hank 
of fog and a flock of geese for a 
missile attack. The system fails, 
on average, once every 35 
minutes. 
Bradley maintains that not 
eniv does. Wimex keep crying 
wolf, but in the event of real 
nuclear attack it would either 
not he believed or be incapable 
of efficient response. 
He took his complaints to the 
Department of Defence and then 
to the National Security Coun- 
cil in the early Seventies. He 
says that no action was taken 
except that, in 1977, he 
fired from his job. He is 
suing the department 
wrongful dismissal. 
was 
now 
for 
Bradley's statements are sup- 
rorted by the former supreme 
allied commander in Europe, 
General Alexander Haig. In 
November 1976 Haig sent a 
memorandum to the joint chiefs 
of staff in Washington which 
said that Wimex "is generally 
considered to be inefficient 
Brown: surprise strike 
Development of Wimex began 
in 1971 with a directive from the 
Department of Defense that it 
must be " the most responsive 
reliable and survivable system 
that can be provided with the 
resources available. " 
According to the General 
Accounting Office, however, 
things began to go wrong as 
early as 1973 when the test 
director reported serious failures. 
A year later an independent 
study found "major reliability 
problems. " By March 1976, the 
system was incapable of working for more than an hour at a 
stretch without breaking down. 
The network went fully opera- 
tional in December 1977, despite 
a report by the Defense Com- 
munication Agency which com- 
plained of "repeated system 
failure, failure during electrical 
storms or when power systems 
are subject to voltage and 
frequency fluctuations. " 
In December 1979, the GAO 
concluded vet again that the 
entire system was " not reliable " 
and " generally not survivable. " 
Bradley fears that the Russians 
must long have been as aware 
as the Pentagon of the short- 
comings of the Nimes system. 
rltey may therefore be tempted 
co risk a first strike. The com- 
ment by the defense secretary, 
Harold Brown, earlier this year 
recognised as false only -three is hardly encouraging. He said 
minutes and 14 seconds after the 
alarm had first been raised. The critical role played by 
Wimex in the Western defence 
system was explained in a Penta- 
gon report. It is a network of 35 
computers in 27 command 
centres, and of warning sensors 
and telecommunications. It is 
used by the National Command 
Authorities-which means the 
President and the Secretary of Defense - to control US forces 
throughout the world. In case 
of nuclear attack, the report 
says, the system should provide 
early warning, select appropriate 
retaliatory action, provide means 
to assess damages to the US, de- 
cide the effectiveness of the re- 
taliatory strike against the 
enemy and then terminate 
actions to end the war. Accord- ing to the defence experts World War Three will last at most half-an hour. 
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that a Soviet surprise nuclear 
strike was unlikely because 
" prudent planners in Moscow 
could never be sure that he 
would not launch our inter. 
continental ballistic missiles on 
warning. " 
The Pentagon's major problem 
at the moment is that the missiles 
might be launched because of a 
faulty computer chip, Bradley 
points out that an efficient cont" 
puter system would correct its 
own mistake within micro- 
seconds and would not have to 
wait for generals to hold a tele- 
phone conference. 
If, in that June 3 alert. 
missiles had really been launched 
from Soviet submarines off the 
American coast, then it would have taken them only six to 
eight minutes to reach target. 
As Bradley says: " In a nuclear 
war the three minutes and 14 
seconds 
r 
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Man Alive - Phantom, Tuesday 9.30 BBC2 
Man Alive follows a squadron of Phantom fighters 
through the dizzying missions of a NATO war exercise. 
Mick Brown descended into the Combat-Operations- 
Centre at RAF Wildenrath, and reports on the 
organised nightmare that simulates a Third World War 
Faces of 
modern war 
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1 
This booklet tells you how to make 
your home and your family as safe as 
possible under nuclear attack 
Page. 2-3b 
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"When radiological conditions permitted movement, district and borough 
London controllers should assume that one of the priority tasks for their 
staff, in areas where survivors were to continue residing, would be to collect 
and cremate or inter human remains in mass graves. 
"Once the initial clearance of corpses has been completed, there would 
be still a problem of several weeks, and perhaps months, of an above average 
rate of dying from disease and radiation effects. Nevertheless, a return to the 
pre-attack formalities should be the objective in the longer term. " 
Home Office circular No. ES 8/1976, issued on a "need to know" 
basis to chief executives of Councils. 
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C0NCLUS10NS 
When we pointed out in the title of this work 
that it would be "a cybernetic essay in political science", 
our intention was to apply cybernetic theory to political 
science. This requires the application of the basic postulates 
of the theory to the political context of each of the 
problems studied in this work. In our case the analysis. 
has been located within the referential framework of under- 
development and dependency theory. 
Within this framework, our conclusions, which are 
basically directed'to the Latin American situation, are as 
follows: 
1. - The control of the technology implicit in the productive 
process of the underdeveloped countries acquired 
strategic significance for peacetime development and 
wartime survival. For this reason a huge effort must 
be made towards the control of this technology. 
2. - If in cybernetic terms access to information about a 
nation's reality is possible for an underdeveloped 
country, then such a nation should adopt a strategy 
of changes directed to increase such access to a level 
where the implementation of development can be 
successful. 
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3. - No strategy of development for those underdeveloped 
countries which have resources would be successful 
if a strategy of control of information is not 
planned and executed first. 
4. - A cybernetic organization can help a government to deal 
with destabilization actions. This organization 
would provide the government with vital information 
whenever the relative stability of the output of 
goods and services from a firm or. industry was 
disturbed and threatened to become intentionally 
unstable. 
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21. - U. S. A. FUNDS USED FOR PERFORMANCE OF RESEARCH & D. 1974 
22. - DISTRIBUTION OF COSTS IN SUCCESSFUL PRODUCT INNOVATIONS 
23. - ANDEAN GROUP'S IMPORTS 1977 
24. - ANDEAN GROUP'S IMPORTS GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION 1977 
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25. - RECEIPTS AND PAYMENTS OF ROYALTIES AND FEES, FROi4 
SELECTED NATIONS 
26. - FOREIGN-CONTROLLED SHARES OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 1975 
27. - LIST OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN VENEZUELA 1981 
28. - UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION STANDARD 
FOR INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITIES. 
29. - A LATIN AMERICAN CLOSED SYSTEM. 
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MAJOR COMPUTER COMPANIES PERFORMANCES 
IN 1979 
Company 
IBM 
Burroughs 
Control Data 
Honeywell 
NCR 
Sperry Rand 
ICL-ý 
Total 
revenues 
22,862 
2,831 
2,300 
4,210 
3,003 
4,586 
1,373 
8.5 
15.1 
21.0 
18.7 
15.0 
12.8 
23.0 
(US$m) 
Net profits change 
1978 
3.001 
306 
124 
- 261 
235 
259 
75.9 
Estimated at exchange rate of £1 = $2.20 
Source: "The Computer Industry" 
Financial Times Survey 
London, March 3 1980 
changes 
1978 
3.2 
20.6 
; g. 0 
29.3 
21.1 
21.0 
29.0 
ANNEX NO 1: MAJOR COMPUTER COMPANIES PERFORMED 
IN 1979 
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Data Act. 
Given in the Palace of Stockholm, May 11th, 1973 
We Gustaf Adolf, by the Grace of God, King of Swedes, 
Goths, and Wends, hereby promulgate, that we, together 
with Parliament, have thought well fit to enact as 
follows: 
Introductory Provisions 
Section 1 
For the purpose of this Act 
Personal information means information concerning an 
individual, 
Personal register means any register or any other notes 
made by automatic data processing and containing perso- 
nal information that can be assigned to the individual 
concerned, 
Individual registered means an individual in respect of 
whom personal information occurs in a personal register, 
Responsable keeper of a register means anyone for whose 
activity ADP is being carried out, if the register is 
at his disposal. 
Permission etc. 
Section 2 
A personal register may not be started or kept without 
permission by the Data Inspection Board. 
The first paragraph of this Section does not apply to 
personal registers established according to a decision 
by King or Parliament. Before such a decision is taken 
the Data Inspection Board shall be heard. 
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-8 
Page. '44 
Section 3 
The Data Inspection Board shall grant permission to 
start and keep a personal register, if there is no 
reason to assume that, with due observance of the 
regulations laid down pursuant to sections and 
6, 
undue encroachment on the privacy of individuals will 
arise. 
At the appraisal whether undue encroachment may arise 
special attention should be given to the kind and 
quantity of personal information meant to be included 
in the register and to the attitude towards the register 
shown or expected from the individuals meant to be 
registered. 
Section 4 
Permission to start and keep a personal register con- 
taining information that anyone is suspected of or 
convicted for a crime or has served a sentence or 
paid other consequences of a crime or has been subjec- 
ted to coercive action under the Child Welfare Act, 
the Temperance Act, the Act on Provision of Psychiatric 
Treatment in Detention in Certain Cases, the Act on 
Care of Certain Mentally Retarded Persons, the Act on 
Measures in Cases of Asociality of Danger to the Public 
or the Foreigners Act may be granted to a person 
other than an authority which is by law or statute respon 
sible for keeping a record of such information, unless 
there are extraordinary reasons for this. 
Permission to start and keep a personal register other- 
wise containing information about anybody's illness or 
state of health or information that anybody has re- 
ceived social assistance, treatment for alcoholism or 
the like, or has been the subject of proceeding under 
ANNEX N°3: THE SWEDISH DATA ACT. (page 2 of 11) 
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the Child Welfare Act or the Foreigners Act, may not 
be granted to a person other than an authority which 
is by law or statute responsible for keeping a record 
of such information, unless there are special reasons 
fo this. 
Permission to start and keep a personal register con- 
taining information about anybody's political or reli- 
gious views may be granted only where there are special 
reasons. This shall not, however, apply to a personal 
register that an association wants to keep of its own 
members. 
Section 5 
When granting a permission to start and keep a personal 
register the Data Inspection Board shall issue regula- 
tions as to the purpose of the register and the perso- 
nal information that may be included. If there are spe- 
cial reasons the permission may be limited to certain 
time. 
Section 6 
If permission is granted to start and keep'a personal 
register, the Data Inspection Board shall, insofar as is 
needed to prevent danger for undue encroachment on pri- 
vacy, issue regulations concerning: 
1. - the obtaining of information to the personal re- 
gister, 
2. - the carrying out of the ADP, 
3. - the technical equipment, 
4. - the adaptation of personal information that may be 
made through ADP, 
5. - information to the persons affected, 
6. - what personal information may be made accessible, 
7. - the issuance of personal information to others and 
other use thereof, 
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8. - the keeping and selection of information, 
9. - control and security. 
Regulations regarding issuance of personal information 
may not restrict the duties of authorities under the 
Freedom of the Press Act. 
Section 7 
What has been stated in sections 5 and 6 about the 
duty of the Data Inspection Board to issue regulations 
also applies to personal registers referred to in sec- 
tion 2, second paragraph, if regulations have not been 
given by King or Parliament. 
The Duties of the Responsible Keeper of the Register 
Section 8 
If there is reason to suspect that personal information in 
a personal register is incorrect, the responsible 
keeper of the register shall, without delay, take the 
necessary steps to ascertain the correctness of the 
information and, if needed, to correct it or exclude 
it from the register. 
If a piece of information, that is corrected or ex- 
cluded, has been handed over to a person other than 
the individual registered, the responsible keeper of 
the register shall, at the request of the individual 
registered, notify the receiver concerning the correc- 
tion or the exclusion. If there are special reasons 
the Data Inspection Board may exempt the responsible 
keeper of the register from his duty to notify. 
Section 9 
If in a personal register there is personal information 
ANNEX N°3: THE SWEDISH DATA ACT. (page 4 of 11) 
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which must, with regard to the purpose of the register, 
be regarded as incomplete, or if a personal register 
which constitutes a record of persons lacks information 
of a person who with regard to the purpose of the re- 
gister must be espected to be included in it, the 
responsible keeper of the register ought to supplement 
what is needed. Such supplementary addition shall al- 
ways be made, if the incompleteness may cause undue 
encroachment on privacy or risk of loss of rights. 
Section 10 
At the request of an individual registered the re- 
sponsible keeper of the register shall as soon as 
possible inform him of the personal information con- 
cerning him in the register. When an individual re- 
gistered has been thus informed, new information need 
not be given to him until twelwe months later. 
Information according to the first paragraph of this 
section shall be given free of charge. If there are 
special reasons the Data Inspection Board may, con- 
cerning a certain kind of personal information, per- 
mit a fee. 
The provision of the first paragraph does not apply to 
information which, pursuant to law or statute or the 
decision of an authority, may not be delivered to the 
individual registered. 
Section 11 
Personal information in a personal register may not be 
issued if there is reason to assume that the information 
will be used for ADP contrary to this Act. If there is 
reason to believe that personal information will be 
used for ADP abroad the information may be issued only 
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after permission by the Data Inspection Board. $uch 
permission may be given only is there is ground to be- 
lieve that the issuance will not cause undue encroach- 
ment on privacy. Concerning prohibition of issuance 
from authorities of personal information regulations 
are given in the Act on Restrictions of the Right to 
obtain Public Documents. 
Section 12 
Should a responsible keeper of a register cease to 
keep a personal register the Data Inspection Board 
must be notified. The Data Inspection Board shall 
prescribe how the register should be dealt with. 
Section 13 
The responsible keeper of a personal register and any 
other person who has concerned himself with it may not 
without authorization reveal what he has learnt from 
it about the personal circumstances of an individual. 
If personal information has been issued in accordance 
with such regulations given pursuant to section 6 or 
18 that limit the right of the receiver to pass it on, 
the receiver or any person who in his activity has 
dealt with the information may not without authorization 
reveal what he has learnt about the personal circum- 
stances of an individual. 
Section 14 
Information from an ADP recording, that is used by an 
authority for the purpose of judicial or administrative 
proceedings, shall be added to the relevant file in 
readable form, if special reasons do not speak in favor 
of an exeption. 
a 
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Section 15 
The Data Inspection Board supervises that ADP does not 
cause undue encroachment on privacy. 
The supervision shall be executed in such a way that 
it does not cause greater costs or inconvenience than 
is necessary. 
Section 16 
For the purpose of its supervision the Data Inspection 
Board shall be granted admission to premises where 
ADP is carried out or where computers or equipment or 
recordings for ADP are kept. Moreover, the Data In- 
spection Board shall have access to documents relating 
to ADP and may make arrangements for operating the 
computers. 
Section 17 
The responsible keeper of a register shall deliver to 
the Data Inspection Board the information and parti- 
culars concerning the ADP which the Board requires for 
its supervision. What is now said also applies to 
anyone who handles a personal register on behalf of 
the responsible keeper of the-register. 
Section 18 
If the keeping of a personal register has caused undue 
encroachment on privacy or if there is reason to be- 
lieve that such encroachment will appear the Data In- 
spection Board may, insofar as needed, alter regula- 
tions given before or issue new regulations of the kind 
referred to in sections 5 or 6. With regard to registers 
referred to in section 2, second paragraph, the Data 
Inspection Board may take those steps only if they are 
not contrary to decisions taken by King or Parliament. 
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If protection against undue encroachment on privacy 
cannot be attained by other means, the Board may 
cancel a given permit. 
Section 19 
Any person who has dealt with matters concerning per- 
mission or supervision under this Act at the Data 
Inspection Board may not without authorization re- 
veal what he has learnt about the personal circum- 
stances of an individual or about professional or 
business secrets. 
Penalties and Damages etc. 
Section 20 
Any person who wilfully or by negligence 
1. - starts or keeps a personal register without per- 
mission under this Act, when such permission is 
required, 
2. - offends against a regulation issued pursuant to 
sections 5,6 or 18, 
3. - issues personal information in violation of section 
11, 
4. - offends against the provisions of sections 12 or 13, 
5. - gives incorrect information when fulfilling an 
obligation to inform as stated in section 10, 
6. - gives incorret information in a case referred to in 
section 17, or 
7. - offends against the provisions of section 19, 
shall be sentenced to a fine or to a term of 
imprisonment not ecceeding one year. 
Public prosecution for-an offence against sections 
13 or 19 may be instituted only if the person aggrieved 
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requests this or prosecution is called for from a 
public point of view. 
Section 21 
Any person who, without authorization, effects access 
to recordings for ADP or unduly alters or obliterates 
such information or includes it in a register will be 
sentenced for data trespass to pay a fine or to a term 
of-imprisonment not exceeding two years, if the perpetra- 
tion is not punishable by the Penal Code. 
Attempt or preparation of a crime referred to in the 
first paragraph of this section will be punished 
according to 23rd Chapter of the Penal Code. When the 
offence, if completed, would have been considered tri- 
vial, nobody may be convicted under this paragraph. 
Section 22 
If a personal register has been started or kept without 
permission, though such a permission is needed, the 
register will be forfeit, if that is not manifestly 
unreasonable. 
Section 23 
If an individual registered suffers damage because 
a personal register contains incorrect information 
about him the responsible keeper of the register shall 
pay compensation to him. When judging if damage has 
been caused and assessing the compensation the 
suffering inflicted and other circumstances of other 
than a purely pecuniary significance shall be taken 
into consideration. 
Section 24 
If the responsible keeper of a register or a person who 
administers a personal register on his behalf fails to 
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grant access to promises or documents pursuant to sec- 
tion 16 or fails to give information pursuant to sec- 
tion 17, the Data Inspection Board may impose a money 
penalty. The same shall be applicable if the responsible 
keeper of a register does not fulfil his obligations 
according to sections 8,9 or 10. 
Section 25 
Appeal against decisions of the Data Inspection Board' 
may be lodged with the King in Council, The Chancellor 
of Justice may appeal in order to safeguard public 
interests. 
Interim Regulations 
This Act enters into force on July 1st, 1973. The 
provisions of sections 2-14,18,20 points 1-5,21-23 
and 24 second sentence will not be valid until July 
1st, 1974. 
Notwithstanding the previous paragraph the Data Inspec- 
tion Board may issue regulations referred to in sec- 
tions 5 and 6 for any time before July ist, 1974, if 
there are special reasons. If anybody offends against 
such a regulation, the penalty rule of section 20 
point 2. shall be applicable. Before July 1st, 1974, the 
Data Inspection Board may also try applications for 
permission and issue regulations according to sections 
5,6 or 18 relating to any time after the end of June 
1974. 
If a personal register, that under this Act may not be 
Kept without permission, has been started before July 
1st, 1974, and an application for permission is made 
before January 1st, 1975, the register may be kept un- 
til the application has been ultimately tried. The kind 
of personal information included in the register and the 
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purposes for which the information is used may not be 
altered or expanded until the Data Inspection Board has' 
bee notified. If any person offends against this the 
penalty rule of section 20 point 1. will be applicable. 
This will have to be obediently observed by all con- 
cerned. To make doubly sure We have put Our signature 
to this with Our own hand and let it be confirmed with 
Our royal seal. 
The Palace of Stockholm, May 11th, 1973. 
During the Illnes of His Majesty 
My most Gracious King and Lord 
Carl Gustaf 
(soal) 
Lennart Geijer 
(Department of Justice) 
According to regulations given by the King in Council 
the Data Inspection Board consists of a full-time 
working chairman and eight other members. Important 
cases will be tried by the Board, while matters which 
are not of essential character may be decided by the 
chairman alone. Routine matters - for example per- 
missions concerning simple registers of members, 
employees, tenants, insured persons or other customers 
may be handled by a subordinate official. 
r 
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MAJOR TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS PROFITS 1980 
Corporation 
Standard Oil (Ohio) 
Exxon 
Merrill Lynch 
Standard Oil (Indiana) 
Texas Instruments 
Dow Chemical 
United Technologies 
RCA 
Union Pacific 
Abbott Laboratories 
General Electric 
Alcoa 
Xerox 
BankAmerica 
IBM 
Du Pont 
McDonnell Douglas 
B. F. Goodrich 
Citicorp 
Great Western Financial 
International Paper 
Republic Steel 
Eastern Airlines 
General Motors 
a 
Source: Newsweek May 5 1980 
Earnings in 
millions 
U. S. $ 
450.7 
1.925.0 
35.1 
576.0 
50.3 
230.5 
92.0 
78.7 
102.0 
46.2 
341.5 
143.5 
148.4 
134.5 
681.5 
244.4 
43.4 
20.3 
83.3 
13.5 
89.0 
20.6 
3.5 
155.0 
change 
from 
1979 
+170% 
+102 
+ 78 
+ 65 
+ 32 
+ 31 
+ 30 
+ 27 
+ 21 
+ 20- 
* 13 
+ 12 
+8 
+4 
+2 
2 
4 
23 
34 
41 
51 
52 
73 
- 88 
ANNEX N08: MAJOR TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS PROFITS 1980 
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WORLD POPULATION BY MAJOR REGIONS 1975-2000 
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ii 
More developed countries 
-T- 
2000 
1 
I 
USA, Canada, W. Europe, Japan" 
Australia and New Zeland 
1 11 Russia and East 
Europe 
Less developed countries 
Africa 
China 
I 
Other Asia 
Latin America 
World population 
1975 = 4,090 millions 
2000 = 6,350 millions 
1975 2000 
r 
ANNEX N°9: WORLD POPULATION BY MAJOR REGIONS 1975-2000 
Source: US Bureau of census, 1977 
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VENEZUELAN'S BALANCE OF TRADE 1973-1978 
(US$ 000) 
Year 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
Import Export balance 
2,626,000 
3,841,000 
5,462,000 
6,771,860 
9,749,070 
10,404,186 
5,628,000 
15,206,000 
11,117,000 
9,277,907 
9,534,100 
9,197,786 
3,002,000 
11,365,000 
5,655,000 
2,506,047 
214,970(-) 
1,212,400(-) 
Source: Boletin Estadistico N06 de los 
Bancos Centrales de los Paises del 
Acuerdo de Cartagena. 
Published by Central Bank of Ecuador 
Quito. Enero, 1980. 
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U. S. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES AGREEMENTS 1970-1976 
(selected countries) (Value in thousands of dollars) 
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ANNEX N°11: U. S. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES AGREEMENTS 1970-1976 
Source: Anthony Sampson 
"The Arms Bazar". p. 318. 
ANNEX N°11 -4 Page. 262 
U. S. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES AGREEMENTS 1970-1976 
(selected countries) (Value in thousands of dollars) 
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ANNEX N°11: U. S. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES AGREEMENTS 1970-1976 
Source: Anthony Sampson 
"The Arms Bazar"-P-317 
ANNEX N°12 Page. 263 
SAUDI ARABIA GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AND REVENUE 75-80 
(SRbn) 
Year Expenditure 
Budget Actual 
1975-1976 
1976-1977 
1977-1978 
1978-1979 
1979-1980-, 
81.7 
128.0 
138.0 
147.4 
200.0-` 
Estimates 
110.9 
110.9 
111.4 
130.0 
200.0* 
Revenue 
Actual 
101.9 
135.9 
141.0 
132.8 
220.0 
Surplus/ 
Deficit 
Budget 
95.8 
110.9 
146.5 
130.0 
220.0;; 
+28.2 
+ 7.9 
+ 3.0 
-14.6 
+20.0^ 
Source: Based on published and unpublished 
official Saudi statistics included 
in article by James Buxton showed 
in Financial Times Survey "Saudi 
Arabia". London, 28th April 1980 
ANNEX N°12: SAUDI ARABIA GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AND REVENUE. 
ANNEX N°13 Page. 264 
VENEZUELA GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AND REVENUE 
a 1973-1978 
(US$ 000) 
ý_ 
Year 
1972-1973 
1973-1974 
1974-1975 
1975-1976 
1976-1977 
1977-1978 
Expenditure Revenue 
Surplus % 
Deficit 
3,741,395 
9,918,605 
9,511,163 
8,867,442 
9,412,558 
9,326,977 
3,397,442 
9,191,163 
9,305,814 
9,053,256 
11,603,256 
11,290,930 
+ 343,953 
+ 727-442 
+ 205,349 
185,814 
-2,190,698 
-1,963,953 
Source: Statistics from "Boletin Estadistico 
N06 de los Bancos Centrales de los 
Paises del Acuerdo de Cartagena". 
Published by Ecuador's Central Bank. 
January, 1980 
ANNEX N°13: VENEZUELA GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AND REVENUE 73-78 
ANNEX N°14 Page. 265 
USA ENERGY AVAILABLE FROM DOMESTIC RESOURCES 
VERSUS ANNUAL DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION 1977 
Available Supply in Quads(1015BTU) 
U. S. Consumption in 1977 
Portion 
Recoverable 
With Enhanced 
Recovery 
V« 
ýý 
ýA 
Ore 
Yielding 
10 to 25 
Gal . Ton 
1 Oil Shale 
5,800 
Petroleum 
1,100 
Gas 1,030 
Coal 
12,000+ 
With Breeder Reactors 
4 
Light 
Water 
Reactors 
Uranium 
130,000 
U 
71 Quads 
(1977) 
Source: A National Plan For Energy 
Research, Development & Demonstration, 
ERDA-48(1975). Included in the Antony 
Sutton book "Energy the created Crisis" 
ANNEX N°14: USA ENERGY AVAILABLE FROM DOMESTIC RESOURCES 
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PRICES AND PRICE INDEXES Page. 266 
Series E 123-134. Wholesale Prices of Selected Commodities: 1800 to 1970-Con. 
[In dollars per unit) 
___--., 
Year 
1'ýS 
104: _- 1513- 
19 Ic ___ 
IG31___ 
19to__- 
1937__- 
1936--_ 
19,. "5_. - 10,34__. 
1933... 
1932... 
1931... 
1Ql. 0_- 
1929- 
1928-- 
1027. 
- 
1926_. 
1925- 
1924-- 
1923-- 
1922_. 
1921__ 
1920- 
1019- 
1918- 
1917. 
1916_ 
1915- 
1914- 
1918- 
1912- 
1911- 
1930- 
1909- 
"- P8. 
19011. 
1906. 
1905- 
2904. 
1903. 
1402- 
1901. 
1900 
1899 
138 
1897 
1896 
1895 
1894 
1899 
1892 
1891 
1891 
1881 
188 
188 
188 
18si 
188 
188 
188 
188 
1881 
187 
187 
187 
187 
18' 
18' 
18' 
18 
18 
ee lootnotes at end of table. 
Wheat Wheat Sugar 
Hnu: 
Cotton, 
raw 
4 
Wool Cotton Coal, 
I 
ehýt'snX anthracite 
Steel 
tail. 
Naiie Copper T urpentine! Brick 
123 121 125 
i 
126 127 
! 
129 129 110 131 132 133 134 
Bu. 100 lb., Lb. I- L5. - Lb. Y"d. 1 Ton 1001b. ' SU lb. a Lb. (-a11-n 
lrn1 3.131 0.054 0, °_26 1.102 0.15'3 11.89 2.94 2.850 0.120 0.794 I5. °9 
1 
. 
6r4 3.34 
, 
055 . 
212 1.189 
. 
11n 11.47 40. n0 2.550 . 120 
11.29 
1,440 (1.7'0 10.8J 40.00 2, F50 . 120 .6 
13.43 
1.139 ii. s49 , 
055 . 
193 1.195 . 
141 10 . ^, 1 40.00 2.550 120 
61 
706 . 
21 13 
992 4,752 
. 
049 139 ( ý 
I;. 
1,091 . 
115 
10.01 40.00 2.550 . 
120 G17 12.5: + 
. . 
146 I11 
871 4,: 407 
. 
044 
. 
104 
, 
9F6 . 085 9.55 46.00 2.550 . 115 . 371 1<^. l3 
. 
755 3. [, 7^_ . 
()46 
. 
0? 5 
. 
521 079 9.14 40.00 2.461 
. 
112 . 
314 1^. 05 
777 i "1 367 j . 
045 
. 
OA7 691 . 
076 44 9 41.79 2.575 , 1fi-S . 
294 12.00 
. 1.201 . 6.0(16 I 047 114 . , 
971 
. 
107 ý . 9.37 41.89 2.773 
, 
131 387 12.05 
1.123 5,441 . 
048 
. 121 , 
381 . 
097 9.74 : 1fi. 63 2.229 . 097 . 
438 11.74 
1.040 6.197 . 
049 
. 
119 
, 
723 
. 
110 9.59 31.38 2.629 . 089 . 
500 11.77 
. 932 5.755 . 044 . 123 , 
817 
. 109 9.64 36.38 2.623 . 087 . 
529 12.00 
724 4.633 . 
043 
. 
087 ' , 663 . 
089 10.06 39.33 2.089 . 073 . 
463 10.53 9.13 
. 494 
3.104 . 040 . 064 . 459 . 062 10.88 
42.38 2.060 . 058 . 431 
9.54 
606 570 3 . 044 . 085 621 .0 72 
{ 11.40 1 43.00 1.978 084 . 447 10.02 . . 1. ".. 77 . 
9^0 4.86, -, . 047 . 135 , 763 . 105 12.72 43.00 2.191 . 132 . 
473 10.1( 
1.180 5.794 . 
051 
. 191 . 
987 
. 
125 12.89 43.00 2.667 . 184 . 
650 10.7: 
1 324 406 6 066 200 1 159 135 st lö t 43 00 676 2 148 565 23.04 . . . . . . 1 : . . . . 
1 372 6 686 058 . 176 1 107 
120 10 95 43 00 638 2 . 132 } 621 13.80 
. . . . . , . . 130 l . 
1.496 7.252 . 
055 . 175 1.152 . 123 11.48 43.00 2.750 . 138 . 930 16.41 
2.670 7,678 . 
055 
. 235 1.392 . 
147 11.19 43.00 2.820 . 141 1.013 
14.71 
1.2: 32 5.980 . 074 . 287 1.407 . 161 11.37 43.00 2.989 . 131 . 
912 17.0 
1.112 5.353 . 
084 
. 
293 1.379 
. 
163 10.88 43.00 3.035 
. 
145 1.171 19.8 
1.213 6.130 . 059 . 212 1.238 . 229 10. fi0 40.69 2.610 , 134 1.150 
17.3 
1.826 7,034 . 062 . 151 . 828 . 131 10.62 45.65 3.056 . 126 . 681 15.2 
2.455 11.580 . 127 . 339 1.604 . 288 9.50 53.83 4.187 , 180 1.734 21.8 2.418 10.695 . 089 . 325 1.775 . 232 
8.27 49.26 8.518 
. 
191 1.210 15.9 
2.159 10.302 . 
078 
. 
318 1.815 . 
235 6.86 56.00 8.600 
. 
247 
, 
594 11,9 
2.296 10.551 . 077 . 235 1.568 . 146 6.94 40.00 3.633 . 294 . 488 8.8 1.329 6.091 . 069 . 145 . 845 . 088 6.67 33.33 2.596 . 275 . 491 8.1 
1.290 5.612 . 066 . 102 . 707 . 068 5.33 30.00 1.746 . 173 . 459 
6,1 
. 
939 4.125 . 
047 
. 121 . 693 . 
080 5.32 30.00 1.679 . 234 . 473 5.; ( . 677 
3.847 } 
. 043 . 128 '662 . 
084 6.31 30,00 1.819 
ý 
167 428 6.1 
. ms. r 4.3nx 
l 689 28.00 . , 
1.049 4.686 . 
051 
. 
115 
. 
647 
. 
081 6.28 28.00 1.740 
. 
164 
. 
470 6.. 
084 3,984 . 053 . 130 . 647 . 088 5.00 28.00 1.804 . 126 . 679 5.0 
1.097 4.692 . 
050 
. 
151 
. 
686 
. 
084 4.81 28.00 1.888 
. 
129 
. 683 5. ' 1,200 5,451 . 048 , 121 . 7.: 8 , 
075 4.82 28.00 1.917 . 131 
. 491 6.1 
. 990 
1 4.291 049 105 . 716 . 
078 4.82 28.00 2.100 . 133 . 
453 5. '. 
907 3.988 . 047 . 119 . 
718 
. 
084 4.82 28.00 2.117 ts l 634 6. 
. 793 3.615 . 
045 . 110 . 718 . 080 4.86 28.00 1.958 
.^ 
, 196 
. 
. 665 8.; 
1,010 4.643 . 053 . 096 . 759 . 076 4.82 28.00 1.896 . 158 . 628 R. 1,039 4.826 . 048 . 121 . 686 . 
080 4.83 28.00 1.906 
. 131 . 
576 7. 
790 8.592 . 046 . 112 . 665 . 
068 4.83 28.00 2.075 . 13T . 572 5. ' 
, 741 
3.489 . 045 . 089 . 677 . 068 4.46 28.00 2.104 . 
ý120 
. 474 5. 
. 719 
3.309 . 051 . 086 . 
545 . 063 4.33 27.83 2.865 . 169 . 373 5. 
704 3.349 . 053 . 096 . 659 . 062 8.92 32.29 2.633 . 166 . 477 b. 711 3.382 . 049 . 066 . 623 . 064 3.65 28.13 2.388 . 177 . 458 5. 
. 885 4.145 . 
050 . 060 . 615 . 054 3.55 17.63 1.438 . 119 . 32': 5. 
. 
795 4.361 . 046 . 072 . 496 . 
059 3.74 18.75 1.485 . 113 . 292 
4. 
. 641 3.620 . 
046 . 079 . 894 . 062 8. F6 28.00 2.928 . 110 . 
274 
8.231 . 042 . 078 . 877 . 059 2.98 24.83 2.118 . 108 . 292 5, b59 2.750 . 041 . 070 . 445 . 
060 3.54 24.00 1.662 . 095 . 293 6. 
. 677 3.283 . 048 
088 664 . 068 4.17 28.13 1.992 . 109 300 6. 
. 788 4.122 . 044 . 077 . 612 . 
065 3.94 30.00 2.19U . 115 . 323 5. 
. 962 4.906 . 
047 . 086 . 686 . 073 8.46 29.92 2.467 . 131 . 880 6. 
. 898 4.652 . 062 . 
111 . 716 . 073 3.35 78 } 31 J 2.965 1 158 j . 408 6 863 6,039 . 063 . 115 . 733 . 067 3,92 . 2 00 1" t . 42i 
. 
895 6.640 . 080 . 107 . 
735 
. 
067 4.04 29.25 2.00 . 138 . 461 7 
. 886 6.120 . 071 . 103 . 
680 . 069 4.21 29.83 2.03 . 168 . 898 6 
. 769 6.817 . 069 . 103 . 733 . 068 4.05 37.08 2.30 . 113 . 359 7 
. 707 6.119 . 062 . 094 . 
740 . 064 4.00 34.62 2.27 . 110 . 
396 7 
1.. _ . 864 6.275 . 064 . 
106 . 718 . 067 4.10 28.62 2.33 . 111 . 851 6 1. __ . 918 7.043 . 068 . 106 . 
805 . 069 4.42 80.75 2.39 . 138 . 828 6 1.. _ 1.088 7,735 . 087 . 106 . 
860 . 075 4.54 87.75 3.06 . 169 . 432 8 2... 1.198 9.020 . 096 . 122 . 
905 . 079 4.61 48.50 3.47 . 185 . 518 a! 7 1_.. 1.154 8.895 . 097 . 118 . 955 . 080 4.65 61.08 3.09 . 18 3 . 476 117 
0__ 
1 
'1.067SÖ3 1. 
` 
8.895 1 . 09 . 120 9 1.028 . 
081 4.93 67.62 3.68 . 21 5 . 
393 6 
9_.. 1.225 8.632 . 08 6 . 104 . 
718 . 076 2.7 0 48.21 2.69 . 18 6 . 
313 5 
8... 1.262 9.101 . 
09 2 . 113 . 748 . 074 3.2 2 42.21 2.31 . 16 6 . 
298 4 
7. _. 1.685 10.806- . 11 1 . 117 . 
910 . 080 2.5 9 45.68 2.57 . 19 0 . 862 4 6_.. 1.320 9.898 . 10 
6 . 180 . 870 . 084 8.8 7 99.25 2.98 . 21 0 . 
371 8 
5__. 1.403 10.218 . 10 
7 . 150 1.045 . 099 4.3 9 68.75 3.42 : 22 7 . 845 
7 
'4. 
_. 1.517 10.728 . 10 6 . 270 1.153 . 109 4.6 5 94.28 3,99 . 22 0 . 396 7 !3 1.787 11.498 . 11 2 . 182 1.198 . 128 4.2 7 120.5 8 4,90 . 
28 0 . 497 1 f2_.. 1.780 12.141 . 12 4 . 205 1,56 8 . 136 3.7 4 111.9 4 6,46 . 35 6 . 618 1 fl__. 1.581 10.245 . 13 
1 . 170 1.06 8 . 125 4.4 6 102.6 2 4,52 . 24 1 . 549 1 
ANNEX N°15: WHOLESALE PRICES OF SELECTED COMMODITIES: 1800-1970 
Source; Statistics of U. S., Colonial Times to 1970 
U. S. Commercial Department, Washington, 1975 
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. 00 
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00 
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]FG5___ý 1.6i1 5.725 
. 
1G2 
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1RGi, 
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207 
JR6: _. 
1 1. b42 S. PG2 23S 
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146 
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350 5.1G5 . 113 1RG1. 
__ 
1.425 4 . 5G5 . 
090 
laso 
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185R.. 
- 1857 
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1K51. __ý 
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ý 
Le. B,,. 
1-1o0 
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1.445 
! 5.190 1 . 535 5.310 1.325 4.29"75 
1.675 5.7R5 
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ANNEX N°16: USA IMMIGRANTS BY MAJOR OCCUPATION GORUP: 1820-1970 
Source: Statistics of U. S., Colonial Times to 1970 
U. S. Commercial Department. Washington, 1975 
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ANNEX N016: USA IMMIGRANTS BY MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP: 1820-1970 
Source. Statistics of U. S., Colonial Times to 1970 
U. S. Commercial Department. Washington, 1975 
ANNEX N°17 Page. 270 
TERRITORIAL GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES 
Godsden Purchase 1853 
Ceded by Mexico 1848 
Acquired by treaty 1846 
Annexed from Mexico 1845 
Ceded by Spain 1819 
Ceded by Great Britain 1818 
Louisiana Purchase 1803 
Original Territory of the United States 
ANNEX N°17: TERRITORIAL GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES 
Source: Peter d'A. Jones. "An Economic History of the U. S. Since 1783 
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ANNEX N°20 Page. 273 
LIST OF MAIN INDUSTRIAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST 
Announced 
Type of 
agreement Agreement on 
L VEW buys Soviet electro slag 
resmelting procedure 
Cooperation partner 
East West 
October 1975 
August 1974 
January 1974 
February 1974 
October 1974 
October 1974 
August 1974 
August 1974 
December 1974 
March 1974 
November 1974 
1973 
1973 
1973 
1973 
1973 
1973 
S Cooperation in vehicle pro- 
duction, production of forestry 
machinery, ship engines, and 
transport machinery 
C Industrial design 
RD Development of passenger 
planes, navigation systems, 
oceanological equipment, and 
electronics 
RD Motor vehicle construction, 
aviation technology, electronics, 
research equipment, automa- 
tion, and machine tools 
RD Exchange of research results 
RD Various areas of technology 
C Construction of ammonia 
plants in USSR, delivery of 
1 million t superphosphate 
annually; counterdelivery of 
ammonia and urea to the USA 
C Publication of books by Russian 
authors in English, and Ameri- 
can authors in Russian 
RD Technology for nonferrous 
metals, hydraulic turbines 
RD Processing of crude oil and 
natural gas, organic chemistry 
and plastics, environmental 
protection 
C Compressors 
RD Computer technology 
S Computer technology 
Kiev Paton 
Institute 
Vereinigte 
Edelstahl- 
werke AG 
Committee for Science Volvo 
and Technology 
Litsenzintorg Raymond 
Louis-Willian 
Committee for Science Lockheed 
and Technology 
Committee for Science Bendix Corp. 
and Technology 
Committee for Science Reichhold 
and Technology Chemicals Inc. 
Gulf Oil Co. 
Committee for Science Sperry-Rand 
and Technology Corp. 
not Imown Chemico, 
Occidental 
Petroleum 
Corp. 
Soviet Copyright McGraw-Hill 
Agency (VAAP) Book Pub- 
lishing Co. 
Committee for Science Allis- 
and Technology Chalmers 
Committee for Science Universal Oil 
and Technology Products 
Energomashexport Elliot 
Committee for Science Control Data 
and Technology Corp. 
Elektronorgtekhnika Control Data 
Corp. 
Committee for Science General 
and Technology Electric 
Committee for Science Hewlett 
and Technology Packard 
Committee for Science ITT 
and Technology 
RD Energy production (steam and 
gas turbines, nuclear energy) 
RD F lectromedicine and measuring 
instruments, small computers 
RD Exchange of scientific-technical 
information 
ANNEX N°20: 
LIST OF MAIN INDUSTRIAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST 
Source: Levcik F. & Stankovsky J. "Industrial Cooperation 
between East & West". p. 254-256 
ANNEX N°21 Page. 274 
USA FUNDS USED FOR PERFORMANCE OF RESEARCH AND D. 1974 
BASIC RESEARCH, APPLIED RESEARCH, AND DEVELOPMENT 
Federal 
government 
Industry 
Universities 
and colleges 
Other nonprofit 
institutions 
Total 
distribution 
performers 
(1) 
4,800 
4,800 
14.9% 
(2) 
8,525 
13,000 
21,525 
67.1% 
(3) 
2,130 
90 
1385 
205 
3,810 
11.9% 
(in US$ 1,000,000) 
(4) 
850 
850 
2.6% 
(1). - Federal Government 
(2). - Industry 
(3)"- Universities and Colleges 
(4). - Associated FFRDCs 
(5)"- Other nonprofit institutions 
(6). - Percent Distribution sources. 
(5) 
755 
Total 
17,060 
(6) 
53.2 
115 
245 
1,115 
3.5% 
Basic and Applied research ....... US$ 12,000,000,000 
Development ...................... .. 20,000,000,000 
Total ........ US$ 32,000,000,000 
ANNEX N°21: 
41.1 
4.1 
1.4 
ioo% 
USA FUNDS USED FOR PERFORMANCE OF RESEARCH AND D. 1974 
13.205 
1,385 
450 
32,100 
Source: Guide to World Science. p. 22 
ANNEX N°22 Page. 275 
DISTRIBUTION OF COSTS IN SUCCESSFUL PRODUCT INNOVATIONS 
Research, 
advanced development, 
basic invention 
Engineering and 
designing the product 
Tooling, manufacturing 
egineering(getting ready 
for manufacture) 
Manufacturing 
start-up expenses 
Marketing 
start-up expenses 
5-1o% 
10-20% 
40-5O 
5-15% 
10-25% 
rýý I1III 
Source: Charpie, Technological Innovation. 
included in Graham Jones "The Role of 
Science & Technology in Developing Countries" 
ANNEX N°22: 
DISTRIBUTION OF COSTS IN SUCCESSFUL PRODUCT INNOVATIONS 
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Table III-62. Estimated foreign-controlled shares of the pharmaceutical 
industry; selected countries, 1975 J 
(Percentage) 
Country and 
country group 
Share of sales 
(Percentage) 
Saudi Arabia 100 
Nigeria 97 
Belgium 90 
Colombia 90 
Venezuela 88 
Brazil 85 
Canada 85 
Australia 85 
Indonesia 85 
Mexico 82 
Central American Common Market (1970) 80 
India 75 
Iran 75 
Argentina 70 
United Kingdom 60 
Italy 60 
South Africa 60 
Finland (1971) 50 
Sweden 50 
France 45 
Portugal (1970) 44 J 
Turkey (1974) 40 
Norway (1971) 36 
Germany, Federal Republic of 35 
Switzerland (1971) 34 
Greece 28 
Egypt (1971) 19 
United States 15 
Japan 13 
Source: United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, based on 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Major Issues Arising 
from the Transfer of Technology to Developing C untries (United Nations 
publication, Sales No. E. 75"II"D"2 ; Business International, Investing, 
Licensing and Trading Conditions Abroad (New York, 1976); S. Lall, "The 
International Pharmaceutical Industry in Less Developed Countries, with Special 
Reference to India", Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, August 1974, 
p. 162: Business Latin America, various issues; L. M. Wortzel, "Technology transfer 
in the pharmaceutical industry" (New York, UNITAB, 1971); "The Mathi Committee on 
the Indian Drug industry", in Report of the Committee on Drugs and Pharmaceutical 
Industry (flew Delhi, Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals, 1975); A. Cilingiroglu, 
"Transfer of Technology for Pharmaceutical Chemicals" (Paris, Organiiation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 1974); J. Katz, Oli opoli firmas nacionales 
eapresas multinacionales (Buenos Aires, Siglo Veintiuno, 1974); M. Mandousson, 
the Pharmaceutical industry in. 
_EEt, 
Ph. D. Thesis, University of London, 1974; 
United States Department of Commerce, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States 
(Washington, D. C., 1976); Japan Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry, Trends in 
Foreign Capital Enterprises (Tokyo, 1971); L. Schaumann, Pharmaceutical Industry 
Dynamics and Outlook to 1985 (Menlo Park, Stanford Research Institute, 197b), table 3. 
a/ Except where otherwise indicated. 
b/ Refers to the market share held by the 15 largest foreign-owned companies 
out of the total 64 foreign-owned companies. 
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Annexe No 27 . TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN VENEZUELA 
JAPAN 
Parent Names 
1-DAY-ICHI SHOJI CO. LTD. 
2-FUJITA CORP 
3-FUJITEC CO., KTD 
4-HITACHI LTD 
5-HITACHI LTD 
6-HITACHI LTD 
7. ITOH`&CO., LTD 
8-KANEMATSU-GOSHO LTD 
9-MARUBENI CORP. 
10-MATUSHITA ELEC. IND. CO. LTD 
11-MATUSHITA ELEC. LND. CO. LTD 
12-MITSUBISHI CORP 
13-MITSUBISHI COUP 
14-MITSUI & CO. LTD 
15-NISSHO IWAI CO. LTD 
16-SONY CORP. 
Subsidiary or Associate(a) 
Dai - ICHI Shoji de Venezuela 
Fujita de Venezuela C. A. (a) 
Ascensores FUJITEC C. A 
S. H. Fundiciones C. A. (a) 
Hitachi de Venezuela C. A. 
Mayorca-hitachi C. A. 
C. ITOH & Co de Venezuelqt, S. A. 
17-SUMITOMO LIGHT METAL INDS. LTD 
C. A. 
Siderurgica Occidental C. A. (a) 
Marubeni Venezuela C. A. 
Ntional Corp Venezolane S%A% 
Natioanl de Venezuela C. A. 
Laminal Galvanizadas C. A. (a0 
Mitsubishi Venezolana C. A. 
Mitsui de Venezuela S. S. 
Nissho - Iwai de Venezuela C. A. 
Sony de Venezuela C. A. 
Ind. Venez. de Aluminio C. A. (aO 
AUSTRALIA 
1-WORMALD INTERNATIONAL LTD Ansui chemical Co. de Venezuela. C. A. 
AUSTRIA 
1-VOEST-ALPINE AG 
BELGIUM 
1-AGFA-GEVAERT GROUP 
2-BEKAERT N. V., S. A. 
3-CINZANO INTERNATIONAL S. A. 
4-ETEROUTREMER S. A. 
5-INT. DES PIEUX ARMES FRANKIGNOUL 
6-LNSAY E. T. S. S. A. 
7-L. V. D. CO. P. V. B. A. 
8-MECANIVER S. A. 
Voest-Alpine International Corp. 
Agfa-Gevaert de Venezuela S. A. 
Vicson S. A. (a) 
Cinzano S. A. (a) 
Eternit Venezolana S. A. (a) 
Fundaciones Franki C. A. (a) 
Electro EYS S. A. 
L. D. V. Venezolana S. A. 
Templex C. A. (a) 
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9-PETROFLXA S. A. 
10-SAVEMA S%A% 
11-WITTOCK VAN LANDEGHEM S. A. 
DENMARK 
1-THE BERSOE FOUNDATION 
2-CHRISTIANI & NIELASEN A/S 
3-DET OSTASIATISKE KOMPAGNI A/S 
4-Plumrose A/S 
5-Plumrose A/S 
FINLAND 
t-KONE OY 
FRANCE 
1-AMREP S. A. 
2-CAMPENON BERNARS S. A. 
3-LE CARBONE-LORRAINE S. A 
4-COINTREAU HOLDING 
5-CONSTRUCTIONS METALLIQUES P. 
6-CREDIT LYONNAIS S. A. 
7-PARTICIPATION DES TISSAGES 
S-NOBEL BOZEL S. A. 
9-PECHINEY UGLNE KUHLMANN S. A. 
10-PERNOD-RICARD S. A. 
11-ROUSSEL UCLAF S. A. 
12-SAINT-GOBAIN-PONT-A-MOUSSON, 
CIE., DE, S. A. 
13-SAUNIER DUVAL S. A. 
14-SOLETANCHE S. A. 
15-THOMSON-BRANDT S. A. 
Financiere Elec. de Banque S. A. 
Generale de Radiologie S. A. 
American Petrofina of Venezuela 
Sabema de Venezuela C. A. 
Beltex S. A. (a) 
Bera de Venezuela S. A. (a) 
Construcciones Christ. & Nielsen C. A. 
Bera de Venezuela S. A. (a) 
Granja Porcina Saguino S. R. L. 
Ienca 
Ascemspres H. & S-Kone C. A. 
Atlantida Amrep S. A. (a) 
Empresas Campenon Bernars de Venezuela. 
Morganite Lorraine de Venezuela C. A. (a) 
Cointreau de Venezuela S. A. 
Constructions M. P. de Venezuela(a) 
Banco Provincial SAICA 
Hilos Tubino(a) 
Venbozel S. A. 
Produven S. A. (a) 
Dubonnet Venezuela S. A. 
Roussell de Venezuela S. A. 
C. A. Venezolana de Inversiones, Investiga- 
ciones y Representaciones -CAVIRE- 
Calasa S. A. 
Soletanche de Venezuela S. A. 
C. G. R. Venezuela S. A. 
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WEST GERMANY 
1-BASF AG 
Luchem Corp. -U. S. A. - 
Basf Wyandotte Corp. -U. S. A. - 
2- Basf Wyandotte Corp. -U. S. A. - 
3-BAYER AG 
Bayer Foreign Invest. Canada 
4- Miles Laboratories Inc. U. S. A. 
5-DSD-DILLINGER STAHLBAU GMBH 
6-DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA AG 
. 7-DRESDNER 
BANK AG 
Deutsch-Sudamerikanische B. 
8- Deutsch-Sudamerikanische B. 
9-GUTEHOFFNUNGSHUTTE A. 
10-KARL 0. HELM AG 
11-HENKEL KG. a A. 
12-HOECHST AG 
13- Messer Griesheim GmbH 
14-MANNESMANN AG 
Mannesmann Demag AG 
15- G. L. Rexroth GmbH 
16-NEUE HEIMAT INTERNATIONAL 
17-MUNCHENER RUCKVERSICHERUNGS 
18-PSB ARNFRIED PAGEL ING. 
19-PELIKAN AG 
20-G. M. PFAFF AG 
Pfaff International Corp. USA 
21-SCHERING AG 
22-SIEMENS AG 
23-TELEFONBAU UND NORMALZEIT L 
24-TRIANGELER DAMMSTOFFWERK G. 
25-J. M. VOITH GmbH 
26-H. VON WICHMANN KG 
27-OTTO WOLFF IND. ANLAGEN GmbH 
Wyandotte de Venezuela C. A. 
Chemag Lehrmann de Venezuela S. R. L. 
Bayer Quimicas Unidas S. A. 
Industrias Miles Venezolana C. A. 
CGI Constructora Gral. de Industtrias C. A. 
Lufthansa de Venezuela S. A. 
Cavendes Sociedad Financiera C. A. (a) 
Venezolana de Desarrollo C. A. (a) 
K. S. B. Venezolana C. A. (a) 
Helm de Venezuela C. A. 
Henkel Venezolana S. A. 
Hoechst Remedia S. A. 
Messer Griesheim de Venezuela S. A. 
Supervisora de Instalaciones Tecnicas SRL 
Rexroth S. A. 
Promotora Venezolana Alemana S. A. (a) 
Munchener de Venezuela C. A. 
Pagel Venezuela 
Paragon C. A. 
Pfaff de Venezuela S. A. 
Farmaceutica Industrial C. A. 
Osram de Venezuela S. A. 
Tele Norma C. A. (a) 
Triaven 
Voith de Venezuela S. A. 
Autorex Venezolana S. A. (a) 
Otto Wolff de Venezuela C. A. 
ITALY 
i-BASTOGI-IRBS S. P. A. 
Sabiem S. P. A. 
2-BANCA NAZIONALE DEL LAVORO 
3-FIAT S. P. A. 
4-FIAT S. P. A. 
5-FIAT S. P. A. 
6-FINANZIARIA SIDERURGICA S. P. A. 
Dalmine S. p. A. 
Ponteggi Tubolari D. I. S. p. A. 
7-GENERALE DI ELECTRICITA SPA 
8-GENERALFIN S. p. A. 
Codelfa S. p. A. 
9-Codelfa S. p. A. 
10-LI, NEA C COSTA ARMATORI S. P. A. 
11-ERCOLE MARELLI &CS. p. A. 
12-MONTEDISON S. p. A. 
13- Carlo Erba S. p. A. 
14- Farmaceutici Italia S. p. A. 
15-MONTEDISON S. p. A. 
16-MONTEDISON S. p. A. 
17-ING. C. OLIVETTI & C. S. p. A. 
Olivetti Internat. -Luxembourg- 
18-RIUNIONE ADRIATICA DI S. S. p. A. 
NETHERLANDS 
1-ENNIA N. V. 
2-HAGEMEYER N. V. 
3-CETECO TRADING AND IND. CORP. 
4-CETECO TRADING AND IND. CORP. 
5-CETECO TRADING AND LND. CORD . 
6-CETECO TRADING AND LND. CORP. 
7-CETECO TRADING AND IND. CORP. 
8-CETECO TRADING AND IND. CORP. 
9-CETECO TRADING AND IND. CORP. 
10-CETECO TRADING AND IND. CORP. 
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Corporacion Ascensores S. A. 
Financiera Cavendes S. A. (a) 
Corporacion Ind. Acce. de Vehiculos. C. A. 
Fabrica Ind. Automotores C. A. (FIAV) 
Fabrica de Motores C. A. (FADEMOTOR) 
A. T. Dalmine de Venezuela S. A. 
Sud-America de Electrificacion S. A. 
Consorcio Astaldi Codelfa Colombus 
Consorcio Astaldi Codelfa Proindu 
Linea C 
Ercole Marelli de Venezuela S. A. 
Biofar C. A. 
Carlo Erba S. A. 
Farmitalia de Venezuela S. A. 
General Quimica Venezolana S. A. 
Montedison de Venezuela S. A. 
Olivetti de Venezuela S. A. 
Adriatica Venezolana C. A. 
Primera Holandesa de Seguros C. A. 
Hagemeyer Venezolana C. A. 
Ceteco de Caracas S. A. 
Ceteco de Maracaibo S. A. 
Ceteco Venezuela S. A. 
Cetra Venezolana S. A. 
Esmalteria Zuliana C. A. 
Ind. Venezolana de Componentes Electronicos 
Ind. ArteFactos Domesticos C. A. 
Industrias Regina C. A. 
SA 
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11-CETECO TRADING AND IND. CORP. N. V. 
12-CETECO TRADING AND IND. CORP. N. V. 
13-CETECO TRADING AND IND. CORP. N. V. 
14-CETECO TRADING AND IND. CORP. N. V. 
15-CETECO TRADING AND IND. CORP. N. V. 
16-ROYAL DUTCH SHELL N. V. 
17-ROYAL DUTCH SHELL N. V. 
18-NAARDEN INTERNATIONAL N. V. 
19-VAN NELLE LASSIE N. V. 
20-PHS. VAN Ot*IEREN N. V. 
21-ROYAL PACKAGING IND. VAN LEER 
22-ROYAL PACKAGING IND. VAN LEER 
23-SHV HOLDING N. V. 
24- 
SPAIN 
Metalurgica Nacional C. A. 
Representaciones Ceteco S. A. 
Sony de Venezuela S. A. (a) 
Tecnica C. T. C. S. A. 
Televisores de Caracas S. A. 
Shell Quimica de Venezuela C. A. 
Shell Venezuela S. A. 
Naarden de Venezuela C. A. 
Molinos Lassie C. A. 
Phs. van Omeren de Venezuela S. A. 
Industrias Venezolanas Van Leer C. A. 
Van Leer Envases Valencia C. A. 
Servimar C. A. 
Lever S. A. 
1-ABENGOA S. A. MONTAJES ELECTRICOS 
2-ACUSTICA ELECTRONICA ROSELSON 
3-BANCO DE BILBAO 
4-BANCO CENTRAL 
5-PEDRO DOMEQ S. A. 
6-ESPANOLA DE MONTAJES METALICOS 
SWEDEN 
1-AGA AB 
2-AGA AB 
3-AGA AB 
4-ASEA AB 
5-ALFA-LAVAL AB 
6-ATLAS COPCO AB 
7-ELECTROLUX AB 
8-ESSELTE AB 
Esselte Pendaflex Corp. USA 
9-SKF AB 
10-SANDVIK AB 
11-SIAB BYGGEN AB 
12-SKANDIA LNSURANCE Co. LTD 
13-TELEFON AB L. M. ERICSSON 
Instalaciones Elect. Mecanicas Abengoä S. A. 
Eivox C. A. 
Banco Exterior C. A. (a) 
Banco Exterior C. A. (a) 
Pedro Domeq Venezuela S. A. 
Empresa de Montajes Metalicos S. A. (a) 
AGAVenezolana C. A. 
Agandina S. A. 
Soldaduras del Caribe C. A. 
ASEA Venezuela S. A. 
Alfa-Laval Venezolana S. A. 
Atlas Copco Venezuela S. A. 
Electrolux C. A. 
Esselte Pendaflex C. A. 
SKF Venezolana C. A. 
Sandvik Venezuela C. A. 
Siab International C. A. 
Skandia Venezuela S. A. 
Ericsson C. A. 
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SWITZERLAND 
1-A. E. G. TELEFUNKEN INT. AG. 
2-BBC. AG. BROWN, BOVERI & CIE. 
3-CIBA-GEIGY AG 
4-CIBA-GEIGY AG 
5-DANZAS AG 
6-DOW CHEMICAL AG 
7-FOSECO HOLDING AG 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1-B. A. T. INDUSTRIES LTD 
British-Ame. Cosmetics Ltd. 
2- British-Ame. Tobacco Co. 
3-BICC LTD 
4-BABCOCK INTERNATIONAL LTD 
5-BRIDON LTD 
6-THE BRITISH PETROLEUM CO. 
British Petroleum B. V. -Holland- 
The Standard Oil Co. USA 
7-THE BURMAH OIL CO. LTD 
The Rawlplug Co. Ltd. 
8-COATS PATONS LTD 
9-COATS PATONS LTD 
10-DAVY CORPORATION LTD 
Head, Wrightson & Co. Ltd. 
11-THE DISTILLERS CO. LTD 
Tanqueray Gordon & Co. Ltd 
12-EWBANK CONSULTING LTD 
13-FOSECO MINSEP LTD 
14-THE GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. LTD 
The English Electric Co. 
15- The English Electric Co. 
16-THE GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. LTD 
17-GESTETNER HOLDINGS LTD. 
Gestetner Investments Ltd. 
18-GLAXO HOLDINGS LTD 
Glaxo Group Ltd 
19-GUARDIAN ROYAL EXCHANGE A 
20-C. E. HEATH & CO. LTD 
AEG Telefunken Venezolana S. A. 
Brown Boveri de Venezuela S. A. 
Covigal S. A. (a) 
Productos CIBA-GEIGY Ltda. 
Danzas Venezolana C. A. 
Dow Chemical Latin America S. A. 
Foseco Venezolana C. A. 
Yardley of London Venezolana C. A. 
Cigarrera Bigott Sucs., C. A. 
Proyelec C. A. (a) 
Babcock & Wilcox de Venezuela S. A. 
Brivensa C. A. (a) 
Prospect International C. A. 
Rawlplug de Venezuela C. A. (a) 
Coats de Venezuela S. A. 
Cothilca S. A. (a) 
Davy Internacional de Venezuela C. A. 
Gordon's de Venezuela C. A. 
Ewbank & Partners(Venezuela)S. A. 
Fosven C. A. (a) 
English Electric Marconi de Venezuela C. A. 
Marconi de Venezuela C. A. 
Genalex C. A. 
Gestetner de Venezuela S. A. 
Laboratorios Glaxo de Venezuela C. A. 
Britanica de Seguros C. A. (a) 
Rollins Heath Consorcio de Seguros C. A. (a) 
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21-HEPWORTH CERAMIC HOLDING 
22-IMPERIAL CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES LTD 
23-JOHN LAING LTD 
24-LLOYDS BANK LTD 
25-MCCORQUODALE & CO. LTD 
26-METALOCK (BRITAIN)LTD 
27-THE MORGAN CRUCIBLE CO. LTD 
28-S. PEARSON & SON LTD 
S. Pearson Industries Ltd. 
Midhurst Corp. -USA- 
Camco Inc -USA- 
Camco Cayman-Cayman Inds. 
29- Camco Cayman-Cayman Inds. 
30-THE PLESSEY CO. LTD 
31-RECKITT & COLMAN LTD 
32-THE SHELL TRANSP. & TRADING CO. 
33-THE SHELL TRANSP. & TRADING CO. 
34-THE SHELL TRANSP. & TRADING CO. 
35-SMITH & NEPHEW ASSOC. LTD 
36-STEWART WRIGHTSON HOLDING LTD. 
Stewart W. International Group 
Stewart W. (Overseas Holding) 
37-ULTRAMAR CO. LTD 
38-THE WELLCOME FOUNDATION LTD 
VEN Fordath C. A. (a) 
ICI Kern S. A. 
Laing II C. A. (a) 
Banco La Guaira Internacional C. A. (a) 
Industrias Almac C. A. (a) 
Metalock (Venezuela) S. R. L. 
Morganite Lorraine de Venezuela C. A. (a) 
Camco de Venezuela S. A. 
Camco Wireline C. A. 
Plessey de Venezuela S. A. 
Atlantis Venezolana C. A. 
Comercial Agropecuaria S. A. (a) 
Shell Quimica de Venezuela C. A. 
Shell Venezuela S. A. 
Marcas Asociadas Marcasa S. A. 
Matthews Wrightson de Venezuela 
Ultramar de Venezuela S. A. 
Cooper Venezolana S. A. 
39-THE WESTERN UNITED INVESTMENT CO 
The Union International Co. Ltd 
40- The Union International Co. Ltd 
Agropecuaria Rosalinda:. S. A. 
Industria Envasadora Nacional 
CANADA 
1-ALCAN ALUMINIUM LTD 
2-CANADA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
Polysar Ltd 
3-CANADIAN INTERNAT. POWER CO. LTD 
C. Int. Power Services Ltd 
4- International Power Co. 
5-DQMINION TEXTILE INC 
6-THE MOLSON COMPANIES LTD 
Anthes Imperial Ltd. 
Molanth Holding M. Holland 
. 
Oron Inc. U. S. A. 
The Diversey Corp. U. S. A 
7- The Diversey Corp. U. S. A. 
C. A. 
Aluminio de Venezuela C. A. 
Polysar de Venezuela S. A. 
Consultores Occidentales S. A. 
La Electricidad de Perija C. A. 
Industria Venezolana de Entretelas C. A. (a) 
Diversey Overseas Corp. 
Diversey Venezuela S. A. 
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8-MOORE CORP. LTD 
9-MOORE CORPORATION LTD 
10-NORANDA MINES LTD 
Canada Wire & Cable Co. 
11-THE ROYAL BANK OF CANADA 
12-THE HOUSE OF SEAGRAM LTD 
Distillers Corp. Ltd 
13-THE HOUSE OF SEAGRAM LTD 
14-THE HOUSE OF SEAGRAM LTD 
15-THE STEEL CO. CANADA LTD 
UNITED STATES 
1-ACCO INTERNATIONAL INC 
2-ABBOTT LABORATORIES 
3-ADDISON-WESLEY PUBLISHING 
4-AIRBORNE FREIGHT CORP 
5-ALBERTO CULVER CO 
6-ALCON LABORATORIES INC. 
Alcon Universal Ltd. 
7-ALLEGHENY LUDLUM INDUSTRY INC. 
Chemetron Corporation 
8-ALLERGAN PHARMACEUTICALS 
9-ALLIED CHEMICAL CORP 
10-ALLIED CHEMICAL CORP. 
11-ALLIS CHALMERS CORP. 
12-ALUMINUM CO. OF AMERICA 
13-AMERICAN CAN COMPANY 
14-AMERICAN CAN COMPANY 
15-AMERICAN CAN COMPANY 
16-AMERICAN CAN COMPANY 
17-AMERICAN CAN COMPANY 
18-A ERICAN CAN COMPANY 
19-AMERICAN CAN COMPANY 
20-AMERICAN CAN COMPANY 
21-AMERICAN CAN COMPANY 
22-AMERICAN CAN COMPANY 
23-AMERICAN CYANAMID CO. 
24-AMERICAN HOMEPRODUCTS CORP. 
Formularios y Procedimientos Moore(a) 
Inversions Moore C. A. 
Industrias de Conductores Electricos C. A. (a) 
Banco Royal Venezolano C. A. (a) 
Venezolana Canadiense S. A. 
Corporacion Venezolana Canadiense 
Licorerias Unidas S. A. 
Stelco de Venezuela S. R. L. 
ACCO Manufacturing C. A. 
Abbott Laboratories C. A. 
Fondo Educativo Inter-American C. A. 
Pardo y Cia. 
Alberto Culver Americas Inc. C. A. 
Alcon Pharmaceutical C. A. 
Gases Industriales de Venezuela C. A. 
Allergan de Venezuela S. A. 
Aliada Quimica de Venezuela C. A. 
Union Petrolera Venezolana C. A. 
American Air Filter of Venezuela C. A. 
Inversiones Alcoa S. A. 
Distribuidora Envensa S. A. 
Dixie Cup de Venezuela C. A. 
Envases Plasticos Venezolanos S. A. 
Envases Venezolanos S. A. 
Gentile Industrias Asociadas S. A. 
Ind de Productos Terminados Envasados S. A. 
Inversiones Zeta S. A. 
Representaciones Envensa S. A. 
Vasos Venezolanos C. A. 
Vidrios Domesticos S. A. 
Cyanamid de Venezuela C. A. 
Ekco de Venezuela S. A. 
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25-AMERICAN HOMEPRODUCTS CORP 
26-AFRICAN HOMEPRODUCTS CORP 
27-AMERICAN HOMEPRODUCTS CORP 
28-AMERICAN HOMEPRODUCTS CORP 
29-AMERICAN HOSPITAL SIPPLY C. 
30-AMERICAN MOTORS CORP. 
31- Jeep Corporation 
32-AN-SON CORPORATION 
33-ANSUL COMPANY 
34-ARMCO INC 
35-ARMCO INC. 
36-ARO CORPORATION 
37-ASHLAND OIL INC. 
Ashland Oil Investments Inc 
CDE Company 
38- CDE Company 
39- CDE Company 
40-ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO. 
41-AVON PRODUCTS INC 
42-BAKER INTERNATIONAL CORP. 
Milchem Inc. 
43-BANKAMERICA CORP. 
44-BATTELLE MEMORIAL INSTITUTE 
45-BAXTER TRAVENOL LAB. INC. 
46-BEATRICE FOODS INC 
47-THE BENDIX CORPORATION 
48- United Geophysical Corp. 
Farmaceutic Ayerst-Royal C. A. 
Industrias Kolana C. A. 
Industrias Wyeth S. A. 
Laboratorios Ayerst-Royal S. A. 
American Hospital Supply Corp. de Venezuela S. A 
A. M. C. de Venezuela C. A. 
Jeep de Venezuela S. A. 
An-Son Drilling S. A. 
Ansul de Venezuela C. A. 
Armco Venezolana C. A. 
The National Supply Co. of Venezuela C. A. 
Aro de Venezuela C. A. 
Negroven S. A. (a) 
Valvoline Oil Co. de Venezuela C. A. 
Venezolana de Resinas C. A. (a) 
Sinclair Venezuelan Oil Co. 
Avon Cosmetics de Venezuela C. A. 
Milchem Venezuela Corp. 
Metro-America C. A. (a) 
Battelle Memorial Institute C. A. 
Laboratorios Baxter C. A. 
Savoy Candy C. A. 
Bendix-Miranda S. R. L. 
Exploradora Venezolana S. R. L. 
Black & Decker de Venezuela C. A. 49-THE BLACK & DECKER MANUFAC. CO. 
50-BLUE BELL INC. 
Campana Azul S. A. de Mexico 
51-BOOZ, ALLEN & HAMILTON INC. 
52-BORG-WARNER CORP. 
53-BORG-WARNER CORP. 
54-BRISTOL-MYERS CO. 
Blisa Inc. 
Bristol Lab. Int. Panama 
55-BRISTOL-MYERS COMPANY 
56-BRISTOL-MYERS COMPANY 
57-BRISTOL-MYERS COMPANY 
58-BRUNSWICK CORPORATION 
Sherwood Medical Industry Inc. 
Wrangler de Venezuela C. A. 
Booz, Allen & Hamilton de Venezuela S. R. L. 
Borg & Beck de Venezuela S. A. 
Refrigeracion York S. A. 
Laboratorios Bristol de Venezuela S. A. 
Bristol Myers de Venezuela S. A. 
Clairol de Venezuela C. A. 
Mead Johnson de Venezuela S. A. 
Inyectoplas Venezolana C. A. (a) 
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59-BUNDY CORPORATION 
60-BURROUGHS CORPORATION 
Burroughs International Co. 
Burroughs Euro-Africa Inc. 
Burroughs Int. Switzerland. 
61-CBI LNDUSTRIES INC. 
62-CBS INC. 
63-CBS INC. 
INTERNATIONAL INC 
65 -CAMCO INC 
66-CAMCO INC 
67-CAMERON IRON WORKS INC 
68-CELANESE CORP. 
69-CHAMPION SPARK PLUG CO. 
70-CHAMPION SPARK PLUG CO. 
71-CHASE MANHATTAN CORP. 
The Chase Manhattan Bank 
72- The Chase Manhattan Bank 
73- The Chase Manhattan Bank 
74-CHEMICAL NEW YORK CORP. 
Chemical Bank 
Chemical Int. Finance Ltd. 
75-CHEMTEX INC. 
76-CHESEBROUGH-POND'S INC. 
Chesebrough-Pond's Int. Canada 
77-CHRYSLER CORP. 
78-CHRYSLER CORP. 
Chrysler Comercial. -Mexico- 
79-CHUBB CORP. 
80-CITICORP 
Citibank N. A. 
81-CLARK EQUIPMENT CO. 
82-CLUETT, PEABODY & CO. INC. 
83-CLUETT, PEABODY & CO. INC. 
Van R. Apparel Corp. 
84-COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO. 
85-COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO. 
86-COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO. 
Helena Rubenstein Inc. 
87-COMBUSTION ENGINEERING INC 
88-THE CONTINENTAL CORP. 
Diner's Club Inc. 
Bundy Venezolana C. A. (a) 
Burroughs C. A. 
CBI de Venezuela C. A. 
CBS Columbia C. A. 
Editorial Interamericana de Venezuela C. A. 
Aliven S. A. 
Camco de Venezuela S. A. 
Camco Wireline C. A. 
Cameron Iron Works de Venezuela C. A. 
Celifibras de Venezuela C. A. 
Bujias Ancom C. A. 
Bujias Champion de Venezuela C. A. 
Arrendacima C. A. 
Banco Mercantil y Agricola 
Consorcio Inversionista Mercantil y Agric. 
Financiera Exterior S. A. (a) 
Chemtex de Venezuela S. A. 
Chesebrough- Pond's C. A. 
Chrysler de Venezuela S. A. 
Chrysler Credit Venezuela S. A. 
La Federacion Cia. de Seguros C. A. (a) 
Arrendequipos C. A. 
Industrial Sabal S. A. (a) 
Industrias Jatu S. A. (a) 
Van Raalte de Venezuela C. A. 
Colgate-Palmolive C. A. 
Kendall Venezuela C. A. 
Helena Rubenstein(Inter Americana) S. A. 
Luninus de Venezuela C. A. 
Diners Club de Venezuela S. A. (a) 
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89- Security Reinsurance Corp. 
90-CONTROL DATA CORPORATIO 
91-COOPER INDUSTRIES INC. 
Gardner-Denver Co. 
92-COOPER LABORATORIES INC. 
Cooper Lab. International Inc. 
Cooper Lab. Int. Ltd. -Bahamas- 
93- Cooper Lab. International Inc. 
94-THE DOW CHEMICAL CO. 
Dow Chemical. -Holland Antilles- 
95- Gruppo Lepetit SpA. -Italy- 
Administ. de Part. Entrng. 
96-CORE LABORATORIES INC. 
97-CORNING GLASS WORKS 
Corning Int. Service. -Panama- 
98-COULTER ELECTRONICS INC. 
99-CRANE PACKING CO. 
100-CROUSE"-HINDS CO. 
101-CROWN CORK & SEAL CO. INC. 
102-DANA CORPORATION 
103-DANA CORPORATION 
104-DANA CORPORATION 
105-DANA CORPORATION 
106-DANA CORPORATION 
107-DANA CORPORATION 
108-DART INDUSTRIES INC. 
109-DART INDUSTRIES INC. 
110-DATA GENERAL CORPORATION 
111-DEERE & COMPANY 
112-DIAMOND SHAMROCK CORP 
113-DIAMOND SHAMROCK CORP. 
114-DIAMOND SHAMROCK CORP. 
115-DRAV0 CORP. 
116-DRESSER INDUSTRIES INC. 
117-DRESSER INDUSTRIES INC. 
Dresser AG. -Liechtenstein- 
118-E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS & CO. 
119-THE DUN & BRADSTREET CORP. 
120-EG & G. INC. 
Sealol Inc. 
La Venezolana de Seguros C. A. (a) 
Servicio Cybernet de Venezuela 
Gardner-Denver International C. A. 
Cooper Med. S. A. 
Knox de Venezuela C. A. 
Tecnica Petroquimica Venezuela C. A. 
Lepetit de Venezuela C. A. 
Core Laboratories International S. A. 
Corning Venezuela S. A. 
Coulter Electronics S. A. 
John Crane Venezuela C. A. 
Crouse-Hinds de Venezuela C. A. 
Crown Cork de Venezuela C. A. 
Arrendamientos e Inversiones Camuri S. A. 
Corporacion H. Z. Relianca S. A. (a) 
Danaven C. A. (a) 
Sidaforjas S. A. (a) 
Sidaven S. A. (a) 
Victroven S. A. 
Dart de Venezuela C. A. 
Estireno del Zulia C. A. 
Data General C. A. 
Fanatracto S. A. (a) 
Diamond Shamrock Venezuela S. A. 
Nopco de Venezuela S. A. (a) 
Polifilm de Venezuela S. A. (a) 
Constructora Dravo C. A. 
Ceramica Carabobo C. A. (a) 
Magcobar de Venezuela C. A. 
Du Pont de Venezuela C. A. 
Dun & Bradstreet C. A. 
EG & G. Sealol S. A. 
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121-ESB RAY-O-VAC CORP. 
122-EASTMAN KODAK CO. 
123-EATON CORP. 
Energia Integral S. A. 
Foto Interamericana de Venezuela S. A. 
Cutler-Hammer International C. A. 
124-EATON CORP. Eaton C. A. 
125-EATON CORP. Ejeven S. A. (a) 
126-THE ECHLIN MANUFACTURING CO. Inversora Sabana S. A. 
127-THE ECHLIN MANUFACTURING CO. 
The Echlin Sales Co. 
128-ECONOMICS LABORATORY INC. 
Echlin de Venezuela C. A. 
Economics Lab. Int. Ltd. Soilax de Venezuela C. A. 
129-EMERSON ELECTRIC CO. 
130-EMERSON ELECTRIC CO. 
Skil Corporatiop 
Skil Europe Corp. 
131-EMHART CORPORATION 
USM Corporation 
132- USM Corporation 
133-ESMARK INC 
Estech Inc. 
Emerson Electric C. A. 
Skil Venezolana S. R. L. 
Fijaciones Industriales Tucker C. A. 
USM Andes S. R. L. 
Estech Specialty Chemical Corp. Swift 
134-FMC CORPORATION 
135-FMC CORPORATION 
136-EBERHARD FABER INC 
137-FEDERAL-MOGUL CORP. 
138-FELMONT OIL CORP. 
139-FERRO CORPORATION 
140-FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER CO. 
141-FIRST NATIONAL BOSTON CORP. 
Chemical Co. de Venezuela C. A. 
Manufacturas Industriales C. A. (a) 
Tripoliven C. A. 
Eberhard Faber de Venezuela C. A. (a) 
Federal Mogul de Venezuela C. A. 
Guanipa Oil Corp. 
Ferro de Venezuela C. A. (a) 
Firestone Venezolana C. A. 
The First Nat. Bank of Boston 
Boston Overseas Fin. Corp. Arrendadora Industrial Venezuela C. A. (a) 
142-FIRST CHICAGO CORP. 
First Chicago Int. Finance Corp. First Chicago(Venezuela)C. A. 
143-FORD MOTOR CO. 
144-FRUEHAUF CORP. 
Kelsey-Hayes Co. 
145-GK TECHNOLOGIES INC. 
146-GATES RUBER CO. 
147-GEARHART-OWEN INDUSTRY INC. 
Go Int. South America S. A. 
148-GEARHART-OWEN INDUSTRY INC. 
149-GENERAL BINDING CORP. 
Ford Motor Co. de Venezuela C. A. 
Ruedas de Venezuela C. A. (a) 
Industria Venezolana de Cables Elect. C. A. (a) 
Gates Venezuela S. A. 
Go International de Venezuela C. A. 
Tri-Can de Venezuela C. A. (a) 
General Binding Corp. de Venezuela S. A. 
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150-GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.. 
151-GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. 
Generale di Elettricita 
152-GENERAL FOODS CORP. 
153-GENERAL MILLS INC. 
154-GENERAL MILLS INC. 
155-GENERAL MOTORS CORP. 
156-GENERAL TELEPHON & ELECT. CORP. 
GTE International Inc. 
157- GTE International Inc. 
158- GTE International Inc. 
159- GTE International Inc. 
160-GENERAL TIRE AND RUBBER CORP. 
161-GENERAL TIRE AND RUBBER CORP. 
162-GEOSCIENCE TECH. SERVICE. CORP. 
163-GERBER PRODUCTS CO. 
164-THE GILLETTE CO. 
Giva S. A. Cia. 
165-THE B. F. GOODRICH CO. 
166-THE B. F. GOODRICH CO. 
167-THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER 
168-W. R. GRACE & CO. 
169-GREY ADVERTISING INC. 
170-GRIFFITH LABORATORIES USA 
171-GROLIER LNC. 
172-GROLIER INC. 
173-GROLIER INC. 
W. M. Jackson Inc. 
174-GROLIER INC. 
175-GROLIER INC. 
176-GULF & WESTERN INDUSTRIES INC. 
A. P. S. Inc. 
177- A. P. S. Inc. 
178- Simmons Co. 
179-FRANK B. -HALL & CO. INC. 
Interocean Agency Inc. 
Agencia Interoceanica 
, 
180-HALLIBURTON CO. 
181-HAY ASSOCIATED. M. THE HAY GROUP. 
18 2 -H .J . HEINZ COMPANY 
General Electric de Venezuela S. A. 
SUD . Americana de Electrificacion S. A. 
La India C. A. 
Gneral Mills de Venezuela S. A. 
Grandes Molinos de Venezuela S. A. 
General Motors de Venezuela C. A. 
GTE Electronica Andina C. A. (a) 
GTE Silvania C. A. 
GTE Telecomunicaciones C. A. (a) 
Zinsco de Venezuela C. A. (a) 
Cauchos General S. A. (a) 
Nacional Manufactura de Cauchos y Neumat. C. A. 
GTS de Venezuela C. A. (a) 
Venezolana de Alimentos C. A. 
Gillette de Venezuela S. A. 
B. F. Goodrich Chemical de Venezuela C. A. 
Plastics Petroquimica C. A. (a) 
Goodyear de Venezuela C. A. 
Productos Darex S. A. 
Grey Advertising de Venezuela C. A. (a) 
Griffith de Venezuela C. A. 
Grolier Panamericanä C. A. 
Grolier de Venezuela C. A. 
Editorial Los Andes C. A. 
Pan American Credit Corp. C. A. 
Sistemas y Comunicaciones Electronicas C. A. 
Plavica-Venezuela C. A. 
Venezuelan Supply(VENSU) C. A. 
Simmons de Venezuela C. A. 
Reaseguros Corsa S. A. 
Halliburton de Cementacion y Fomento C. A. 
Hay y Asociados Consultores de Direccion S. A. 
Alimentos Heinz C. A; 
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18 3-HELMERICH & PAYNE INC. 
Helmerich & Payne Int. Drilling 
184- Helmerich & Payne Int. Drilling 
185-HERCULES INC. 
186-HEWLETT-PACKARD CO. 
Hewlett-Packard Delaware 
187-HONEYWELL INC 
188-HOUSTON NATURAL GAS CORP. 
Liquid Carbonic Corp. 
189- Liquid Carbonic Corp. 
190-HUGHES TOOL CO. 
Oil Base Inc. 
Helmerich & Payne C. A. 
Helmerich & Payne de Venezuela Inc. C. A. 
Hercules Andino C. A. 
Hewlett-Packard de Venezuela C. A. 
Honeywell C. A. 
Gases & Chemical International S. A. 
Liquid Carbonic Venezolana S. A. (a) 
Oil Base de Venezuela C. A. 
191-HUGHES TOOL CO. Hughes Tool Co. C. A. 
192-HUGHES TOOL CO. 
B. J. Hughes Inc. Pacemaker Service C. A. 
193-IMS INTERNATIONAL INC. Data Andina S. R. L. 
194-IMS INTERNATIONAL INC. Interdata S. A. 
195-INA CORP. maven C. A. 
196-IU INTERNATIONAL CORP. 
IU Intermetal Inc. 
197-IU INTERNATIONAL CORP. 
Corporacion Chatarraven C. A. 
IU Investment Corp. Mel-Mix de Venezuela S. A. 
198-ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS INC. Multipack de Venezuela C. A. (a) 
199-INGERSOLL-RAND CO. Ingersoll-Rand de Venezuela S. A. 
200-INTERNATIONAL BANKNOTE CO. B. T. Babbitt de Venezuela S. A. (a) 
201-INT. BUSINLSS MACHINES CORP. 
IBM World Trade Corp. 
IBM W. T. America, Far East Corp. IBM DE Venezuela S. A. 
202-INT. FLAVORS & FRAGRANCES Int. Flavors & Fragrances de Venezuela C. A. 
203-INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER CO. Credequipos C. A. (a) 
204-INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER CO. Industria Venezolana de Maquinarias C. A. (a) 
205-INT. MULTIFOODS CORP. 
Fabrico Inc. -Panama- Molinos Nacionales (Monaca) C. A. 
206-INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO. Envases Internacional S. A. 
207-INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS & CONTROLS 
Lang Engineering Corp. Lang Venezuela S. A. 
208- J. F. Pritchard & Co. Pritchard de Venezuela. C. A. 
209-INT. TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH ITT de Venezuela C. A. 
210-INT. TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH 
ITT World Directories Inc. Guia C. A. de Publicidad 
211-INT. TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH 
The Sheraton Corp. 
Sheraton International Inc. Sheraton de Venezuela C. A. 
Page. 294 
212-INTERPACE CORP. 
213-IRVING BANK CORP. 
Irving Int. Financing Corp. 
214-THE ITALIAN ECONOMIC CORP. 
215-JOHNS-MANVILLE CORP. 
216-JOHNSON & JOHNSON 
217-S. C. JOHNSON & SON INC. 
218-JOSTENS INC. 
219-KENDAVIES INDUSTRIES INT. INC. 
Mid-Continent Supply Co. 
Stratoflex Inc. 
220-KENDAVIES INDUSTRIES INT. INC. 
Mid-Continent Supply Co. 
Cummins Sales & Services 
221-KENDAVIES INDUSTRIES INT. INC. 
Loffland Brothers Co. -Canada- 
222-KENNECOTT COPPER CORP. 
The Carborundum Co. 
223-KING RANCH INC. 
224-KLNG RANCH INC. 
225-KOPPERS CO. INC. 
226-KORN FERRY INTERNATIONAL 
227-KRAFT INC. 
228-LEVI STRAUSS INC. 
229-ELI LILLI AND CO. 
ELCO Management Corp. 
Ali Lilly S. A. -Switzerland- 
230-LITTON INDUSTRIES INC. 
Litton Business Systems 
231-JONATHAN LOGAN INC. 
J. L. Overseas Develop. Corp. 
232-LUKENS STEEL CO. 
233-MCCORLMICK & CO. INC. 
234-J. RAY MCDERMOTT & CO. INC. 
235-MCGRAW EDISON CO. 
Studebaker Worthington Inc. 
Onan Corporation 
236-MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE INC. 
MAI International Corp. 
237-MARINE MIDLAND BANKS INC. 
Marine Midland Bank 
Marine Midland Int. Cocp. 
Marine Midland Ltd. -U. K. - 
Concretera lock Joint Consolidada C. A. (a) 
Financiera del Centro C. A. (a) 
Cavendes-Financiera S. A. (a) 
Fibras Aislantes S. A. 
Johnson & Johnson de Venezuela S. A. 
S. C. Johnson & Son de Venezuela C. A. 
Jostens S. R. L. 
Stratoflex C. A. 
Cummins Sales & Services de Venezuela C. A. 
Loffland Brothers de Venezuela C. A. 
Carborundum C. A. 
Rio Yaracuy S. A. 
Venezolana de Ganaderia S. A. 
Koppers Construction(Venezuela)S. A. 
Korn'Ferry Int. de Venezuela C. A. 
Alimentos Kraft de Venezuela C. A. 
Levi Strauss de Venezuela C. A. 
Eli Lilly y Cia. de Venezuela S. A. 
Monroe Venezolana C. A. 
Telmartex C. A. 
Lukens Steel de Venezuela S. A. (a) 
McCormick de Venezuela C. A. 
J. Ray McDermott(Venezuela)C. A. 
Productos Electricos Onan Western C. A. 
MAI de Venezuela S. A. 
Financiera Union C. A. (a) 
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238-MARRIOTT CORPORATION 
Marriott Int. Inc. Marriott Venezuela C. A. 
239-OSCAR MAYER & CO. INC. Venezolana Empacadora S. A. 
240-MEDTRONIC INC. Medtronic de Venezuela S. A. 
241-MEMOREX CORP. Memorex Interamericana C. A. 
242-MERCK & CO. INC. 
Calgon Corp. 
243-MERCK & CO. INC. 
Calgon Interamerican C. A. 
Merck Sharp & Dohme-Panamericana Merck Sharp & Dohme de Venezuela C. A. 
244-MERRILL LYNCH INT. INC. 
Merrill Lynch Int. Inc. 
M. Lynch Int. Bank Inc. -Panama- Merrill Lynch, Pierce & Smith Venezuela C. A. 
245-MINNESOTA MINING & MANUFACTURING Empresa Laboratorios Riker Venezuela S. A. 
246-MINNESOTA MINING & MANUFACTURING 3M Manufacturera Venezuela S. A. 
247-MINNESOTA MINING & MANUFACTURING 3M Venezuela C. A. 
248-MOBIL CORPORATION 
Container Corp. of America 
249- Container Corp. of America 
250- Container Corp. of America 
251- Container Corp. Of America 
252- Container Corp. of America 
253- Container Corp. of America 
254- 
255- 
256- 
257-MONSANTO COMPANY 
258-J. P. MORGAN & COMPANY INC. 
M. Guaranty Trust Co. of New Y. 
M. Guaranty Int. Finance Corp. 
259-PHILIP MORRIS INC. 
260-MORTON-NORWICH PRODUCTS INC. 
261-MOTOROLA INC. 
262-NCH CORPORATION 
263-NCR CORPORATION 
264-NL INDUSTRIES INC. 
265-NABISCO INC. 
Nabisco Int. S. A. -Panama- 
266-NALCO CHEMICAL CO. 
267-NATIONAL STARCH & CHEMICAL 
268-NORTON CO. 
Christesen Inc. 
Cartoenvases Valencia S. A. 
Carton de Venezuela S. A. 
Cartones Nacionales S. A. 
Corrugadora de Carton S. A. 
Molinos. de Carton y Papel S. A. 
Union Grafica S. A. 
Propiedades Sucre C. A. 
Socony Paint de Venezuela S. A. 
Servicios Tecnicos Mobil C. A. 
Monsanto Venezuela C. A. 
Financiera Valinvenca S. A. (a) 
Tabacalera Nacional C. A. (a) 
Norwich de Venezuela C. A. 
Motorola Electronica de Venezuela C. A. 
National Chemsearch S. A. (a) 
The National Cash Register of Venez. C. A. 
Baroid de Venezuela S. A. 
Nacional de Galletas Nabisco La Favorita C. A. 
Nalco de Venezuela C. A. 
Adgovenca C. A. (a) 
Christesen Diamond Products de Venezuela C. A. 
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269-OAKITE PRODUCTS INC. 
270-OGILVI & MATHER INT. INC. 
271-OLIN CORPORATION 
272-OWENS ILLINOIS INC. 
273-OWENS ILLINOIS INC. 
274-PPG INDUSTRIES INC. 
275-PAN-AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE 
Panarad Inc. 
276-PANCOASTAL INC. 
277-THE PARKER PEN CO. 
Manpower Inc. 
278-THE PARSONS CORP. 
The Ralph M. Parsons Co. 
279-PENNWALT CORP. 
280-PEPSICO INC. 
281-PEPSICO INC. 
282-PFIZER INC. 
Pfizer Corp. 
283- Pfizer Corp. 
284-PHELPS DODGE CORP. 
285-PHELPS DODGE CORP. 
286-PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO. 
Phillips Investment Co. 
287- Phillips Petroleum Int. Co. 
288-THE PILLSBURY CO. 
289-THE PILLSBURY CO. 
Pillsbury Holding(Canada)Ltd. 
290-PLANNING RESEARCH CORP. 
PLanning Research Corp. Harris 
291-PREMIER INDUSTRIAL CORP. 
292-THE PROCTER & GAMBLE CO. 
293-PUEBLO INTERNATIONAL INC. 
294-THE QUAKER OATS CO. 
295-RCA CORP. 
RCA International Ltd. 
296-RALSTON PURINA CO. 
297-RALSTON PURINA CO. 
298-RALSTON PURINA CO. 
299-RALSTON PURINA CO. 
300-RALSTON PURINA CO. 
Oakite de Venezuela C. A. 
Corporacion Publicitaria Nacional C. A. (a) 
Etoxyl C. A. (a) 
Manufacturera de Vidrios Pianos C. A. 
Owens Illinois de Venezuela C. A. 
Inveca-Pittsburgh C. A. 
Pan-American de Venezuela de Seguros(a) 
Pancoastal Inc. 
Manpower de Venezuela S. A. 
Parsons de Venezuela S. A. (a) 
Penwalt Venezolana C. A. (a) 
Distribuidora de Productos la Vienesa C. A. 
Pasteleria Vienesa C. A. 
Pfizer Bioquimicos S. A. 
Pfizer S. A. 
Alambres y Cables Venezolanos C. A. 
Corporacion Venezolana del Cobre C. A. 
Quimica Venoco C. A. (a) 
Venezolana Int. de Productos Quimicos C. A. 
Milani S. A. 
Molinos Caracas Maracaibo S. A. 
I. DIT Harris C. A. (a) 
Premier de Venezuela C. A. 
Procter & Gamble de Venezuela C. A. 
Panificadora Holsum Venezolana C. A. 
Productos Quaker C. A. 
RCA de Venezuela C. A. 
Avicola Bejuma C. A. 
Avicola Continental C. A. 
Corgan de Venezuela C. A. 
Empacadora Nuticos C. A. 
Purina de Occidente C. A. 
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301-RALSTON PURINA CO. 
302-RALSTON PURINA CO. 
303-RALSTON PURINA CO. 
304-RAYBESTOS MANHATTAN INC. 
Naja Inc. 
305-RAYMOND INTERNATIONAL INC. 
Raymond Int. Builders Inc. 
306- Raymond Int. Builders Inc. 
307- Raymond Int. Builders Inc. 
308- Raymond Int. Builders Inc. 
309- Raymond Int. Builders Inc. 
310-REICHHOLD CHEMICALS INC. 
311-RICHARDSON MERRELL INC. 
312-A. H. ROBINS CO. INC. 
313-ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP. 
314-ST REGIS PAPER CO. 
315-SCHERING PLOUGH CORP. 
Scholl Inc. 
Purina de Venezuela C. A. 
Reproductora Avicola C. A. 
Venezolana de Progenetores de Aves C. A. 
Manufacturas Multiples S. A. (a) 
. 
Concretos Industriales C. A. (a) 
Contratistas del Lago S. A. (a) 
Empresas Raymond C. A. 
Equipos del Lago C. A. (a) 
Raymond-Brown & Root C. A. (a) 
Resimon C. A. (a) 
Laboratorios Richmer C. A. 
Laboratorios Ergos S. A. 
Rockwell Standard de Venezuela C. A. (a) 
Inversiones Ferre C. A. (a) 
Casama S. A. de C. V. Mexico Cacene C. A. 
316- Casama S. A. de C. V. Mexico Calzado Confort C. A. 
317- Casama S. A. de C. V. Mexico Ortopedia Nacional C. A. 
318- Casama S. A. de C. V. Mexico Pedica Venezolana C. A. 
319-SCHERING PLOUGH CORP. 
S. Overseas Ltd. -Bermuda- Productos Farmaceuticos de Venezuela C. A. 
320- S. Overseas Ltd. -Bermuda- Schering de Venezuela S. A. 
321-SCOVILL INC. 
322-G. D. SEARLE & CO. 
323-SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO. 
324-THE SIGNAL COMPANIES INC. 
Mack Trucks Inc. 
Mack T. Worldwide Ltd. -Bermuda- 
325-THE SINGER CO. 
326-THE SINGER CO. 
Singer Int. Securities Co. 
327-SMITH INTERNATIONAL INC. 
328-SMITH INTERNATIONAL INC. 
329-SMITHKLINE CORPORATION 
S. Kline & French Int. Co. 
330-SONOCO PRODUCTS CO. 
331-SONOCO PRODUCTS CO 
332-SOUTHERN NATURAL RESOURCES 
The Offshore Co. 
Eaton C. A. 
Laboratorios Quimicos Nacionales C. A. 
Sears, Roebuck de Venezuela S. A. 
Mack Trucks de Venezuela S. A. (a) 
Friden S. A. 
Impulsora Comercial Singer C. A. 
Smith Int. de Venezuela C. A. 
Smith Brocas C. A. 
Smith Kline & French C. A. 
Sonoco de Venezuela C. A. 
Sonopro C. A. 
Offshore Venezuela C. A. 
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361-UNITED MERCHANTS & MANUFAC. INC. 
362-UNITED MERCHANTS & MANUFAC. INC. 
363-UNITED MERCHANTS & MANUFAC. INC. 
364-U .S . LEASING 
NT. NC . 
365-UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP. 
366-UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP. 
Inmont Corp. 
367-UPJOHN CO. 
Upjohn Co. S. A. -Panama- 
368-VIATECH INC. 
Lockwood, Kessler & Bartlett 
369-WACKENHUT CORP. 
370-WANG LABORATORIES INC. 
J71-WARNER LAMBERT CO. 
372-WARNER LAMBERT CO. 
Parke, Davis & Co. 
373-WARNER LAMBERT CO. 
374-WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP. 
375-WHEELABRATOS-FRYE INC. 
The Rust Engineering Co. 
376-WHITAKER CABLE CORP. 
377-WYNN, 'S INTERNATIONAL INC. 
Wynn Oil Co. 
378-XEROX CORP. 
379--XEROX CORP. 
380-XEROX CORP. 
381-ZAPATA CORP. 
Tiendas Milsaldos C. A. 
Venaseta C. A. 
Venchem C. A. 
Arrendacima C. A. (a) 
Ascensores Otis de Venezuela C. A. 
Inmont de Venezuela C. A. 
Laboratorios Upjohn C. A 
Aeromapas Servenca S. A. (a) 
Venez. de Seguridad y Vigilancia C. A. (a) 
Wang Latin America S. A. 
Cirsa S. A. 
Parke, Davis de Venezuela C. A. 
Schick Interamericana S. A. 
Westinghouse de Venezuela S. A. 
Construcciones Venezolanas Rust C. A. 
Prod. Elect. Phelps Dodge-Whitaker C. A. (a) 
Wynn's de Venezuela S. A. 
Copicentros C. A. 
Inversiones San Simon S. A. 
Xerox de Venezuela C. A. 
Servicios Petroleros Zapata S. A. (a) 
The Distribution of companies by country of origin is as follows: 
Country Number 
1. - United States 380 
2. -United Kingdom 40 
3. -West Germany 27 
4. -Netherlands 24 
5. -Italy 18 
Percentage of total 
65.51 % 
6.90% 
4.67% 
4.15% 
3.10% 
Page-300 
6. -Japan 
7. -France 
8. -Canada 
9. -Sweden 
10. -Belgium 
11. -Switzerland 
12. -Spain 
13. -Denmark 
14. -Australia 
15. -Austria 
16. -Finland 
17 
1j 
14 
13 
11 
7 
S 
1 
1 
1 
2.93% 
2.59% 
2.41% 
2.24% 
1.90% 
1.20% 
1.03% 
0.86% 
0.17% 
0.17% 
0.17% 
Total...... 580 100.00 
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United : dattJlls Int. Class . Stajidard. 
Primary industrial sector; 
Code Activity 
110- ,., rriculture % iiunntiii; 
120- Forestry 
130- Fisuino 
210- Coal aiiiing 
Secondary industrial sector: 
Cude Activity 
311- Food :, Ianufacturing 
313- Beverages 
314- Tobacco 
321- Textiles 
322- Clothing 
323- Leather & leather Prod 
324- Foodwear 
331- Wood & wood products 
332- Furniture & Fixtures 
341- Paper & paper products 
342- Printing, Publisuing 
351- Industrial ctie. nical 
352- Otiier chemical prod. 
353- Oil ref icing 
Annexe Ng ;: 3 
Code Activity 
? 12U- Crude Oil . tiat. bas 
23. )- . Metal ore . niiiiiid 
29k)- vtuer ldiLliii6 
Code Activity 
354- Products of oil & coal 
355- lcubi)er products 
356- Plastic products 
361- Pottery & Earthenware 
362- tllass & glass products 
369- Ce. nent, concrete , as be stos 
371- lroci, steel u ferio-alloys 
372- `uu-ferrous wetals 
331- ., fetal products 
332- . Iacninnery 
333- Llect... tac. iiuery x sup, )l ies 
3S4I- kraiisport eiIuip. aeiit 
335- 3cieutiiic innstruiaeuts. 
39U- Jtuer .. Iaiiufact. lildustr ius 
tertiary ilidubtrial sector: 
Code activity 
410- L"'lect. k, as & S. sut)J)1y 
420- Water works & suNtAy 
500- Construction 
611- Wholesale of cons. boucis 
(312- Wholesale of Yroci. 'uUt15 
613- 'ºY: of (utur vetiic. & Fuel 
614- Cu, aºaission broking 
621- Department stores 
ci22- itetail iiid of foods 
623- ltetziliao of textile u. 
624- ltet. of furniture 
625- itet. uf tiardware etc. 
626- ltet. of iustrumeuts etc. 
ü27- icet. of . aotor veuic. 
629- Otiler retailing 
Code Activity 
U31- Operations iýest.; * Cafes 
632- Operations Motels etc. 
711- Land transport 
712- Water transport 
713- Air transport 
719- Services allied to Trnsp. 
730- Cu, a, auaicatioas 
61O- 1 'iiiancial institutions 
S20- I. isurance 
331- Leal estate 
8316w) - 6uisiiess services 
S33- Lquipmeut rental & leasing 
920- Sanitary sevices 
952- Laundries 
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333-SOUTHERN NATURAL RE&%URCES 
The Offshore Co. 
International Shiping Co. Intesco C. A. 
334-SPERRY RAND CORP. 
335-STANDARD BRANDS INC. 
Sperry Rand Venezuela C. A. 
International Standard B. Inc. Royal Productos Alimenticios C. A. 
S36-STANDARD BRANDS INC. 
De E. de Wed J. van Nelle N. 
Van Nelle Lassie B. V. 
337-STANDARD OIL CO. (INDIANA) 
Amoco Int. Oil Co. 
338-STANDARD OIL CO. (OHIO) 
339-STANLEY HOME PRODUCTS INC. 
340-STANLEY HOME PRODUCTS INC. 
341-THE STANLEY WORKS 
342-SUN CHEMICAL CORP. 
343-SUNBEAM CORPORATION 
Molinos Lassie C. A. 
Amoco Servicios de Venezuela C. A. 
Prospect International C. A. 
Stanhome C. A. 
Stanhome Panameri. cana C. A. 
Stanley Venezolana S. R. L. 
Fuchs & Land-Sun Chemical de Venezuela C. A. 
Sunbeam Holding Inc. Oster de Venezuela S. A. 
344-SYBRON CORP. Taylor Instrument C. A. 
345-TAPPAN CO. Climar C. A. (a) 
346-TECHNICON CORP. Technicon Venezuela S. A. 
347-TENNECO INC. 
Tenneco Corp. 
Kern County Land Co. 
J. I. Case Co. J. I. Case International S. A. 
348-J. WALTER THOMPSON CO. J. Walter Thompson de Venezuela C. A. 
349-TIDEWATER CORP. 
Tidewater Marine Service Inc. Equipo Zulia C. A. 
350- Tidewater Marine Service Inc. Tidewater Caribe C. A. 
351- Tidewater Marine Service Inc. Tidewater Marine Service C. A. 
352-THE TIMES MIRROR CO. 
Graphic Controls Corp. 
353-TOPFLIGHT CORP. 
354-TRANS WORLD CORP. 
Hilton International Co. 
355- Hilton International Co. 
356-TRANSWAY LNT. CORP. 
Tropigas Int. Corp. 
357-WILLIAM UNDERWOOD CO. 
358-UNION CARBIDE CORP. 
359-UNITED MERCHANTS & MANUFAC. INC. 
360-UNITED MERCHANTS & MANUFAC. INC . 
Controles Graficos Venezuela S. A. (CGV) 
Topflight de Venezuela 
Hilton International de Venezuela C. A. 
Inversions Hilton C. A. 
Tropigas C. A. 
Diablitos Ventizolanos C. A. 
Union Carbide de Venezuela C. A. 
Inversiones Aragua C. A. 
Sudantex de Venezuela C. A. 
Page-302 
Annexe 149 29: A Latin-americaii closed system. 
ýý 
Page-303 
GENERALBIBL10GRAPHY 
Ashby, W. Ross 
Alstine, R. W. Van 
Brzezinski, Zbgniew 
Bertalanffy, Ludwig von 
Beer, Stafford 
Baran, Paul & 
Sweezy, Paul 
Boarman, P. and 
Schoolhammer, M. 
-Editors- 
Boorstein, Edward 
"An Introduction to Cybernetics" 
Methuen & Co. Ltd. 
London, 1979 
"The Rising American Empire" 
Thames and Hudson. 
London, 1973 
"Between two Ages" 
The Viking Press. 
New York, 1971 . 
"General System Theory" 
Allen Lane. Penguin Press 
London, 1971 
"Platform for Change" 
John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
London, 1975 
"El Capital Monopolista" 
Siglo Veintiuno-Editores. 
Mexico, 1q66 
Multinational Corporations and 
Government". Prager Publisher 
New York, 1975 
"The Economic Transformation of Cuba" 
Monthly Review Press. 
London, 1968 
Page. 304 
Bufalo, E. & Paredes, E. 
Brooke, M. & Remmers, L. 
Brooke, M. & Remmers, L. 
Cairncross, A. K. 
Chossudovsky, Michel 
Date, C. J. 
Elstob, C. Mike 
Fleming, D. F. 
Franck, T. & 
WeiSband. E. 
"El Pensamiento Critico Latinoamericano" 
Ediciones Nueva Sociologia. 
Caracas, 1978 
"The Strategy of Multinational 
Enterprise, Organisation and Finance" 
Longman Group Ltd. London, 1970 
"The International Firm" 
Pitman Publishing Ltd 
London, 1977 
"Home and Foreign Investment 1870-1918" 
The Harvester Press Ltd. 
Sussex. England, 1975 
"La Miseria en Venezuela" 
Vadell Hermanos. 
Venezuela. Valencia, 1977 
"An Introdifction to Database Systems" 
Addison-wesley Publishing Co. 
London, 1977. 
II Information Meaning & Knowledge" 
Brunel University. Cybernetics 
Department. London, 1981 
"The Cold War and its Origins 1917-1960" 
Allen and Unwin. 
London, 1961 
"Secrecy and Foreign Policy" 
Oxford University Press. 
London, 1974 
Page. 305 
Furtado, Celso 
Galbraith, John K. 
"Economic Development of Latin America" 
Cambridge University Press. 
London, 1970 
"The New Industrial State" 
Penguin Books Ltd. 
London, 1979 
Galeano, Eduardo "Open Veins of Latin America, Five 
Centuries of the Pillage of a Con- 
tinent". Monthly Review Press. 
London, 1974 
George, Frank H. "The Brain as a Computer" 
Pergamon Press Ltd. 
London, 1971 
Guillaumaud, Jacques "Cibernetica y Logica Dialectical'. 
Titulo original: Cybernetique et 
materialisme dialectique. Traduccion 
M. Suarez. Edit. Castilla. Madrid, 1971 
Gunder Frank, Andre 
Gunder Frank, Andre 
"Latin America: Underdevelopment or 
Revolution". Monthly Review Press. 
London, 1974 
"Capitalism and Underdeveloment in 
Latin America". Monthly Review Press 
London, 1969 
Goldman, Marshall I. "The Enigma of Soviet Petroleum" 
George Allen & Unwin. 
London, 1980 
Hacker, Louis "The Course of American Economic 
Growth and Development". John Wiley 
and Sons, Inc. London, 1970 
Page .. 306 
Huberman, Leo 
Jenkins, Robin 
Jones, Peter 
Jones, Graham 
Kennet, Mayland 
Kissinger, Henry A 
Krauss, L. & 
MacGaham, A. 
Kranzburg, M. & 
Pursell, C. 
Khalaf, Nadim 
"Man's Worldly Goods" 
Monthly Review. 
New York, 1952 
"Exploitation, The World power struc- 
ture and the inequality of nations" 
McGibbon & Kee Ltd. London, 1970 
"An Economic History of the United 
States since 1783". Routledge & 
Kegan Paul. London, 1964 
"The Role of Science & Technology in 
Developing Countries". Oxford 
University Press. London, 1971 
"Sovereignty & Multinational Companies" 
Prager Publisher 
New York. USA, 1975 
"Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy" 
Harper & Bros. 
New York, 1957 
"Computer Fraud and Countermeasures" 
Prentice Hall, Inc. 
New Jersey, USA, 1979 
"Technology in Western Civilization" 
Oxford University Press 
London, 1967 
"Economic Implications of the Size 
of Nations". 
E. J. Brill, Leiden, Netherlands, 1971 
Page. 307 
Lange Oskar 
Levcik, F. & 
Stankovsky, J. 
Levi, Werner 
Myrdal, Alva 
"Introduccion a la Economia Cibernetica" 
Siölo Veintiuno Editores. 
Mexico, 19b9 
"Industrial Cooperation between East 
& West". Translated by Michael Vale 
MacMillan. London, 1979 
"International Politics Foundations 
of the System". University of Minne- 
sota Press. Minneapolis. USA. 1974 
"The Game of Disarmament" 
Pantheon Books. 
New York. USA. 1978 
Mandelbaum, Michael "The Nuclear Question, The United 
States & Nuclear Weapons 1946-1976" 
Cambridge University Press. 
London, 1979 
Martin, A& "An Introduction to Radiation 
Harbison, S. Protection". Chapman and Hall Ltd. 
London, 1979 
Manescu, Manea 
Marina, Manut-1 
"Economic Cybernetics" 
Abacus Press 
London, 1980 
"La Dependencia Tecnologica en los 
Sistemas de Computacion". ÜCV. Facul- 
tad de Economia. Trabajo de Ascenso 
en el escalafon docente. Caracas, 1973 
Marx, Karl "Capital", A critique of political 
economy. Lawrence & Wishart. London, 1977 
Page. 308 
Maza Zavala, D. F. 
Moray, Neville 
"Los Mecanismos de la Dependencia" 
Fondo Editorial Salvador de la Plaza 
Caracas, 1973 
"Cibernetica"Titulo original: Cybernetics 
Traduccion T. Mendizabal. Editorial 
Herder S. A. Barcelona. Espana, 1967 
Novik, I. & "Cibernetica Ciencia y Practical' 
Kasakovsev, V. Traduccion: D. Reuter Krull. 
Editorial Lotauro. Argentina, 1967 
Nora, Simon & "L'informatisation de la societe. 
Minc, Alain La Documentation francaise. 
Paris, 1978 
Pask, Gordon "An Approach to Cybernetics" 
Hutchinson. London, 1961 
Parker, Phyllis R. 
Pividal, Francisco 
Popkess, Barry 
Roche, Marcel 
"Brazil and the quiet intervention" 
American University Publishers Group 
Ltd. London, 1979 
"Bolivar Pensamiento Precursor del 
Ant imperialismo". Ediciones Casa de 
las Americas. La Habana. 1977 
"The Nuclear Survival Hand-book" 
Living through and after a nuclear 
attack. Arrow Ltd. London, 1980 
"Descubriendo a Prometeo", Ensayos 
sobre Ciencia y Tecnologia en Vene- 
zuela y Latinoamerica. Monte Avila 
Editores. Caracas, 1975 
Pabe. 309 
Rostow, Walt W. "The World Economy", History and 
Prospect. The MacMillan Press. 
London, 1978 
Sabolo, Y& "The Impact of Transnational 
Trajtemberg, R. Enterprises on Employment in Developing 
Countries" R. Newfarmer. Geneva, 1976 
Sampson, Anthony "The Arms Bazaar", The Companies, The 
Dealers, The Bribes,: From Vickers to 
Lockheed. Hodder and Stoughton. 
London, 1977 
Sampson, Anthony 
Sampson, Anthony 
"The Sovereign State, the Secret 
History of ITT". Coronet Books. 
London, 1976 
"The Seven Sister' 
Coronet Books 
London, 1977 
Shoup, L. & "Imperial Brain Trust" 
Minter, W. Monthly Review Press. 
Londo, 1977 
Selser, Gregorio "Diplomacia, Garrote y Dolares en 
America Latina". Editorial Palestra. 
Buenos Aires, 1962 
Solla Price, D. J. de "The structures of publication in 
science and technology". In Factors 
in the Transfer of Technology. Edited 
by Gruber, W. & Marquis D. MIT Press. 
USA, 1969 
Page. 310 
Spiro, Herbert J. "World Politics; The Global System" 
The Dorsey Press. Illinois, USA, 1966 
Sutton, Anthony "Western Technology and Soviet Econo- 
mic Development". Hoover Institutions 
Publications 1971. Stanford University 
Stanford, California, USA, 1971 
Sutton, Anthony "Energy the Created Crisis". Books 
in Focus Inc. New York. USA, 1979 
Texas Instruments "Understanding Digital Electronics" 
Book with a foreword by Jack Kilby, 
and developed and published by Texas 
Instruments Learning Centre. Texas 1978 
The Economist "World Outlook 1981. 
Intelligent Unit. The E. I. U. London, February 1981 
The Economist I. u. "Soviet Oil Gas to 1990" 
The E. I. U. Lonäon, 1980 
Thompson, E. P. 
United Nations 
"Protest and Survive" 
Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation 
Russell Press Ltd. 
Nottingham, England, 1980 
"Transnational. Corporations in World 
Development". Commission on Trans- 
national Corporations. 
New York, USA, May 1978 
Vernon, Raymond "Sovereignty at Bay, The multinational 
spread of U. S. enterprises" 
Longman Group Ltd. 
London, 1971 
Page. 311 
Vaitsos, Constantine 
Wiener, Norbert 
Wolf, Eric 
Young-, John F. 
"The Process of Comercialization 
of Technology in the Andean Pact". 
Oxford Clarendon Press. 
London, 1974 
"Cybernetics: or Control and 
Communication in the-Animal and 
the Machine". Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. USA, 1948 
"The Spanish in Mexico and Central 
America". Included in Economic 
Development and Social Change. The 
Natural History Press. New York, 1971 
"La Cibernetica"Titulo original: 
Cybernetics. Traduccion Nestor Miguez. 
Monte Avila Editores. Caracas, 1969 
